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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
1.1 Search, Innovation and Growth 
Technological change is considered a driving force of long-term economic 
growth and societal progress. Advancements in several domains have 
contributed to the outward shift of the production-possibility frontier paving 
the way to economic development. In particular, technological change occurs 
when new or improved technologies are introduced into the existing repertoire 
of knowledge. The polymerase chain reaction, for example, is considered an 
indispensable technique useful for the diagnosis of genetic diseases and for the 
study of specific segments of DNA. The laser, another key achievement of the 
twentieth century, has been defined as an ubiquitous invention given its wide 
application in scientific and industrial development (eye surgery, fiber-optic 
communication, bar code readers, cancer treatment to mention few). In health 
care, biopharmaceutical drugs - using biological rather than chemical 
synthesis- are increasingly improving treatment in a range of diagnostic areas. 
Other famous inventions like the personal computer, GPS, blockchain 
algorithms, MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses), autonomous cars, 
defibrillators, Google’s Page Rank algorithm, and the 3D printer illustrate how 
drastic improvements in technology can open up new markets, inspire a range 
of applications and, in doing so, increase both social and economic welfare.  
Given the importance of technological change, scholars have focused on 
the understanding of the locus and mechanisms of the inventive process. 
Arthur (2007) notes that a novel technology, like those mentioned above, 
"seems to materialize out of nothing, but it emerges always from a cumulation 
of previous components and functionality already in place" (p. 284). In a 
similar vein, other scholar have identified the recombination of existing or of 
new technologies as the "fil rouge" in the development of inventions 
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(Schumpeter, 1934; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Fleming 
& Sorenson, 2004; Fagerberg, 2005; Nerkar, 2003). For example, the 
polymerase chain reaction combines knowledge from computer science with 
techniques from chemical engineering, whereas the laser combines 
fundamentals from physic and optics. 
The recombination of knowledge is not a random nor an automatic 
practice. Indeed, it requires extensive search over existing knowledge and 
technologies that will be recombined for solving existing problems, satisfying 
or discovering new economic opportunities. Hence, understanding how 
economic actors orchestrate technological search is crucial in order to explain 
how technological development unfolds.  
1.2 The Search Debate 
The concept of search underlying the inventive process has attracted the 
attention of several scholars in the attempt to characterize its main aspects. 
While conventional wisdom conceived search and discovery as a sequential 
and linear process, recent approaches recognize that the search process is 
characterized by an intrinsic complexity that increases with the bits of 
knowledge that is searched and recombined. To solve the complexity, 
inventors adopt a recursive approach using feedback loops and a continuous 
refinement of their mental schemes (Magitti et al., 2013; Arthur, 2007). This 
process, generally triggered by problem-solving and opportunity seeking, stops 
when a satisfactory result has been achieved (Greve & Taylor, 2000).    
Theoretical contributions have conceptualized the search process using a 
spatial metaphor distinguishing between local versus distant - or ‘boundary-
spanning’ - search (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Local 
search relates to the search in the neighborhood of the existing organizational 
knowledge base (Stuart & Podolny, 1996) whereas boundary-spanning refers 
to search into distant, unfamiliar knowledge domains and away from existing 
organizational routines (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). In their empirical work, Katila 
and Ahuja (2002) distinguish between search depth (the extent to which firms 
reuse their existing knowledge) and scope (the extent to which the firm 
explores new knowledge). The greater the depth of search, the greater tend to 
be firm's knowledge and competences in that field.  
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Studies based on the behavioral and evolutionary theory of the firm have 
concluded that firms show a strong tendency to limit their search to familiar 
domains guided by past routines, experience and practice (March, 1963; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982). Helfat (1994) uncovered this pattern in the petroleum 
industry where firms tend to persist in their R&D activities Along this line, 
Pavitt (1988) highlighted that "firms seek to improve and to diversify their 
technology by searching in zones that enable them to use and to build upon 
their existing technological base" (Pavitt, 1988, p.130). The repeated search 
among local domains of knowledge hinder shift in technological paradigms 
and the combination of ideas from disparate domains. In this regard, Dosi 
(1982) posited that technological progress often advances along an established 
trajectory guided by existing paradigms.  
The strong tendency towards local search can be explained by two main 
reasons. First, individuals have limited cognitive abilities, they are unable to 
process every possible solutions to a problem. Hence, they can only aim for a 
satisfactory rather than an optimal outcome. This generates bounded rational 
behavior pushing firms or inventors to search in the neighborhood of their 
existing expertise where it is easier to deduce clearer conclusions (Cyert & 
March, 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Simon, 1982). Second, search in familiar 
areas facilitates a deeper and faster learning of the cause-effects of a 
phenomenon or problem (Cohen & Levinthal., 1990). Hence, local search is 
efficient because the costs of selecting and processing familiar information are 
lower (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003).  
Searching only in local domains can have important negative 
repercussions. It generates inertia, myopic behavior, fewer opportunities for 
knowledge recombination and difficulties in dealing with new problems 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 
2001; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). A deep focus on local search leads to 
cognitive biases and search traps. Firms that search locally tend to overlook 
possible solutions that are in distant knowledge domains. Another limitation 
related to a high reliance on local search is the inability to exploit potential 
markets. For instance, in 1974 Du Pont developed the aramid fiber called 
Klevar used today in a variety of clothing and accessories (e.g. body armor) 
that exploit its robustness. However,  since Du Pont’s strategy was to leverage 
its competences in the tires market, it was only in 1987, after many failures, 
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that Du Pont decided to enter other markets that were more responsive to this 
new product (Christensen, 1998).  
In order to mitigate the disadvantages of local search, March (1991) has 
advocated the need to find a balance between the two search strategies. Recent 
contributions have started to question the prominence of local search strategies 
by investigating the role of boundary-spanning as a way to introduce variety 
into firms’ routines. (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; 
Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; He & Wong, 2004). These studies stress that 
external collaborations, diversified teams, in-licensing, alliances or staff 
mobility may solve the problems linked to local search. This stream of 
literature recognizes the importance of external, diverse and complementary 
knowledge in facilitating the recombination of knowledge and technologies.  
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation 
1.3.1 Setting the stage - the dissertation at a glance 
This dissertation has two main objectives. The first is to extend the 
understanding of how the external environment shapes the search process. The 
trade-off between local and distant search is not only determined by 
organizational factors. Environmental conditions may affect the type of search 
performed by firms. The second, is to provide insights about the trade-off 
between local and distant search. While existing literature has widely 
discussed the fundamentals of search, our knowledge about the role of external 
contingencies on the direction and intensity of the search process remain 
limited. For instance, March (1991) posits that in tight competitive situations it 
is exploration that, although entailing a higher risk, leads to significant 
improvements. Katila and Chen (2009) focus on the role of competition in the 
search process of robotics firms and show that firms that search ahead of 
competitors introduce more innovative products. Leten et al., (2016) analyze 
firms' choices to enter into new technology domains - which can be conceived 
as firms' efforts towards distant search. They argue that in this choice firms are 
driven not only by firm-level factors but also environmental characteristics, in 
particular the potential for new technological opportunities. They also stress 
that in order to exploit technological opportunities in the new domain, firms 
require related technological expertise.  
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Other external pressures may shape the search process, for example a 
decrease in profits, slack resources or contraction in economic growth. Hence, 
it is important to understand the influence of external environment on the 
direction and intensity of search process. Another important aspect is the 
difference in performances and value linked to diverse search processes.  
1.3.2 Across the chapters 
This dissertation consists of three studies. Based on the foundation of search, 
the study presented in Chapter 2 explores the search and knowledge 
recombination process underlying inventions. The search for new 
combinatorial possibilities usually occurs in the proximity of existing 
competences through local search. This process is characterized by lower 
levels of risks and uncertainty as it builds on extant competences, past failures 
and previous successful solutions (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1978). 
However, connecting pieces of knowledge and ideas that are already highly 
related hinder the possibilities of exploring new trajectories and producing 
impactful inventions (Perkins, 1995). Although inventions resulting from local 
search are essential for increasing technological performance (Baumol, 2002), 
distant search aiming for novel or breakthrough innovations prevent core-
rigidities with positive impacts on performance and economic growth (March, 
1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Dosi, 1982). Distant search entails the 
exploration of new and unfamiliar technological domains, with larger 
possibilities to extend the range of combinatorial alternatives (Katila & Ahuja, 
2002). The ultimate result of this process is that inventions are more likely to 
include new or original coupling relationships characterized by higher level of 
novelty (Levinthal & March, 1993; Simonton, 1999; Schilling, 2005, Katila & 
Chen, 2009). On the other hand, compared to local, distant search is a costly 
activity, associated with higher levels of uncertainty and failures, as it requires 
more effort in the selection and integration of relevant knowledge (Fleming, 
2001).  
The chapter proposes a measure of the extent to which knowledge is 
combined within inventions in an unconventional or atypical way. It focuses 
on the proximity among the knowledge components recombined in inventions. 
Rather than looking at backward citations, as other measures have done, we 
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examine patent class membership and the joint occurrences of subclasses 
combination in the entire technological space. 
The analysis uncovers that a large fraction of patents is based on 
conventional knowledge recombination resulting from local search. Inventions 
that build on more novel combinations are rare but more cited. The analysis is 
further enriched by a comparison with existing measures of novelty in 
knowledge recombination. Results show that the measure presented in this 
study is only weakly correlated with existing measures suggesting that they 
capture different dimensions of knowledge recombination. This chapter 
contributes to the stream of literature on recombinant invention by 
emphasizing the role of distance in the recombination process. Compare to 
measure based on the first instance of a combination, the unconventionality 
measure allows to consider also those inventions that are in the continuum 
between extremely unconventional and conventional inventions.   
The study presented in Chapter 3 investigates the impact of the business 
cycle on firms' search strategies using the measure built in Chapter 2. The 
scholarly debate on the relationships between economic crises, business cycles 
and innovation has mainly dealt with the impact of recessions on the input side 
of innovation (R&D) suggesting a pro-cyclical response to recessions 
(Filippetti & Archibugi, 2011). More recently, the discussion has been partially 
extended to the analysis of the output side (Hud & Hussinger 2015; Cincera et 
al., 2010; Ouyang, 2011; Berchicci et al., 2013; Fabrizio & Tsolomon 2014).  
Theoretical contributions have advanced two opposing arguments, one 
suggesting pro-cyclicality (Barlevy, 2007; Ouyang, 2011) and the other 
predicting counter-cyclicality trends in innovation activities (Aghion & Saint-
Paul, 1998, Aghion et al., 2012). The first line of argument, focusing on the 
relevance of financial constraints, states that economic downturns are 
associated with reduced profitability on existing products, forcing firms to cut 
back on expenses, including R&D, and to postpone the introduction of 
innovations (Campello et al., 2010). The second line of argument, claims that 
firms will react to the reduced profitability on existing products by investing in 
new projects due to lower opportunity costs (Berchicci et al., 2013). The extant 
empirical evidence indicates that both R&D investments and innovative 
outputs are pro-cyclical.  
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Tighter economic conditions not only affect the propensity of firms to 
invest in R&D, but are also expected to shape the type of inventions that are 
generated. Chapter 2 contributes by exploring the relationship between the 
nature of the inventive process and the business cycle. Results suggest that 
contractive phases of the cycle are associated with more conventional 
recombination signaling local search strategies, i.e. knowledge recombination 
processes that, by combining familiar components, generate inventions 
characterized by lower level of novelty. Firms respond asymmetrically to 
expansions and contractive phases showing overall a pro-cyclical trend both at 
the intensive (a decrease in the degree of unconventionality of patents) and at 
the extensive margins (an overall decline in number of patents). This process is 
not uniform across the entire technological portfolio of firms, but it is 
concentrated in firms’ core technologies. Moreover, only financially 
constrained firms retrench from explorative activities, indicating that the 
mechanism behind the result acts through a decrease in financial resources. 
These findings contribute to the innovation literature, enriching it with a 
discussion on how search and the resulting innovation output vary along the 
business cycle. 
The study in Chapter 4 examines when and to what extent pharmaceutical 
firms learn from prior failures in their subsequent drug development efforts. 
Innovation has been conceptualized as a cumulative process (Scotchmer, 2004) 
where organizations build on their previous knowledge and experience. The 
experimental nature inherent to innovation implies high risk and uncertain 
outcomes. The pharmaceutical industry represents a typical example of an 
innovation setting where organizations face high failure rates and extensive 
development costs. Chapter 4 examines the extent to which current drug 
development projects benefit from experience with previous - successful or 
failed – related drug development efforts: not only firms’ own experience, but 
also rival firms’ experience as a relevant environmental influence. Related 
prior drug development efforts are prior projects of which the underlying 
patent is cited by the patent that is exploited in the current drug development 
project. Benefiting from comprehensive and detailed information on 
pharmaceutical firms’ global drug activities, we find that projects that build on 
firms’ previous successful projects have a higher likelihood to generate 
marketable drugs, while building on prior failures reduces this likelihood. A 
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similar pattern, though weaker in magnitude, is observed for drug development 
projects building on prior projects of other firms through vicarious learning. 
This study also show that local search, measured as drug development in 
existing or related ATC classes, can increase the likelihood of drug 
development success The study contributes to the debate on organizational 
learning by providing a more nuanced view on the role of failure and success 
for future performance in the drug development process.  
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Chapter 2 
(Un)conventional 
Combinations: at the Origins 
of Breakthrough Inventions* 
¿Qué, quieren una originalidad absoluta? No existe. 
 Ni en el arte ni en nada. Todo se construye sobre lo anterior... 
Ernesto Sabato (1963), El escritor y sus fantasma p.26 
2.1 Introduction 
Technical change has been unanimously recognized to be the main engine of 
long-term economic growth (Schumpeter, 1939). Some inventions like the 
laser or the turbojet engine are unshakably mentioned amongst the most 
fundamental achievements of human kind and responsible for shifts in 
technological paradigms (Arthur, 2007; Dosi, 1982). These inventions are 
customarily addressed as breakthrough or radical as they overcome existing 
bottlenecks in technological development and pave the way for new 
technological advancements. Studies on the origins of radical innovations have 
long debated on whether radical innovations originate from completely new 
knowledge or from the combinations of already existing knowledge 
(Rosemberg, 1982, Schumpeter, 1939; Weitzman, 1998). Much of the 
academic literature builds on seminal works by Schumpeter (1939) who 
emphasizes the role of combining existing components in a new way or 
                                                          
✴ This chapter is based on a working paper joint with Antonio della Malva (KU Leuven) and 
Massimo Riccaboni (IMT Lucca / KU Leuven). We thank Ludovic DiBiaggio, Gino Cattani, Jian 
Wang and participants of the KTO Workshop (Sophia Antipolis June 2013) for useful comments 
on previous versions. The current version has benefitted from informal discussion with department 
members at MSI-KU Leuven and LIME-IMT Lucca. Timon Gaertner provided useful research 
assistance. 
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developing new combinations. Hargadon (2004) stresses that many key 
technologies like the light bulb result from bridging disconnected but pre-
existing components. A common assumption made in the literature is that the 
impact of inventions is a function of the newness of knowledge combination 
generated during the inventive process. By looking at the inventive process as 
one of search and recombination of existing ideas (Fleming, 2001; Kaplan & 
Vakili, 2015; Magitti, 2013), newness is determined by those inventive acts 
that embed unfamiliar, unconventional or atypical combinations (Simonton, 
1999). As the search process is usually local, the extent to which combinations 
are unconventional or atypical is in turn a function of the distance in the 
technological space.  
In this study we draw on the literature on recombinant search and 
conceptualize the origins of novelty in the inventive process as a function of 
the proximity of the elements constituting the invention (Stuart & Podolny, 
1996). Drawing on the literature on product market diversification, we adapt 
the measure of relatedness in product space to account for the distance 
between each element combined in the invention. The measure proposed in 
this chapter - "Unconventionality"- is population based and, similarly to the 
concept of technological regime, reflects the current understanding of the 
relational structure of the components in the knowledge space (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982).  
To assess the novelty of inventions, the Unconventionality measure 
presented in this chapter focuses on the proximity among the knowledge 
components recombined in inventions. Rather than looking at backward 
citations as other measures have done (Trajtenberg et al., 1997; Keijl et al., 
2016), we examine patent class membership and the joint occurrences of 
subclasses combination in the entire technological space. In so doing, the 
unconventionality indicator also differentiate itself from other measures based 
on first instances of combinations (Verhoeven et al., 2016; Fleming, 2001). 
The focus of this study is on the underlying dimension of the recombinant 
process responsible for the extraordinary impact of some inventions, i.e. 
unconventional combinations. Moreover, the unconventionality measure offers 
an overview over the search and recombinant process exploring all 
combinatorial possibilities in the technological landscape. The framework 
upon which this measure builds, shares strong similarities with the exploration 
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- exploitation concept (March, 1991). This notion defines exploration (or 
exploitation) relative to the organizational or the inventor existing domain of 
knowledge Unconventionality measure instead takes a broader perspective by 
considering the entire technological landscape. We enrich our analysis by 
comparing the Unconventionality measure to existing measures based on 
backward citations, in particular the originality measure pioneered by 
Trajtenberg et al., (1997), and related measures building on technological 
classes by Verhoeven et al., (2016), Fleming and Sorenson (2001). 
Results reported in Section 2.4, show that most combinations are indeed 
conventional as they occur between elements that are related and that have 
been similarly combined in the past. Only a handful of combinations bring 
together components that are substantially far apart. This result is in line with a 
view of unconventionality as a result of wide search, which spans technical 
domains to incorporate principles and solutions from other realms. These 
unconventional recombinant efforts come about in very few inventive acts but 
show a significant and positive association with technological impact captured 
by the number of forward citations received by the invention. 
In our analysis we also consider the role of team on the search process. 
Experienced teams are mostly responsible for unconventional combinations in 
the inventive process, whereas lonely inventors are at disadvantage. Large 
teams are instead negatively associated with Unconventionality while large 
organizations produce more unconventional combinations.  
From a theoretical standpoint, the results are in line with the body of work 
on the theory of invention and creativity in general, which posit that agents 
mostly work in the neighborhood of their competences.  
This work belongs to a recent stream of research that inquires the origins of 
breakthrough inventions and scientific discoveries by means of large scale 
databases (i.e. Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Arts & Veugelers, 2013; Dahlin & 
Beherens, 2005; Fleming et al., 2007; Kelley et al., 2013; Schilling & Greene, 
2011; Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010; Uzzi et al., 2013; Verhoeven et al., 
2016). However, most of the studies listed above trace the origins of radical 
innovation on the base of citations to existing technologies. Measures based on 
backward citations (Dahlin & Berhens, 2005; Uzzi et al., 2013) however, may 
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be sensitive to strategic decisions (Uzzi et al., 2013) and to changes in the 
composition of the patent universe. 
From a methodological point of view, we are among the first to propose a 
measure that take into account the proximity aspect in the recombinant process 
by considering the technological classes recombined in inventions. With the 
exceptions of Fleming (2001), Dahlin and Behrens (2005), and Verhoeven et 
al., (2016), most of the empirical studies on the origins of high-impact 
inventions have assumed that the ultimate source of technological impact had 
to be found in the generation of unconventional combinations (Ahuja & 
Lampert, 2001; Fleming & Singh, 2011; Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010; 
Kelly et al., 2013). Yet, these studies made no effort to operazionalize this 
concept. Other attempts have focused on the very first instance of a 
combinatorial occurrence and have mostly considered backward citations (i.e. 
Fleming et al., 2007; Operti & Carnabuci, 2013; Verhoeven et al., 2016). Such 
approaches operationalize novelty in absolute terms, neglecting the cumulative 
nature of the inventive process. We claim that novelty is often distributed 
across early attempts but not necessarily constrained to the very first one. In 
addition, these studies do not take into account that combinations that have not 
been occurring for a longer time, my emerge again after a long period of non-
occurrence (Verhoeven et al., 2016). The approach based on first instances is 
plagued by a problem of incompleteness, which Unconventionality measure 
tries to overcome. To identify absolute novelty, a complete knowledge of all 
human inventions and the exact time at which they came into existence is 
needed. Unconventionality is instead a population based measure and reflects 
the state of relationships among the elements of the knowledge space at a 
given point in time in relation to the wider technological landscape.  
Section 2.2 discusses the literature on the origins of radical inventions and 
the characteristics of the search process (Section 2.2.1) useful for identifying 
the antecedents of unconventionality (Section 2.2.2). To construct the 
Unconventionality measure, we take advantage of the patent dataset at the 
USPTO (Lai et al., 2014) using patent data and their technological classes over 
more than two decades – i.e. between 1975 and 2000 (Section 2.3). Results are 
discussed in Section 2.4 while section 2.5 closes the chapter with the 
concluding remarks. 
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2.2 Measuring  unconventionality: Theoretical 
consideration 
2.2.1 Locus of Search in the Recombination Process 
Scholars have identified several different forms characterizing the process 
through which new knowledge is created: combination of new components, 
new recombinations of existing components, or reconfiguration of existing 
combinations
1
 (Schumpeter 1939, Nelson & Winter 1982, Weitzman 1998, 
Henderson & Clark 1990, Fleming & Sorenson, 2001). Therefore, knowledge 
is generated by integrating new components within an established framework 
or by modifying the existing framework to accommodate new configurations 
(Schilling & Phelps, 2007).  
Knowledge generation initiates with the search of knowledge components 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Rosenkopf & Neckar, 2001). The set of 
combinable components comprises all bits of knowledge which are potentially 
available: existing components, previously untried components, or new 
components.
2
 Inventors are expected to operate with an extraordinary large 
number of possible components and possibly an infinite number of 
combinations: the search process exponentially increases the number of 
possible combinations with which individuals should deal. To ease the search 
process, subjects are used either to take into account familiar components 
which are locally available for new combinations, or to implement earlier 
utilized combinations. The choice of the components is therefore usually based 
on their availability, proximity, and saliency according to the inventor’s aims 
and mental schemas (Fleming 2001; Mugatti et al., 2013). Inventors usually 
search in the vicinity of their competences (Dosi, 1988; Stuart & Podolny, 
1996). They rely on existing and certain solutions, whose past use has been 
proved successful to their purpose (Cyert & March, 1992). The type of 
                                                          
1 The reconfiguration of existing components refer to architectural innovation like for example in 
the case of the aircraft industry as discussed by Henderson & Clark, 1990). 
2 Jung and Lee (2013) report different definitions of the components involved in the recombinant 
process employed in the literature. Components are considered as “conceptual or physical 
materials”, such as routines or technologies (Nelson & Winter, 1982); “old knowledge,” such as 
existing cultivated plant varieties (Weitzman, 1998); pre-existing “elements,” such as materials in 
periodic tables, and “conditions,” such as temperature and pressure (Romer, 1994); and 
“constituents of invention,” such as Schumpeterian “factors” (Schumpeter, 1939; Fleming, 2001).  
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recombinant effort that results from local searches is characterized by high 
search depth (Katila & Ahuja, 2002), as it is geared towards increasing the 
understanding of a limited set of relationships among the components. The 
exploration of local and familiar domains of knowledge is likely to deliver 
incremental solutions as the combinatorial possibilities can quickly exhaust 
(Fleming, 2001). Inventors therefore reproduce or incrementally alter existing 
combinations, preserving the actual framework of relations among 
components. As relationships are scrutinized and challenged, the framework in 
which they are established is reinforced. Agents thus develop expectations on 
the nature of the relationships among the components forming the knowledge 
space and tend to constrain themselves to search within the existing boundaries 
of extant problems (Finke, 1995 as in Schilling & Greene, 2011). The patterns 
of association of the components therefore reflect conventions and common 
understanding of the possible interdependencies.  
The continuous exploitation of local reservoirs of knowledge can lead to 
inventive traps, where inventors find themselves trapped in inefficient local 
optima. Extending the breadth of the knowledge base from which components 
are sourced is expected to bring outcomes with higher degree of novelty and 
originality (Levinthal & March, 1993; Fleming, 2001). The number of possible 
combinations used in an invention increases with the set of elements that are 
available to the inventor in the generative phase. Furthermore, the broader the 
search scope, the more likely are inventors to combine components which 
stand far apart from each other in the technological space.
3
 From a cognitive 
standpoint, being exposed to a variety of sources may lead agents to analyze 
and re-conceptualize the same problem from different angles, facilitating the 
integration of new knowledge into an existing interpretative framework (see 
Schilling and Greene, 2011, for an overview). The inclusion of novel elements 
in established interpretative frameworks challenges the existing cognitive 
structures and lead to the generation of novel and overlooked combinations 
                                                          
3 The psychological literature has also stressed that newer, and thus more creative, combinations 
are those which are apparently not related among each other. Simonton (1999) pointed out that 
many of the most famous scientific breakthroughs occurred through a free associative process 
(what Freudians might call “primary process thinking”). Agents generate many unusual 
combinations between different bodies of knowledge that set to a screening process of selective 
retention, keeping only the best variations (much like Darwinian evolution). 
15 
 
(Fleming, 2001; Simonton, 1999). Combinations that relate components that 
are rarely, if at all used together, are therefore unconventional.  
Our measure of unconventionality has strong conceptual similarities with 
the tension described by Levinthal and March (1993) between distant search, 
leading toward exploration, and local search, pointing to exploitation. 
However, the main distinction relies in the perspective that is adopted. While 
most of the studies on technological recombination discuss the tension 
between exploration and exploitation in relation to the organizations and 
inventors' existing knowledge domains, we adopt a broader perspective by 
considering the recombination process over the entire technological landscape. 
The Unconventionality measure presented in this study is population-
based
4
, in the sense that it reflects the actual state of relationships between 
elements of the knowledge space at a given point in time. This measure builds 
around the “principle of survival” as the actual configuration of 
interdependences among components is the result of successful attempts. 
Consequently weak or nonexistent links represent overlooked connections or 
failed trials. This feature enables to delineate the actual boundaries of the 
conceptual space and consequently any act of modifying sensibly the latter at 
any time.  
2.2.2 Sources of Unconventionality 
A growing empirical literature has analyzed high impact, breakthrough or 
radical inventions, detailing several determinants for their impact (i.e. Fleming, 
2001; Kelley et al., 2013; Schilling & Greene, 2011; Schoenmakers & 
Duysters, 2010 among others). These studies speculate on the role of novelty 
in the determination of highly impactful inventions advancing arguments that 
mostly pertain to the sources of novelty (or unconventionality as we define it). 
One of the most discussed aspect is whether unconventionality is the 
outcome of the recombination of existing knowledge or whether relies on 
completely new solutions. A stream of literature has argued that novelty in the 
knowledge base used for the generation of inventions relies on completely new 
                                                          
4 In the derivation of the measure we consider the entire universe of patents. Patents with only one 
USPC are included in the derivation of the measure but are excluded in the analysis as we are 
interested in the process of recombination of components within the invention.  
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technical knowledge, hence not yet embedded in existing inventions (van de 
Poel, 2003). A second stream of research points to the role of existing 
components, and their recombination (Schumpeter, 1939; Arthur, 2007; 
Fleming, 2001). Under the first view, novelty is carried forward by little if not 
existent references to previous inventive efforts (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). 
However, Unconventional combinations might find their rationale in a broad 
scientific realm (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005). The second perspective instead 
posits that the knowledge base from which unconventional recombinations are 
sourced is broadly distributed. Despite being a repository of knowledge with 
potential technological implications (not yet exploited), Science works as a 
map of the technological space, allowing inventors to move within the latter 
with greater foresight (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). By elaborating and testing 
theories of general validity, Science helps predict the outcome of scarcely 
tested combinations, guiding inventors in their search beyond the existing 
cognitive boundaries. 
Despite the different realms comprising the knowledge space, proximity 
has been defined by variety of terms. The temporal dimension has recently 
gained noteworthy attention (Neckar, 2003). The debate revolves around the 
contribution of novel and emerging bodies of knowledge to the generation of 
original solutions as opposed to the contribution of more mature ones. 
Emerging technologies usually bring about novel solutions, embed a higher 
degree of novelty in the proposed solutions and hence expand the current space 
for recombinations – for instance by bringing to the market new components 
themselves (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Mature technologies, on the opposite, 
tend to be “… well understood and offer greater reliability relative to more 
recently developed and less tested” technologies" (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001, p. 
527). Hence, familiarity with the nature and properties of older technologies 
will be substantially higher. 
Unconventional recombinations are also expected to be the result of 
combinations of older and emerging knowledge bases. As they result from the 
association of distant bodies of knowledge, recombinant efforts will most often 
link bodies of knowledge with high internal coherence – i.e. areas of the 
knowledge space whose existing interdependences are mostly understood – but 
loosely recombined among themselves. A useful analogy in this respect is the 
realm of Science, where new contributions bear a tension between conformity 
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to the “currently predominant beliefs about the nature of things” (Polanyi, 
1962, p.58) and dissent from it.  
The organizational literature has extended the discussion on the sources of 
impactful inventions to include the role of inventors and teams. The debate 
focuses on the role of teams in the process of idea generation and retention. 
The question at the core of the debate is whether teams facilitate the 
recombination of dispersed competences, distributed across team members 
(Singh and Fleming, 2010) or whether they generate frictions in the phase of 
retention of creative ideas (Paulus & Nijstad, 2003). Advocates of the latter 
view, embrace the “myth of the lone inventor” as source of unconventional 
solutions because teams are plagued by collaborative frictions in the process of 
idea generation (Mullen et al., 1991). Proponents of the former view, claim 
that collaboration enables greater combinational opportunities and that teams 
are better endowed in the “sorting and identification of most promising ideas” 
(i.e. Singh & Fleming, 2010, p.42). In this respect, inventors’ experience plays 
a crucial role in that it determines the extent of combinatorial possibilities and 
the ability to select promising inventive venues (Fleming et al., 2007; 
Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Schilling & Greene, 2011). 
The debate on the origins of novel or unconventional inventions is also one 
of the cornerstones of the industrial organization discussion. Scholars have 
been debating as to whether the type of organization in which inventions occur 
- large firms vs. small firms – has an influence on the extent of 
unconventionality in recombination. On the one hand, large firms are 
considered to be at disadvantage with the generation of unconventional 
solutions as they are trapped in established routines and product lines, around 
which new solutions are incrementally developed (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). 
On the other hand, firms can be thought as repositories of knowledge and 
competences (Grant, 1996) whose potential for recombination depends directly 
on firm size. This assumption is consistent with theories of industry evolutions 
via corporate spin-offs, where unconventional ideas are rejected by incumbent 
firms because of mismatch with the firms’ main strategy (Klepper & Thomson, 
2010). Hence large firms are a seedbed for unconventional combinations, 
whose exploitation will depend on strategic decisions.  
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2.3 Measuring Unconventionality: existing measures. 
Indicators established in literature, rely on information from backward 
citations. The Originality measure by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) is defined as 
the Herfindahl Index on technological classes of cited patents and points to the 
spread of citations over classes. Rosenkpopf  and Nerkar (2001) also use patent 
citations to identify the number of patent classes that do not belong to the focal 
patent. Along this line, Dahlin and Behrens (2005) define an invention as 
radical on three main basis: its novelty (few common citations to patent in 
previous years), uniqueness (citations to other patents in the same year) and its 
impact (technological impact). These studies determine novelty as the overlap 
in backward citations among patents to determine similarity among patents. 
This methodology is problematic as the universe of patents is ever expanding 
and similar inventions might share few backward citations as they occur in two 
different time periods or because the solution they address is grounded in a 
multitude of former patents, which might end up not being cited in all the 
future inventions.  
Closer to our approach, are the measures based on the recombination of 
components within inventions (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Verhoeven et al., 
2016). Fleming and Sorenson (2001) identify new pairwise combinations of 
patent subclasses as novel inventions. They also account for the number of 
times that the same combination has been used (Cumulative Usage) and for 
the Interdependence of the components recombined in the focal invention. 
Verhoeven et al. (2016) adopt a combination of constructs that consider 
both the newness of the combination of technological classes (Novelty in 
Recombination, "NR") but also, via citations, the extent to which inventions 
built on previously unconnected scientific fields (Novelty in Knowledge 
Origins, "NSO") and different technological classes (Novelty in 
Technological Knowledge Origins, "NTO"). This novelty measure identify 
ex ante characteristics of novel inventions by adopting pairwise combinations 
of technological classes and by considering the extent to which focal 
inventions rely on new technological origins and knowledge.  
However, existing measures do not account for the distance among the 
technological components as expressed by their synergic usage. Moreover, 
although novelty is often distributed across early attempts, it may not be 
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necessarily captured by the very first combination. A low usage of that 
combination after the first novel attempt can still have a value for attempts 
occurred at later time. 
Others studies have recognized the importance of considering distance by 
looking at the number domains (Nemet & Johnson, 2012; Schoeenmaker & 
Duysters, 2010). Keijl et al, (2016) investigate the recombination process by 
considering both the number of domains and the distance between them. 
However, in line with existing studies, they also conceive distance based on 
the spread of technological components over technological domains through 
the use of backward citations. They analyze the recombination process in the 
biotechnology industry distinguishing between focal patents citing others 
patent in biotechnological classes versus those that cite patents in adjacent 
classes (chemicals or drugs) or in unrelated classes. 
Schilling and Greene (2011) use the Dewey decimal system, a 
bibliographic categorization for the organization of libraries, to determine 
which combinations of topics is the least likely to occur within the articles 
cited as references. Their work however is not informative on the actual 
procedure to determine unconventional connections.  
The study by Uzzi et al. (2013) on the universe of scientific articles in the 
Web of Science is the closest to the approach used for the Unconventionality 
measure. They explicitly model novelty in the creative process as the pairwise 
combination of references in the bibliography of each paper. Similarly to this 
study, they also take a probabilistic approach as to whether combinations are 
deterministic or instead the outcome of a random process. They find that 
highest impact is grounded in exceptionally conventional combinations, yet 
with the inclusions of unusual combinations. Table 2.1 reports a summary of 
the related indicators. 
2.4 Data and methodology  
2.4.1 Data 
We use U.S. patent data from 1975 to 2000 (Lai et al., 2014), to measure the 
degree of Unconventionality of the inventive outputs. In line with most 
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researches on patent data (Hall et al., 2001), only the utility patents are used.
 5
 
The unit of analysis in the derivation of the measure and used in the regression 
models is the individual patent. The information contained in patents enables 
to model the extent to which the components used in the generation of 
inventions are combined in an unconventional fashion. In particular, we used 
detailed information about  patents' technological class and subclass references 
(there are over 400 classes, and over 100,000 subclasses). Classes reflect broad 
technological areas, whereas subclasses reflect specific technological 
components within a given technological area. Central to this study is the 
listing of the technological components used in the generation of the invention 
and their joint occurrence across the whole universe of patents at the USPTO 
level. 
Aside from containing a great deal of technical information (e.g. patent 
number, date of application and grant, number of claims, technological 
classes), a single patent also provides a rich amount of individual and 
organizational-level data. Patents documents also list inventors’ names (also 
referred to as the authors) and hometowns, the assignee (i.e., the owner of the 
patent that typically identifies the organization for which the inventor works, 
such as a firm, a university or government, or the inventor himself).  
 
2.4.2 Unconventionality measure 
The degree of unconventionality in recombination reflects the distance 
between elements in the space of components as a function of the 
commonalities they shared. 
From the literature on firms' business diversification, we borrow the 
measure of relatedness and its conceptualization, used in previous studies to 
describe the diversification of firms in the product market Teece et al. (1994). 
More recent studies have adapted the relatedness measure to describe the 
                                                          
5 A patent is a legal instrument that protects a new and useful product, process, machine, or new 
combinations of materials. Patents are especially useful for analyzing inventions because they are 
granted only to products and processes that a knowledgeable, objective third party (e.g. United 
States Patent and Trademark Office USPTO) decides that the work exceeds a minimum threshold 
of creativity and innovation. 
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diversification patterns of firms at the technological portfolio level (Dosi et al., 
2016; Breschi et al., 2003; Nesta & Saviotti, 2005). 
Two elements constituting a diversified set - two products or two 
technologies in the portfolio of a firm - are said to be related if their joint 
occurrence is not driven by a random process. This is usually the outcome of 
existing commonalities or synergies between the two elements.  
The concept of coherence extends the rationale behind relatedness to the 
whole set of elements to capture the systematic relatedness of the elements 
comprising it.
6
 We follow the same line of reasoning and measure the extent to 
which each pair of components, constituting a single recombinant act, are 
related to each other or close in the knowledge space.  
In line with the empirical literature on the origins of novelty(Fleming, 
2001; Dahlin & Beherens, 2005; Schoemakers & Duyster, 2010), we use 
patent documents and the occurrence of patent classes therein as base for the 
construction of the measure. A patent has membership in one or more patent 
subclasses which are the objects to be combined. The extent to which each 
possible pairwise combination of patent subclasses actually occurs within each 
patent determines the starting point for the calculation of the measure. Let 
1izC  if patent z has membership in class i, and 0 otherwise. The number of 
patents having simultaneously membership in classes i and j is  
jz
z
izij CCJ 
 
Raw count of the number of patents having membership in each pairwise 
subclass combination, however, cannot be taken directly as a measure of 
relatedness. Although Jij increases with the relatedness of i and j, it also 
                                                          
6 By extension, we can think of the degree of relatedness between two components of the 
knowledge space as the strength of the link between them. Like in the parallel of knowledge or 
technological landscapes (Fleming, 2001), coherent areas of the knowledge networks are made of 
highly interrelated components, where the use of one component is usually associated to the use of 
other ones. Alternatively, there will be combinations of components which link otherwise 
disconnected areas; these links will be weaker, or less related, than the tighter ones characterizing 
the coherent sections of the knowledge space. Consequently, the knowledge space can be thought 
as a network, made of areas of highly interrelated components, eventually connected by 
unconventional or unconventional combinations (Shilling & Greene, 2011). 
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increases with ni and nj, the number of patents having membership in each 
class of the couple. Thus, large values of Jij might simply reflect intense 
inventive activities in i and j. Therefore, Jij must be adjusted for the number of 
patents that would have simultaneous membership both in i and j under the 
null hypothesis that classes were randomly assigned to inventions. Teece et al. 
(1994) show that the joint occurrence of two objects i and j follows an 
hypergeometric distribution against which the null hypothesis can be tested. 
Hence, relatedness, τij, is measured as the difference between the observed 
pattern of co-occurrences of i and j and the expected one:  
ij
ijij
ij
J





 
where 
ij  is equal to the expected number of patents with simultaneous 
membership in i and j under the observed occurrences of i and j and 
ij  the 
standard deviation of the observed occurrence.
7
 This measure thus reports the 
extent to which a combination of patent subclasses appears as unconventional 
or conventional. When this measure is large, components i and j are 
systematically recombined. Thus they are highly related in the technological 
space. When it takes values close to 0 or even negative, the measure indicates 
that unexpectedly few inventions embed the two components given their 
separate use; consequently i and j are unrelated and their joint use will be 
rather novel or unconventional.
8
 
Most combinations are highly conventional; only a handful of them have 
values of τij which are close to zero, and are hence original or unconventional. 
For instance, among the most unconventional combinations we can find the 
attempts to explore biotechnology-related applications in the late 1990s. The 
patent subclass 435/320.1 [Molecular Biology (435); Vector, per se (e.g., 
                                                          
7 Details on the derivation of the measure and formulae to calculate 
ij
 and 
ij
 are reported in 
the appendix.  
8 The index of relatedness τij can also be interpreted as the centripetal strength that ties together 
the nodes (patent subclasses) of the cognitive space in which inventions occur. High values 
indicate that two elements are very close in space or interdependent as in Fleming (2001). 
Intuitively, components which are largely used – large ni – are indeed hardly interdependent with 
other components. 
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plasmid, hybrid plasmid, cosmid, viral vector, bacteriophage vector, etc.) 
(320.1)] 
9
 appears to be combined in an unconventional fashion with 425/401 
[Drug (425); Cosmetics, antiperspirants, dentifrices (401)], and 707/3 [Data 
Processing: Database and File Management, Data Structures, or Document 
Processing (707); Query processing (i.e. searching) (3)]. 
10
 The two examples 
document the attempts to explore new applications for the nascent 
biotechnology sector: the first is the application of genetic engineering to the 
domain of cosmetics, whereas the second relates to the bio-informatics. 
Following the construction of the measure, we derive patent-based 
measures of unconventionality, on the basis of the distributional properties of τ 
for each pairwise combination of patent subclasses within each patent. To this 
purpose, we provide two indicators of the degree of unconventionality in an 
invention: the median and the minimum value of τ among the possible pair-
wise combinations contained in an invention.  
The median captures the degree of unconventionality around the main bulk 
of combinations within the invention, whereas the minimum value indicates 
the most unconventional recombinant act within an invention. Most patents 
embed a high degree of conventionality in the combination of their constituent 
parts. More than half of the patents (50,46%) in the sample have a median τ 
larger than 33, whereas only 28 patents have a median τ below 0. These highly 
unconventional patents are mostly in drugs and communication domains as for 
instance the patent number "US 5863736" recombining the subclass 435/6.16, 
435/91.2 [Molecular Biology (435); Vector, per se (e.g., plasmid, hybrid 
plasmid, etc.) and the subclass 715/234 [Data processing, structured 
documents (e.g. htm, sgml, etc.)]. When we look at the minimum value of τ 
within each patent, more than half of the patents combine components whose τ 
is above 17; the occurrence of negative values is a rare event as well. All in all, 
the preliminary evidence provided so far indicates that the inventive process 
                                                          
9 Subject matter directed to self-replicating nucleic acid molecules which may be employed to 
introduce a nucleic acid sequence or gene into a cell; such nucleic acid molecules are designated as 
vectors and may be in the form of a plasmid, hybrid plasmid, cosmid, viral vector, bacteriophage 
vector, etc. 
10 Subject matter directed to methods of searching for (i.e., querying) data stored as a database in a 
computer or digital data processing system, including sequential searching, primary and secondary 
index searching, and bit-map searching of inverted lists or topological maps. 
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relies mostly on conventional recombinations and only rarely embed more 
unconventional efforts. 
Table 2.2 and 2.3 report the distribution of the median τ respectively across 
years of application and technological domain of the focal invention. On 
average, inventions are less conventional over time; yet, there is a tendency to 
both exploit established trajectories and to move beyond the existing 
boundaries as we also observe that the dispersion of conventionality increases 
over time. Table 2.3 provides further evidence on the goodness of our measure, 
suggesting that inventions in domains like “Apparel and Textile” and 
“Furniture, House Fixtures” are more conventional than ICT related inventions 
like “Semiconductors” or “Computers”, which for instance find applications in 
a multitude of other domains.  
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Table 2.1: Description of existing measures. 
Article Measure Construction Meaning Difference 
Trajtenberg, 
Henderson & 
Jaffe 1997  
Originality  Herfindahl Index of distribution of 
patent classes in backward citations  
Novelty is associated to a 
broader and more balanced 
knowledge base  
Static measure, it doesn’t take into 
account the current practices and 
the consequent dynamics  
Fleming Mingo 
& Chen 2007  
Creativity  New Combination of patent 
subclasses  
Creativity is the result of novel 
combinations  
It does not take into account the 
extent to which combinations are 
close in space  
Verhoeven, 
Bakker & 
Veugelers 2016  
Novelty  Pair-wise combination Inventions are novel when 
they include combinations 
connected for the first time  
It does not offer suggestions on the 
technological distance between 
components  
Uzzi Mukherjee 
Stringer & Jones 
2013  
Novelty  Frequency of co-citation 
pairs across all papers published that 
year in the 
WOS benchmarked by those 
expected by chance (randomized 
citation networks)  
Atypical connections across 
knowledge domains are at the 
core of novelty  
Conventionality is built on yearly 
base, and the benchmark does not 
reflect the path-dependency in idea 
generation  
Dahlin and 
Behrens 2005  
Radicalness  Similarity measure with previous and 
current patents on the basis of the 
overlap of backward citations  
Differences in citation 
structures across patents 
indicate differences in the 
knowledge 
that inventions rely upon  
Prior art differs over time and 
inventions might not necessarily be 
substantially different over time – 
especially when they are 
incremental changes  
Keijl, Gilsing, 
knoben & 
Duysters 2016  
Novelty Average distance between the patent 
classes of the cited patents and the 
patent classes of the focal patent. 
Novelty is associated to a 
higher distance between the 
patent classes cited and focal.  
It does not take into account the 
distance among the components 
recombined in the invention.  
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Conventionality of Inventions across years. 
 
Year Conventionality St.Dev. N 
 
Year Conventionality St.Dev. N 
1980 52.322 43.133 57,185 
 
1991 45.384 41.392 90,331 
1981 51.400 42.715 55,584 
 
1992 44.170 40.281 93,781 
1982 51.431 42.668 56,723 
 
1993 44.163 41.120 97664 
1983 50.915 43.079 54,310 
 
1994 44.066 41.128 111,428 
1984 51.028 42.623 59,401 
 
1995 44.039 41.367 130,686 
1985 50.133 42.718 63,264 
 
1996 43.079 43.015 129,961 
1986 49.411 41.447 66,885 
 
1997 43.314 43.585 152,371 
1987 48.884 41.994 72,710 
 
1998 42.327 44.758 151,632 
1988 48.056 41.971 80,404 
 
1999 42.086 44.174 161,870 
1989 47.301 41.449 85,728 
 
2000 43.550 47.141 176,747 
1990 46.470 41.801 89,066 
 
Tot. 45.638 43.012 2,037,731 
Table 2.1 displays the distribution of inventions' conventionality over application year. Conventionality decreases over time, 
namely patents are characterized by combination that are on average more atypical. We find similar trends across technologies 
which are showed in the Appendix A. In non reported tables, we checked the consistency of this pattern by looking at all pair of 
combinations supporting the tendency over time to combine components in an unconventional manner. Fixed effects estimates 
taking as unit of analysis the coupling of subclasses, indicate that a move toward lower levels of conventionality is occurring in the 
central part of the distribution. On the opposite, conventionality increases for extreme values of initial conventionality: highly 
unconventional combinations become more conventional, at a faster rate than more conventional ones become unconventional, and 
conventionality strengthens over time for highly conventional combinations with the current understanding of structural 
relationship among constituting components.  
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Table 2.3: Distribution of Conventionality of Inventions across Technology fields. 
Technological Category Mean Std. Dev. N 
Agriculture, Food, Textiles 47.309 39.323 20,999 
Agriculture, Husbandry, Food 57.829 55.266 50,366 
Amusement Devices 69.975 56.446 23,936 
Apparel & Textile 74.472 66.065 35,871 
Biotechnology 77.455 76.561 9,664 
Coating 33.406 29.955 56,012 
Communications 34.621 30.684 194,391 
Computer Hardware & Software 34.318 30.950 168,644 
Computer Peripherals 30.584 28.268 65,859 
Drugs 32.109 27.785 21,6705 
Earth Working & Wells 58.499 49.609 36,765 
Electrical Devices 44.266 40.553 88,954 
Electrical Lighting 41.609 32.203 48,456 
Furniture, House Fixtures 65.429 51.958 57,918 
Gas 49.738 37.306 14,111 
Heating 51.227 45.500 36,204 
Information Storage 31.759 29.479 111,469 
Materials Processing & Handlin 50.522 41.838 144,494 
Measuring & Testing 41.925 36.087 83,094 
Metal Working 47.604 41.869 87,355 
Miscellaneous-Drug & Med 54.592 49.141 16,985 
Miscellaneous-Electrical 40.620 33.473 112,175 
Miscellaneous-Mechanical 59.109 50.274 129,295 
Miscellaneous-Others 41.583 40.948 319,628 
Miscellaneous-Chemical 38.090 32.894 308,242 
Motors, Engines & Parts 54.308 46.397 93,533 
Nuclear & X-rays 37.891 32.399 49,659 
Optics 41.510 37.187 32,690 
Organic Compounds 47.373 42.406 64,715 
Pipes & Joints 42.499 32.624 25,122 
Power Systems 41.244 35.379 116,500 
Receptacles 46.994 33.976 55,378 
Resins 27.727 22.517 101,862 
Semiconductor Devices 30.861 23.413 96,714 
Surgery & Medical Instruments 40.812 34.788 83,323 
Transportation 64.758 55.523 83,211 
Total 42.561 39.526 3,240,299 
Note: Each invention is associated to more than one technology, hence we linked each UPC 
classes to Technological Categories considering all classes reported in a patent. 
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2.4.3 Unconventionality and its sources 
As the unconventionality measure is positively skewed, we use as dependent 
variable the natural logarithm of it, Log Unconventionality.
11
  
Based on the literature on the origins of novel inventions, the first type of 
origin we consider is the extent to which the focal invention builds on existing 
knowledge. In our setup, we will use the (natural logarithm plus one of) 
number of citations to prior art as measure of the knowledge base on which the 
focal invention relies on (Log Citations). We also differentiate between 
citations to previous technical and scientific literature (non-patent literature), 
include the latter as the share of total citations (Science).  
Furthermore, we include a control for those inventions that do not cite any 
prior art to account for the possibility that unconventional connections might 
not find support in any existing knowledge base (No Prior Art). We use the 
average patent number of the patent documents cited as prior art as a measure 
of the average age of the patent literature which forms the basis of the focal 
invention (Age). Furthermore, we control for the standard deviation of the 
patent numbers of the patent documents cited as prior art (Spread Age). We 
also control for patents citing no patents in the prior art, because for this group 
we cannot calculate the variable Age (No Patent) and a control for inventions 
citing a single patent document as prior art because Spread Age cannot be 
calculated for this group (Single Citation). Based on Verhoeven et al., (2016), 
we also include the log of the number of connection between classes and 
scientific articles referenced in the focal patents that have never occurred 
before the focal application year (NSO-Novelty in Scientific Origins). Along 
the same line, we also include the log of the number of references to other 
technological classes referenced in the focal patent that have not occurred in 
the years prior the focal patent application year (NTO-Novelty in 
Technological Origins).  
                                                          
11 As our measure of conventionality takes negative values, we added the absolute of the lowest 
value taken by Conventionality. We then took the natural logarithm of the newly transformed 
covariate plus one. As the number of co-occurrences among patent subclasses can be highly 
volatile over time, we use 5 year moving averages. For the sake of exposition, we display the 
natural logarithm of τij 
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The extent of conventionality embedded in an invention is a positive 
function of the elements constituting it, that is its components. Hence, we 
include the number of patent subclasses the patent has membership in 
(Component). 
We further control for the main organizational factors affecting the search 
process. We include the number of inventors comprising the inventive team 
(Team) as well as a measure for single inventor patents (Single Inventor). To 
control for the experience of the inventive team, we include the largest 
progressive number of patents by the inventors in the team (Experience).  
We also account for the determinants of organizational inventive behavior, 
by considering the inventive size of the organizations (e.g. assignee on the 
patent document) as the (log plus one) of the number of patents at USPTO in 
the year of the focal invention (Assignee) as well as a dummy indicating 
whether the patent was not assigned to any third party and remained to the 
inventors (Self). We finally add Year and Technology dummies to account for 
macro trends in the degree of conventionality among patents, such as the 
introduction of novel patent classes in a given year at USPTO which would 
artificially alter the measure of recombinant conventionality. 
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics split by degree of median Unconventionality (10th of the most unconventional inventions). 
 
 
Full Sample 
 
90% least Unconventional 
 
10% Most Unconventional 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
Unconv. 2,037,731 -3.658 0.675 
 
1,833,956 -3.780 0.593 
 
203,775 -2.561  0.223 
Min Unconv. 2,037,731 -3.237 0.758 
 
1,833,956 -3.337 0.728 
 
203,775 -2.345  0.296 
Interdependence 2,037,731 1.456 1.068 
 
1,833,956 1.458 1.092 
 
203,775 1.440 0.820 
Originality 1,690,973 0.530 0.348 
 
1,512,793 0.523 0.351 
 
178,180 0.583  0.323 
Cumulative Usage 2,037,731 20.969 8.2715 
 
1,833,956 21.001 85.766 
 
203,775 20.681 47.062 
NR 2,037,731 0.026 0.1787 
 
1,833,956 0.026 0.178 
 
203,775 0.024   0.179 
NTO 2,037,731 0.35 0.702 
 
1,833,956 0.356 0.705 
 
203,775 0.289 0.669 
NSO 2,037,731 0.017 0.157 
 
1,833,956 0.0167 0.154 
 
203,775 0.022 0.181 
Bwd Citations 2,037,731 2.199 0.827 
 
1,833,956 2.185 0.816 
 
203,775 2.326  0.910 
Fwd Citations 2,037,731 13.105 21.90 
 
1,833,956 13.014 21.831 
 
203,775 13.923 22.585 
Science 2,037,731 0.138 0.256 
 
1,833,956 0.133 0.252 
 
203,775 0.188  0.287 
Components 2,037,731 4.659 3.267 
 
1,833,956 4.607 3.213 
 
203,775 5.121 3.691 
Age 2,037,731 63.568 4782.242 
 
1,833,956 59.571 4620.925 
 
203,775 99.541 6043.214 
Spread Age 2,037,731 102.383 77454.44 
 
1,833,956 99.485 81510.22 
 
203,775 128.464 14026.08 
No Patent 2,037,731 0.027 0.163 
 
1,833,956 0.026 0.161 
 
203,775 0.035 0 .185 
No Prior Art 2,037,731 0.012 0.110 
 
1,833,956 0.012 0.109 
 
203,775 0.012 0.112 
Team 2,037,731 2.216 1.573 
 
1,833,956 2.186 1.556 
 
203,775 2.484  1.695 
Max Experience 2,037,731 11.680 27.564 
 
1,833,956 11.330 26.748 
 
203,775 14.837  33.873 
Single Inventor 2,037,731 0.423 0.494 
 
1,833,956 0.433 0.495 
 
203,775 0.336  0.472 
Assignee 2,037,731 3.839 2.758 
 
1,833,956 3.729 2.740 
 
203,775 4.826  2.722 
Self 2,037,731 0.153 0.360 
 
1,833,956 0.162 0.368 
 
203,775 0.073  0.261 
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2.5 Results 
In this section, we analyze the degree of unconventionality in inventions 
through a multivariate setting (Table 2.4) report the summary statistics of the 
variables used).  
In a first analysis we examine the relationship between Unconventionality 
and the main indicators of technological novelty discussed in Section 2.3. In 
particular, we analyze the relationship between Unconventionality the measure 
of Interdependence and cumulative usage by Fleming and Sorenson (2001), 
Originality by Trajtenber et al., (1997) and with the measure of Novelty in 
New Combination (NR) by Verhoeven et al., (2016). Table 2.5 shows the 
correlation between Unconventionality and other indicators. Correlations 
among the indicators are weak suggesting that these measures capture different 
dimensions of knowledge recombination. Table 2.6 reports the OLS 
estimations of the relation among the indicators.  
In a second analysis we analyze the role of the main antecedents and 
sources of novelty discussed in Section 2.2.2. In this analysis we are mainly 
interested in the understanding of the extent to which unconventionality is the 
result of a search process that span different knowledge domains (via the 
number of technological classes recombined and citations to existing domains 
of knowledge). In addition, we examine whether unconventionality is affected 
by the organizational structure, team/organization, in which search occurs. 
Table 2.6 presents bivariate correlations among the variables that we have 
identifies as determinant of unconventionality. Table 2.7 shows the correlation 
table. Table 2.8 reports instead the OLS estimations of this set of analysis 
In a third set of regressions reported in Table 2.9 and 2.10 we focus on the 
extent to which unconventional combinations contribute to overcoming 
inventive traps and are related to higher technological impact. Also in this 
analysis we relate the Unconventionality measure with existing Indicators of 
novelty.  
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2.5.1 Relation with existing Indicators 
In Table 2.6 we report the OLS estimations that include existing measures 
of novelty, in particular originality by Trajtenberg et al., (1997) and NR by 
Verhoeven et al., (2016). In Model 1 to 4 we introduce the indicators 
sequentially while Model 5 reports the full model. Unconventionality is 
negatively associated with interdependence. Components that are highly 
interdependent are synergistically recombined. As a consequence they are 
strongly related and hence associated to well-established combinations. Along 
this line, a higher cumulative usage (number of times a particular combination 
has been used since 1975), is associated to a decrease in unconventionality, 
although with a smaller magnitude relative to the interdependence of 
components.  
As expected, originality and NR are statistically significant and positively 
associated with unconventionality. Higher scores of Originality as measured 
by the spread of backward citations over technological classes, indicate that 
inventions integrate divergent ideas. Inventions with high score of originality 
may not necessarily be novel per se. This measure suggests the importance of a 
broad knowledge base. Inventions that source on wide knowledge base are 
associated with less conventional combinations.  
The NR construct points instead to the existence of pair of classes in 
inventions that were previously unconnected. Higher number of previously 
unconnected classes within inventions are hence positively associated with 
unconventionality, although with a smaller magnitude compared to the 
originality construct.  
Model 5 includes all constructs and contrary to model 1 the 
Interdependence change sign and shows a positive association with 
unconventionality. To uncover potential underlying patterns among the 
variables we run a factor analysis that revealed a potential underlying structure 
between Interdependence and Cumulative usage that drives the change of the 
sign of Interdependence coefficient. This may suggest the need to have a 
balance between wide and local search and of having focused search strategy 
within narrow and synergic components before making connections to 
unrelated field. 
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Table 2.5: Correlation tables with existing measures. 
Unconventionality   1.0000  
    Interdependence  -0.0609* 1.0000  
   
Originality   0.1020* -0.1521* 1.0000  
  
NR   0.0060* -0.0457* 0.0730* 1.0000  
 
Cumulative Usage  -0.0363* 0.2057* -0.0017* -0.0169* 1.0000  
Note: Correlation between Unconventionality and related measure is very low 
suggesting that the measures pick up different dimensions. 
 
Table 2.6: OLS estimations for the relation with other measures. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Interdependence -0.017***    0.009*** 
 (0.000)    (0.001) 
Originality  0.200***   0.201*** 
  (0.001)   (0.001) 
NR   0.054***  0.024*** 
   (0.002)  (0.003) 
Cumulative Usage    -0.001*** -0.001*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.930*** -4.032*** -3.948*** -3.945*** -4.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
N 2,037,731 1,690,973 2,037,731 2,037,731 1,690973 
R2 0.116 0.115 0.116 0.125 0.124 
*, **, and *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance. Regressions include 21 year 
dummies and 37 technology dummies; all dummies are jointly statistically significant. Regressions include also 
controls (dummies) for missing information on the age of the backward citations and. 
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2.5.2 Sources of Unconventionality 
Table 2.8 reports the results of OLS and logit models on the determinants of 
unconventionality. Model 1 introduces the variables at the level of the 
invention; Model 2 accounts for the inventive team whereas Model 3 adds the 
determinants at the level of the assignee. The initial set of variables provide the 
bulk of explanatory power, most of which is attributable to year and 
technology effects: regressing Unconventionality only on the 21 year dummies 
and 37 technological dummies yields an R-squared of 0.1147. Adding the 
remaining invention controls improves the explicative power of the model to 
0.147. Yet, this improvement is by far the largest when compared to the 
inclusion of team and assignee level controls. 
Unconventionality in inventions is positively associated with the amount of 
backward citations in patents. A 10% increase in the amount of documents 
cited as prior art is related to an increase of 0.13% in the median level of 
conventionality of the focal invention. However, references between 
technological classes and scientific field that occur for the first time (NSO) are 
associated with a decrease in unconventionality. Originality instead, spread of 
citations over technological classes, is positively associated with 
unconventionality. As expected references to non-patent literature contributes 
to unconventionality. An increase in one standard deviation of Science (Non 
patent literature) is associated with 2.9% increase in the degree of 
unconventionality of the focal invention. Ceteris paribus, the more inventions 
source from other domains than the technical one – especially from Science – 
the higher the extent of unconventionality in their recombinations. 
Inventions carrying forward unconventional recombinations rely to a larger 
extent on less recent prior art. The results indicate that inventions are more 
unconventional when they embed a higher number of components. 
Conventionality is rooted in familiar and mature solutions which happen to be 
combined with more recent ones. The degree of unconventionality instead 
increases as the number of components used in the focal invention also 
increases: one standard deviation increase in the number of patent subclasses 
in which the focal invention has memberships in is related to an increase of 
0.10% in the median value of conventionality of the invention, ceteris paribus. 
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Teams produce inventions with a higher degree of unconventionality 
(model 2) as opposed to single inventors. This finding suggest that large teams 
benefit from knowledge from multiple inventors that are likely to search and 
built on larger and diversified range of components. Inventions being the result 
of collaborations are less conventional; yet, larger teams seem to recombine 
components in a more conventional fashion. The median value of 
unconventionality in an invention produced by a single inventor is indeed 
3.8% lower. More experienced inventors are able to combine components in an 
unconventional fashion.  
The final set of controls suggest that larger firms are more likely to be 
responsible for the generation of unconventional inventions
12
. Inventions 
occurring in larger organizations carry forward unconventional solutions, as 
opposed to “garage” inventions. At the average, doubling the size of the 
assignee in terms of successful patents applied in a given year increases the 
degree of unconventionality by 2.1%, all else equal. "Garage” inventors, 
inventors which do not belong to any existing organization and most likely are 
self-employed, produce less unconventional combinations. Large firms may 
leverage economies of scope and scale in R&D. Large firms can spread costs 
and risks on broader output (Cohen & Klepper, 1996a, 1996b; Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1996). Moreover, they can exploit a more diversified portfolio and 
technological base which may facilitate the recombination of knowledge. 
Adding the final set of variables for the size of the patent assignee, causes 
some covariates related to the characteristics of the team to change sign: team 
size become negative and significant. We suspect that this has to do with the 
ability of large firms to coordinate larger teams. The OLS estimations reported 
in Table 2.8 has been replicated by using logit models on the 10th centile of 
the inventions with the highest values of median unconventionality. The most 
unconventional inventions have a higher probability to combine components in 
an unconventional way (lower likelihood to be conventional). Consistently 
with OLS results, a higher likelihood to score in unconventionality, is driven 
                                                          
12 Note that information on the Assignees are not consolidated. To check the robustness of this 
finding we uses alternative data sources from Orbis. Results are robust to this alternative 
specification of the firm patent portfolio. In general we expect that consolidated data would 
reinforce this finding. The finding that large firms produce more unconventional inventions also 
holds in non reported analysis that control for the concentration of firm activities computed 
through the Herfindahl Index.  
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by the amount of citations and the number of components that are recombined 
while the odds for large team and experienced inventors suggest a focus on 
established combinations.  
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Table 2.7: Correlation table on the determinants of Unconventionality 
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Table 2.8: Determinants of Unconventionality 
 
OLS  LOGIT 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NTO -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014***  -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
NSO -0.002 -0.003 -0.002  0.022 0.021 0.022 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Originality 0.181*** 0.182*** 0.186***  0.584*** 0.586*** 0.606*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Citations 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.013***  0.009** 0.005 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Science 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.008***  0.173*** 0.163*** 0.119*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Component 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030***  0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spread Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No Patent 0.148 0.142 0.126  0.251 0.222 0.167 
 (0.401) (0.404) (0.407)  -1.204 -1.211 -1.211 
No Prior Art -0.148 -0.144 -0.006  -0.333 -0.313 0.265 
 (0.401) (0.404) (0.407)  -1.205 -1.211 -1.211 
Team  0.002*** -0.002***   -0.001 -0.013*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Experience  0.000*** 0.000   0.000*** -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Single Inventor  -0.038*** -0.018***   -0.134*** -0.071*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.007) (0.007) 
Assignee   0.021***    0.062*** 
   (0.000)    (0.001) 
Self   -0.024***    -0.214*** 
   (0.002)    (0.012) 
Constant -4.241*** -4.232*** -4.316***  -5.105*** -5.048*** -5.291*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
N 1,690,973 1,690,973 1,690,973  1,690,973 1,690,973 1,690,973 
R2   0.135 0.136 0.142  0.1020 0.1026 0.1068 
Log Lik 
   
 -5.11e+05 -5.11e+05 -5.09e+05 
Chi squared     83.905.815 84.783.230 89.459.625 
*, **, and *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance. The first 
three columns reports the results of Ordinary Least Square on the median value of 
conventionality in patents. The last set of columns report the results of a logit regressions on 
the likelihood of a patent of belonging to the most unconventional 10%. Regressions include 
21 year dummies and 37 technology dummies; all dummies are jointly statistically significant. 
Regressions include also controls (dummies) for missing information concerning the age of the 
backward citations and whether the backward citations is made of one single patent. Standard 
Errors are robust to outliers in the case of the OLS results in the first three columns. 
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2.5.3 Technological Impact 
This section discusses the results of a set of generalized negative binomial 
models for the technological impact of inventions (forward citations).  
Table 2.9 reports the estimations for the technological impact of inventions 
by considering only the Unconventionality measure and the other indicators of 
novelty. Unconventionality is positively associated with forward citations. 
Original inventions and those based on new combination (NR) also received 
more forward citations. In line with expectations, interdependence and 
cumulative usage are negatively associated with technological impact. The 
dispersion of unconventionality is lower compared to the other indicators. 
Table 2.10 reports the estimations for the technological impact using all 
variables. Both median Unconventionality and minimum Unconventionality 
are positively associated with future citations. This finding indicate that 
unconventionality, both at median value and at its most unconventional effort, 
is associated with higher impact on future technological developments. 
However, when they are introduced together in the analysis, median 
Unconventionality turns negative and significant, whereas minimum 
Unconventionality remains positive. Inventions combining components in an 
unconventional fashion are on average more cited. The effect is more 
pronounced for those inventions that are unconventional in their most 
unconventional combination (minimum unconventionality) as compared to 
inventions that are unconventional at the core of their combinations (median 
unconventionality). In line with Uzzi et al., (2013), this may suggest that 
inventions combining unconventional combinations within an established 
framework may benefit from the highest impact. This result is also in line with 
Schilling and Greene (2011), who argue that it suffices a very small amount of 
unconventional combinations to connect large bodies of knowledge, that 
otherwise would remain distant.  
Higher interdependence and cumulative usage of components are 
associated with lower impact. In line with expectations, higher score of 
originality and new pairwise combinations on average receive significantly 
more forward citations. Compared to the other indicators of novelty, the results 
show that Unconventionality has a lower dispersion. This may suggest that 
measures based on the first combination are riskier and originate from a 
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process of experimentations characterized by potentially many failures. 
Unconventionality measure instead captures not only the inventions at are at 
the extreme of the continuum of novelty (most and least unconventional) but it 
also includes those inventions that are in between.  
Impact is positively associated with the number of claims in a patent used 
in the literature as a further indication of the originality of an invention. For 
what concern reference to prior art, the number of backward citations as well 
as the number of patent classes therein and references to previously 
unconnected scientific fields have a positive influence on future impact. This 
finding is in line with the view that inventions spanning across a wide spectra 
of the knowledge space receive a higher number of citations. The ratio of 
citations coming from non-patent literature is negatively associated with 
impact. This result has to be understood in combination with the coefficient 
associated with the number of backward citations, indicating that patents 
drawing mostly from outside the patent literature have a limited impact on 
future inventions
13
.  
Finally, inventions from larger teams receive a larger number of future 
citations, whereas inventions by lone inventors and large applicants receive 
less citations, ceteris paribus. 
All in all, these results provide evidence that unconventionality is 
associated with higher impact, especially when it is related to the most creative 
act, as long as it remains embedded in established frameworks.  
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Regressions include 21 year dummies and 37 technology dummies; all dummies are jointly 
statistically significant. Regressions include also controls (dummies) for missing information 
concerning the age of the backward citations and whether the backward citations is made of one 
single patent. In this regression we also control for the number of claims reported in the focal 
inventions. The over-dispersion parameter, unreported, is significantly different from zero. High 
level of conventionality as well as the variable Min Conv and increase the dispersion. However 
L_Conv and Min Conv decrease the dispersion in the full model. Interdependence decrease the 
dispersion, Originality and NR increase it. Note that the dispersion parameter is shown only for the 
main variables of interest. 
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Table 2.9: Generalized negative binomial regressions estimating the impact of 
inventions: comparison with exiting indicators. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Unconven. 0.132***     0.108*** 
 (0.002)     (0.002) 
Interdependence  -0.065***    -0.061*** 
  (0.001)    (0.001) 
Originality   0.122***   0.059*** 
   (0.003)   (0.003) 
NR    0.285***  0.260*** 
    (0.007)  (0.007) 
Cumu_Usage     -0.000*** 0.000*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.335*** 1.869*** 1.891*** 1.800*** 1.815*** 2.386*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) 
lnalpha       
Unconven. -0.023***     -0.019*** 
 (0.002)     (0.002) 
Interdependence  -0.022***    -0.020*** 
  (0.001)    (0.002) 
Originality   0.110***   0.092*** 
   (0.004)   (0.004) 
NR    0.097***  0.079*** 
    (0.008)  (0.008) 
Cumu_Usage     0.000*** 0.000*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.115*** 0.210*** 0.056** 0.190*** 0.197*** -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) 
Observations 2,037,731 2,037,731 1,690,973 2,037,731 2,037,731 1,690,973 
Pseudo R2 0.0190 0.0189 0.0192 0.0187 0.0184 0.0202 
Log Lik. -7.14e+06 -7.14e+06 -6.04e+06 -7.15e+06 -7.15e+06 -6.04e+06 
Chi squared 1.75e+05 1.73e+05 1.49e+05 1.71e+05 1.68e+05 1.61e+05 
*, **, and *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance. Regressions include 21 
year dummies and 37 technology dummies; all dummies are jointly statistically significant. Regressions 
include also controls (dummies) for missing information concerning the age of the backward citations and 
whether the backward citations is made of one single patent. In this regression we also control for the 
number of claims reported in the focal inventions. The over-dispersion parameter, is significantly different 
from zero.  
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Table 2.10: Generalized negative binomial regressions estimating the impact of inventions. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Med. Unconven. 0.074***  -0.041*** -0.152*** -0.174*** -0.168*** -0.173*** -0.042*** 
 (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Min Unconven.  0.100*** 0.137*** 0.303*** 0.307*** 0.321*** 0.327*** 0.124*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Interdependence    -0.026***    -0.014*** 
    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Originality     0.065***   -0.007** 
     (0.003)   (0.003) 
NR      0.252***  0.198*** 
      (0.006)  (0.006) 
Avg_Cumu_Usage       -0.000*** 0.000 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
NTO -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.025***     -0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     (0.002) 
NSO 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.143***     0.115*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)     (0.007) 
Citations 0.225*** 0.223*** 0.223***     0.228*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)     (0.002) 
Science -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025***     0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)     (0.006) 
Component 0.039*** 0.030*** 0.027***     0.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     (0.001) 
Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**     -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) 
Spread Age 0.000* 0.000** 0.000**     -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) 
No Patent -0.125*** -0.131*** -0.132***     -1.342* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)     (0.747) 
Team 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033***     0.036*** 
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 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     (0.001) 
Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.000     0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) 
Single Inventor -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039***     -0.036*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)     (0.003) 
Assignee -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007***     -0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     (0.001) 
Self -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.049***     -0.057*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)     (0.003) 
claims 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***     0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) 
Constant 1.251*** 1.363*** 1.341*** 2.260*** 2.266*** 2.223*** 2.238*** 1.396*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) 
lnalpha         
Med Unconvent -0.039***  -0.025*** -0.010** -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.020*** 0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Min Unconvent  -0.038*** -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.036*** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Interdependence    -0.025***    -0.031*** 
    (0.001)    (0.002) 
Originality     0.110***   0.064*** 
     (0.004)   (0.004) 
NR      0.103***  0.033*** 
      (0.008)  (0.008) 
Avg_Cumu_Usage       0.000*** 0.000*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)     (0.008) 
Constant 0.033 0.039 0.021 0.046** -0.083*** 0.020 0.046** 0.064** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) 
N 2037026 2037026 2037026 2037731 1690973 2037731 2037731 1690504 
*, **, and *** indicate respectively 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance.  
44 
 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study we investigate the origins of unconventional combinations of 
knowledge components. Unconventional or novel combinations are largely 
believed to be at the foundation of breakthrough inventions as they establish 
new connections between distant and overlooked domains of knowledge. In so 
doing, they remove obstacles and bottlenecks to the combinatorial power of 
research and development efforts, thus favoring an upsurge of follow on 
inventions.  
By considering the inventive process as a process of recombinant search, in 
our analysis, we first discuss the concept of distance in the search process and 
then how it influences the extent of unconventionality in the inventive process.  
As inventors typically search locally, they will mostly recombine 
technological components in a conventional manner, i.e. according to the 
structure with which relationships have proved to work in the past. By 
extension, most inventions will be the outcome of conventional combinations. 
We thus propose a measure to determine the distance among the elements of 
the technological space - Unconventionality measure. We borrow the concept 
and operationalization of relatedness from the literature on product market 
diversification (Teece et al., 1994) and adapt it to our purpose in the same 
fashion as in Breschi et al. (2001) and Nesta and Saviotti (2005). We use 
patent documents at USPTO between 1975 and 2000 to measure 
unconventionality in combinations, in inventions at the core of their 
combinatorial effort (median) and at the most unconventional instance 
(minimum). Our approach rests on a fairly stable feature of the patent system, 
the patent classification, which is only marginally subject to variations, and 
therefore more reliable in the determination of the measure. We claim that this 
indicator captures the extent of unconventionality in the recombinant process 
over the technological landscape. 
Our results confirm that most of the recombinant and inventive activities 
are grounded in conventional efforts, with some rare instances of 
unconventional connections. Furthermore, we show that average 
conventionality decrease over time providing indirect evidence that 
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unconventional combinations may contribute to shifts of the technological 
paradigms.  
We identified the main drivers of distance in the search process, which we 
expected to be responsible for unconventional combinations. We find that 
patents that take a broader view by citing a widespread spectrum of previous 
results, both in science and technology, have a higher chance to identify 
unconventional connections. Moreover, patents having no backward citations 
of any kind are more conventional. Unconventionality is more likely to occur 
with experience, and in large organizations.  
We provide suggestive evidence on the relationship between 
unconventional combinations and future impact. We observe a premium on 
future impact from unconventionality: inventions embodying conventional 
combination in their core but carrying forward unconventional combinations in 
their most unconventional acts are cited more by future patent applications 
than conventional inventions.  
The contributions of this study are manifold. From a theoretical standpoint, 
the results are in line with the body of work on the theory of recombinant 
invention and creativity in general. This stream posit that agents mostly work 
in the neighborhood of their competences. Combinations mostly occur with 
components whose associations have proved to be effective by past use. 
Inventors eventually experiment with a limited set of components at a time 
(Fleming, 2001). Much like in Schilling and Greene (2011), this outcome 
confirms that novel and unconventional combinations are at the origin of high 
impact solutions as they bridge deep pools of coherent and established 
knowledge. Unconventional combinations bring together distant concepts and 
ideas, reshaping the associative framework within which concepts are related 
and rendering associations that had been overlooked suddenly feasible. 
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Chapter 3 
Sailing in all Winds: 
Technological Search over 
the Business Cycle✵ 
3.1 Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009
14
 has showed how deep recessions 
may affect the ability of firms to persistently invest in innovation, with 
important consequences for long-term competitiveness and economic growth 
(OECD, 2012). Despite the heterogeneous response across countries and 
sectors, a large fraction of firms in the European Union have curtailed their 
R&D expenses, calling for a deeper understanding of the effects of crises on 
the innovative strategies of firms (Filippetti & Archibugi, 2011). The scholarly 
debate on the effects of economic crises, business cycle in general, and 
innovation, has identified a pro-cyclical relationship and the centrality of 
financial constraints in the R&D investment decisions of firms (Aghion & 
Saint-Paul,1998; Aghion et al., 2012; Campello et al., 2010).  
                                                          
✵ This chapter is based on working paper, joint with Antonio della Malva (KU Leuven) and 
Massimo Riccaboni (IMT Lucca / KU Leuven). We thank Gino Cattani, Reinhilde Veugelers  for 
their valuable comments and suggestions as well as participants at the internal seminars at MSI-
KU Leuven, the 3rd KTO workshop at SKEMA Business School, the XXXI EGOS Conference, 
the 5th SEEK Conference in ZEW, the T2S Annual Conference in Dublin , the Large-scale Crises: 
1929 vs. 2008 Conference in Ancona and the 50th Anniversary SPRU Conference at the 
University of Sussex. We also thank Andrea Morescalchi for assistance on the first version.  
14 The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis motivated this study however due to data constraint our analysis 
only include the period 1980-2000. The measure of conventionality that we use in this study to 
assess the recombination process only include inventions up to 2000 before the introduction of 
new technological classes that can influence our results. We leave to future research the expansion 
of our dataset and hence the inclusion of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis.  
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In this study we extend this line of research by exploring the relationship 
between the inventive process and business cycle. We argue that tighter 
economic conditions not only affect the propensity of firms to invest in R&D, 
but also shape the type of inventions that are pursued and generated. In 
response to a decline in output and profits, firms can be expected to focus on 
less challenging roads through local search in the attempt to innovate 
incrementally. Innovations departing from conventional technological 
paradigms have a fundamental impact on society (Dosi, 1982) motivating this 
study to investigate the recombination process along the business cycle. 
Inventions are the final result of a process of search and recombination of 
knowledge into new domains of applications or reconfiguration of existing 
knowledge into novel combinations (Fleming, 2001). The search for novel 
combinatorial possibilities usually occurs in the proximity of firms’ 
competences through local search, characterized by lower levels of risks and 
uncertainty as it builds on past failures, extant competences and previous 
successful solutions (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1978). However, 
connections of pieces of knowledge that are already highly related, or 
complementary, are likely to hinder the possibility of producing impactful 
inventions (Perkins, 1995). Unlike local search, distant search explores new 
and unfamiliar technological domains, with greater possibilities of extending 
the range of combinatorial alternatives (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). The ultimate 
result of this process is that inventions are more likely to include new, atypical 
or original coupling relationships characterized by higher level of 
(un)conventionality (Levinthal & March, 1993; Simonton, 1999; Schilling, 
2005; Katila & Chen, 2009). Compared to local, distant search is a costly 
activity, characterized by higher levels of uncertainty and failures as it requires 
more efforts in the selection and integration of relevant knowledge (Fleming, 
2001). Although inventions resulting from local search have a positive impact 
on productivity growth (Baumol, 2002), novel or breakthrough innovations, 
resulting from distant search, prevent from core rigidities traps with positive 
impacts on performances and long term competitiveness (March, 1991; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
To study how firms adapt their search strategies to the business cycle, we 
analyze the variation of the degree of unconventionality in patented inventions 
at the USPTO over the business cycle between 1980 and 2000. For this 
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purpose, we have assembled an original database which links patent data from 
the USPTO (Li et al., 2014) to financial information of firms listed in 
Compustat and macro-economic data related to the business cycle from the 
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database. To capture the degree of 
technological unconventionality, we employ a measure of relatedness of 
knowledge components recombined in inventions (see Chapter 1 and 
Appendix A for the derivation of the measure). In line with the extant literature 
acknowledging the link between economic growth and impactful innovations, 
we also consider the technological impact of inventions by analyzing the 
relationship between business cycle and unconventionality on forward patent 
citations. Unlike previous studies which used measures of innovation input and 
output, aggregated at the level of countries, sectors and firms, our approach 
relates individual inventions, and their characteristics, to the phases of the 
business cycle, allowing for a finer analysis of the relationship. 
Our results indicate that, during contractive phases, firms retrench from 
novel inventive activities. Inventions generated during the recessive phase of 
the cycle embed more established combinations, resulting from a process of 
search which is more localized in the technological space. Therefore, not only 
are downturns associated with a reduction in the amount of innovative inputs 
and outputs, as the financial constraint arguments predict, but also the resulting 
output is characterized by lower levels of novelty. We further investigate some 
mechanisms that affect the relationship between inventiveness and the business 
cycle by analyzing the extent to which the decision to cancel or postpone novel 
inventive projects depends on the reliance on external financing and the 
technological competences of firms. We find that the retrenchment from 
unconventional inventive activities is pronounced among financially 
constrained firms, whereas unconstrained firms do not change their inventive 
behavior along the business cycle. Looking at the technological portfolio of 
firms, we notice that firms become more conservative in their inventive efforts 
in the core of their technological competences. Finally, impact-wise, the results 
suggest that the consequences of retrenching from novel inventive activities 
can be most harmful for financially constrained firms. We claim that this is 
due to the fact that they are forced to cancel or postpone projects in the core of 
their technological competences. 
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This study extends the scholarly debate that has mainly dealt on the impact 
of recessions on the input side of innovation, i.e. R&D expenditures (Barlevy, 
2004, 2007; Ouyang, 2011; Aghion et al., 2012; Amore, 2015; Pauvnov, 2012; 
Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011). Our findings also contribute to a more recent 
stream of literature that has focused on innovation outputs and on the 
effectiveness of technology policies (Hud & Hussinger 2015; Berchicci et al., 
2013; Cincera et al., 2010; Ouyang, 2011; Fabrizio & Tsolmon 2014). Finding 
that managers are less willing to embark in novel inventive activities during 
downturns, characterized by higher uncertainty, indicates that the reduced 
profitability and the lower availability of resources experienced by firms affect 
investment decisions not only at the extensive margins (the amount of 
resources dedicated to innovation expressed by a change in the size of the 
portfolio), but also at the intensive margins (the riskiness of the inventive 
projects being pursued, expressed by the degree of unconventionality in the 
surviving portfolio). These results extend the literature on the behavioral 
theory of the firm in general and the role of slack resources in particular (Cyert 
& March, 1963; Troilo et al., 2014). An increase in uncertainty following 
challenging economic conditions shortens the time horizon with which 
managers make their investment decisions (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993), 
especially with regards to innovation, as they prefer to invest in projects whose 
returns are more predictable. 
From a policy perspective, the evidence that firms engage in less novel 
inventive projects during contractive phases, in particular financially 
constrained firms, call for an active role of policy makers not only to sustain 
the level of  R&D investments but also to intervene in the decisions and 
incentives of which type of innovation to pursue (Mazzuccato, 2015). Indeed, 
a recent contribution by Hud and Hussinger (2015) has documented a 
crowding-out effect from subsidy recipients in Germany during the last 
financial crisis, especially among SMEs. Our result add to their finding 
suggesting that firms may use R&D subsidies to finance less novel projects.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
presents a review of the literature on the relationship between innovation and 
business cycles. Section 3.3 describes the data and the empirical model whose 
results are discussed in section 3.4. The chapter concludes with section 3.5 
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with a summary of the main findings and a discussion of the policy 
implications. 
3.2 Innovation and the Business Cycle 
Dating back to Schumpeter (1939), scholars have questioned the relationship 
between business cycles and innovation. Two competing arguments have 
emerged. A first approach states a counter-cyclical relationship between 
downturns and innovations, i.e. innovation increases during downturns. This 
argument is based on a lower opportunity costs that firms can exploit for 
investing in innovation (Saint-Paul, 1997; Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1998). Firms 
have higher incentives to allocate internal resources to the development of 
innovations via new products (Berchicci et al., 2013). As returns from existing 
product lines and activities decline, firms are more prone to search for new 
market niches less affected by the downturn, reducing the risks through 
diversification. Geroski and Walters (1995) advocate that firms have higher 
incentives to innovate when the loss associated with a decline in current 
activities is larger than the relative returns to be gained from implementing 
new product or process. The introduction of new products during downturns 
enables firms to establish a leading position in the eyes of consumers when the 
demand recovers (Steenkamp & Fang, 2011). Firms also have higher 
incentives to introduce cost-saving process innovations in order to reduce the 
costs of production and therefore match the lower demand. Moreover, the 
advantages stemming from more efficient production processes can provide 
firms with an advantage when the economy recovers (Saint-Paul, 1997).  
A second perspective theorizes a pro-cyclical relationship, stating that 
innovative activities decrease during downturns due to a reduction in resources 
allocated to R&D. Following this argument, profit-maximizing firms will time 
their innovation activities to periods of high-demand to capture higher profits 
(Schleifer, 1986). As the demand for goods and services decreases during 
downturns, firms usually experience a reduction in profits. The reduced 
profitability translates in fewer resources, especially liquidity, which limits 
firms' ability to invest in innovation (Barlevy, 2007; Fabrizio & Tsolmon, 
2014). Moreover, the availability of external resources to finance innovation, 
such as bank loans, decline as financial institutions may deleverage from 
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existing investments and be more reluctant to finance risky projects (Aghion et 
al., 2012). The limited amount of liquidity and a higher perceived risk, bias 
firms' decisions in the pursuing more conservative approaches, whose returns 
are certain and closer in time (Bovha Padilla et al., 2009).  
The empirical evidence has mostly documented a pro-cyclical relationship 
between general economic, industry-specific fluctuations and input/output 
measures of innovation (Barlevy 2007; Geroski & Walters, 1995; Ouyang, 
2011; Fabrizio & Tsolmon, 2014). Using data for manufacturing sectors over 
four decades, Ouyang (2011) finds that the cyclical pattern of R&D 
investments is due to the existence of financial constraints that limit the ability 
of firms to sustain high levels of R&D during downturns. However, the author 
finds that sectors react negatively to positive shocks in the economy, 
advancing that the opportunity cost argument, despite not being predominant, 
is also in place. Using a sample of French firms, Aghion et al. (2012) 
complement these findings by showing that the effect of financial constraints is 
not uniform across firms and sectors. The relationship between R&D and 
business cycle is pro-cyclical for firms with higher dependence on external 
capital and fewer collaterals and in sectors more exposed. Moreover, the 
authors find that the ratio of R&D to total investments is counter-cyclical, 
supporting the view that firms limit the negative effects of cash-flow 
fluctuation on R&D by relying on internal reserves of cash (Himmelberg & 
Petersen, 1994). Using patents as measure of output, Geroski and Walters 
(1995) find that in the UK patent output clusters around periods of boom over 
a period of 40 years. The results suggest that economic fluctuations drive 
inventive activities, in line with the view that firms time their innovative 
activities with periods of high customer demand. Along these lines, Fabrizio 
and Tsolmon (2014) show that the relationship between business cycles and 
patenting differs across sectors. The authors use firm data from Compustat 
from 1975 to 2002 to show that the relationship is positively moderated by the 
likelihood of imitation and the rate of product obsolescence of sectors. 
Berchicci et al., (2013) have analyzed the relationship between industry 
fluctuation and types of innovation, namely product and process innovation. 
The results of this study suggest that the opportunity cost and the financial 
constraint arguments co-exist when product and process innovations are 
considered separately. The authors show that, for a panel of Italian firms, 
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product innovation is most likely to occur during downturns, therefore 
supporting the counter-cyclical argument. During industry downturn, firms 
engage in product innovation while holding back on process innovation 
(Berchicci et al., 2013). The authors suggest that engaging in process 
innovation is less likely since it may be not profitable to improve the efficiency 
of producing existing lines of products whose value is dropping. Process 
innovation is thus more likely to coincide with upturns, as the financial 
constraint argument indicates (Devinney, 1990).  
Based on the first line of argument, we would expect firms to engage in 
distant search during the contractive phases of the industry cycle. Firms 
incentives to orchestrate more unconventional innovations would be higher 
during this phase due to a decrease in profitability on existing products. Firms 
may also experience an excess of slack resources that may be reallocated to 
more explorative search at lower marginal costs.  
Based on the second line of argument, we would expect firms to be less 
prone to engage in distant search due to higher constraints in financial 
resources. Moreover, due to a lower demand, firms may perceived the 
exploration of new domains as a riskier activity relative to periods of more 
favorable market conditions.   
3.3 Data and Methodology 
Our research strategy tracks the degree of Unconventionality of patent 
production over time with respect to the technological portfolio and financial 
characteristics of firms, as well as economic conditions in the manufacturing 
industry business cycles. The unit of analysis is represented by the single 
patent
15
. We use data on utility patents granted by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1980 and 2000
16
 (Li et al., 2014). The 
                                                          
15 The focus of this study is the recombination process which is manifested in the final invention. 
As a consequence our analysis are patent based as allow us to examine the recombination process 
at a more disaggregated level.  Firm level analysis are provided in the appendix for robustness 
checks. 
16 We consider only granted patents between 1980 and 2000 in order to guarantee consistency in 
the conventionality measure used in this Chapter. In  2001 new technological classes were 
introduced and for consistency we only computed conventionality measure up to 2000. Details on 
the derivation of the measure are available in the Appendix to this Chapter and in Chapter I.  
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database includes procedural information about patents (i.e. publication and 
application number, grant and application date, claims), inventor and assignee 
data and complete references to the technological classes and subclasses 
according to the US Patent Classification (USPC) system. The USPC system is 
articulated in more than 400 classes, representing broad technological fields, 
and about 100,000 subclasses, that point to specific technological divisions 
within each class. Patent subclasses identify, in our framework, the knowledge 
components available for the search and recombination process (Fleming, 
2001). We complement the dataset with the relational table of patents and 
firms from Orbis Bureau Van Dijk. Orbis provides information on about 
70.000 listed companies. We matched the patent dataset with firms' financial 
accounts database and we used the companies' sector of operation to retrieve 
sector-level information.
17
We matched firm-level data with the NBER-CES 
Manufacturing Industry Database, which contains annual industry-level data 
(i.e. number of workers, total payroll, value added) for the U.S. manufacturing 
sector from 1958 to 2009 (Becker et al., 2013).
18
 Our final dataset comprises 
166,168 patent observations belonging to 1,077 US firms with at least one 
listed activity operating in the manufacturing sector between 1980 and 2000. 
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics. 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
We measure the degree of unconventionality (Unconventionality) in the 
technological space by the extent to which an invention is the result of a search 
and recombinant process that departs from established and conventional 
practices. Leveraging on the concept of relatedness, previously used to assess 
the diversification of business activities (Teece et al., 1994) and technological 
portfolios of firms (Breschi et al., 2003; Nesta & Saviotti 2005), we define as 
novel those combinations of knowledge components embedded in inventions 
that are distant in the knowledge space, or rarely coupled together. We 
conceptualize distance as the strength of the relationship among the 
                                                          
17 The exclusion from Compustat of non-listed firms may generate possible sample selection bias 
as typically smaller firms are not included. However, the potential bias is diminished  by the fact 
that normally US firms have a high recourse to stock markets and R&D is concentrated in publicly 
listed firms which enable Compustat to have a reliable coverage on long historical data and 
extensive financial and operating accounts for a large time window, 1950-2013. 
18 The manufacturing sector includes a large concentration of R&D investments which ranges 
between 70-80% (Barlevy, 2007). 
55 
 
components underlying inventions. Hence, two components will be close in 
the technology space, if their joint occurrence is highly frequent. This is likely 
to be the outcome of a systemic search towards related or familiar paradigms. 
Conversely, two components are more distant if their joint occurrence in 
previous inventions is rarer with respect to what a random process would 
predict. The combination of strongly related components indicates that 
inventions build on an established technological base, as opposed to the 
combination of distant and rarely combined elements in the knowledge space 
which are associated with more novel inventions. Based on the USPTO patents 
population and its classification system, we derive a patent-based measure of 
unconventionality by computing the yearly frequency of the joint occurrence
19
 
of each possible combination of subclasses within the same patent. We then 
compare the observed occurrence to the outcome of a purely random process.
20 
 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
Drawing on prior studies about innovation and business cycles (Barlevy, 2007; 
Fabrizio & Tsolmon, 2014), we compute nominal gross output by summing 
annual value added and material costs for each of the three-digit SIC industries 
in the NBER Manufacturing and Productivity database (Bartelsman & Gray, 
1996). Then we calculate the annual real gross output (RO) for each industry 
by dividing the nominal gross output by each industry’s shipments deflator as 
provided by the NBER database. We use the variation of the natural log of real 
gross output (lagged by 1 year) to identify Contraction
21
 (e.g. negative growth 
rate of RO). As we are mostly interested in the relationship between search 
strategies and the downturn phases of the business cycle, we multiply 
                                                          
19 Note that we identify the joint occurrence of the components at year t and observe the 
recombinations of these two components with other technologies in the knowledge space in the 
previous 5 years. See Chapter 1 and Appendix B for details on the derivation of the measure. 
20 As an example, the patent "US6180351", assigned to Agilent Technologies Inc., has a high 
degree of unconventionality in the knowledge recombination process. In 1999 (application year) 
this patent recombined  two components, i.e. database maintenance principles [class 707/200] and 
nucleic acid base hybridization processes [class 435/6 for molecular biology and microbiology], 
that were previously used mostly independently.  
21 In line with previous studies (de Rassenfosse & Guellec 2009; Hall et al.,1986; Kondo, 1999) 
we use a one year lag of this variable. These studies have showed that R&D investments create 
patent applications within a time lag of about a year and half. Results with two years lag are 
provided in Appendix B.  
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Contraction by (-1), higher value are associated with a deeper contraction in 
Real Output.  
Positive growth is output is captured by the variable Expansion. However, 
firms may have different responses to a variation in the growth rate of RO 
depending on the total level of output at which the variation occurs. Hence, we 
also include in our empirical setting the natural log of real gross output lagged 
by 1 year (RO).  
3.3.3 The role of Financial constraints 
Due to the inherent riskiness and uncertainty, innovations, in particular 
novel inventions, are more difficult to finance through external sources of 
capital than other types of investments (Amore et al., 2013; Hall & Lerner, 
2010; Peia, 2016). These problems are exacerbated during downturns, when 
profitability and availability of internal finance decrease and the financial 
sector lends a lower share of their total asset (Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994). 
Moreover, financially constrained firms will be more exposed to credit 
shortage during downturns (Aghion et al., 2012). It follows that during 
recessions retrenchment from original inventions is expected to be more 
pronounced in firms which mostly depend on external capital. To understand 
how the degree of unconventionality varies according to the dependence on 
external finance, we use the Kaplan and Zingales Index (1997) that measure 
firms' dependence on external financial capital. The Index is a linear 
combinations of cash flow, market value, debt, dividends, cash holding and 
assets.
22
 Firms with fewer availability of liquid assets, lower ratio of cash flow 
and dividends to assets, higher ratio of debt to assets and Tobin's Q are 
                                                          
22The Kaplan and Zingales Index is  defined as: 
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where cash flow (CF) is the sum of Income before extraordinary items and depreciation and 
amortization (Compustat IB+ DP items), dividends (Div) common and preferred (Compustat 
DVC+DVP items), CHE refers to cash and short term investment. These variables are normalized 
by lagged PPE. Leverage (LEV), is the ratio of long term debt (DLTT item) and debt in current 
liabilities (DLC item) to stockholders equity (SEQ item). Tobin's Q (Q) is the ratio of total asset 
(AT), Market Value of Equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) minus the book value of equity (CEQ) and 
deferred taxes (TXDB) to total assets. According to Kaplan and Zingales (1997), firms are 
financially constrained as the wedge between internal and external funds increases with increasing 
cost in rising external sources of capital. 
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expected to be more financially constrained and hence have more difficulties 
in financing their ongoing operations when economic conditions tighten. High 
values of the Index flag firms that rely heavily on external sources of funds 
and are characterized by high debt, low cash-flow and low dividends whereas 
lower value are associated with more resilient firms. We use the median value 
of the index to split the sample according to firms' reliance on external finance 
(Table 3.2).  
3.3.4 The Competences of the firm 
The perceived risks and uncertainty related to distant search are not 
uniform across the technological portfolio of firms (Brusoni et al., 2001). 
Firms indeed mostly operate in the core of their technological competences, 
being those technologies in which they dedicate a large amount of resources 
and have secured a strong advantage. Conversely, non-core technologies are 
associated with activities aimed at expanding the technological base of the firm 
(Granstrand et al., 1997). Core technologies can support the ramification in 
new technological domains by allowing a more efficient search for solutions 
(Granstrand et al., 1997; Katila & Chen, 2009). Technologies in this set of 
activities are frequently recombined and are usually linked to the upgrade of 
existing products or to ongoing R&D projects. On the other hand, technologies 
that are at the periphery of the firm's activities entail a deeper experimentation 
process functional to the exploration of new technologies, knowledge and 
ideas that lead over time to the development of new products or processes 
(Gatignon et al., 2002). As the exploration phase requires time, these activities 
are usually associated with more time to market.  
To measure whether inventions belong to the core versus the peripheral 
competences of the firm, we use the Revealed Technology Advantage (RTA) 
index (Patel & Pavitt, 1997), calculated on the 36 technology categories 
proposed by Hall et al. (2001). Patents are assigned to technological categories 
using their primary patent class
23
 (Li et al., 2014). The RTA index has been 
computed at the company level. It is given by the firm's share of patents in a 
particular technology divided by the share of patents in that technology at the 
                                                          
23 USPTO assigns patents to "Original Class" or  primary classes on the base of the broadest claim 
reported in the patent. This class best describe the inventive step of the patent and is generally 
reported in bold font in the first position on the front page of a patent (USPTO, 2003).  
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USPTO level. We labeled as Core all those technology fields whose RTA is 
above one and Non-core those with values less or equal to one. It turns out that 
the distribution of patents is highly skewed with 88% of inventions in the core 
technologies of firms (Table 3.3). 
3.3.5 Control variables 
We introduce a battery of controls concerning the invention (patents) and 
the firms. On the invention side, we account for the extent to which the focal 
patent builds on prior knowledge using backward citations (Citations). We 
calculate the natural logarithm (plus 1) of the number of backward citations to 
prior art. However, original recombination of components might be the result 
of completely new combinations which are not based on pre-existing 
knowledge (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Hence, we also account for the 
possibility that inventions do not cite prior art (No Prior Citations). The 
degree of novelty characterizing each invention is a positive function of the 
number of knowledge components that are recombined. In our framework, the 
Number of Technological Components are represented by (the natural log of) 
the number of technological subclasses on which the patent is based. Drawing 
on the organizational literature, we also include a set of controls for the 
inventive process at the level of inventive teams. Since knowledge is 
distributed among individuals, teams may facilitate the recombination of 
competences and hence draw solutions from a more diversified pool (Singh & 
Fleming, 2010). We capture the composition of teams by accounting for the 
number of inventors in every patent, Team. We also control for the experience 
of inventors by considering (the natural logarithm of) the total number of 
patents of the most prolific inventor in the team, i.e. Experience. We also 
include company characteristics that may influence the propensity to engage in 
novel search strategies. Large firms have been found to be path dependent, 
usually confined within their established routines and practices showing 
resistance towards new or more radical solutions (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). 
Yet, they also build on a larger knowledge base from which they can easily 
diversify their technological portfolio (Leten et al., 2007). Hence, we control 
for the firm inventive size Assignee Size, computed as the (log plus one) of the 
total number of patents at the USPTO in the year of the focal invention. The 
concentration of firms' R&D portfolios may affect the knowledge 
recombination process. Hence, we control for the technological Concentration 
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of firms over technological classes through the use of the Herfindahl index of 
concentration. This measure will take the value of one for firms having a very 
concentrated patent portfolio, whereas it will approach zero for technologically 
diversified firms. We also identify patent whose assignee show a tendency to 
cut in R&D during the contraction phases of the cycle. These firms may be 
more sensitive to fluctuations in the industry and prone to engage in local 
search (Cut in R&D). We finally add dummies for Year, Technologies and 
Sectors to account for possible trends over time and differences among 
technologies and sectors. Summary statistics of the variables are showed in 
Table 3.1. Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for low versus high 
financially constrained. Table 3.3 presents the correlation among the variables. 
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3.4 Results  
In our empirical strategy we focus on the effect of business cycle on the type f 
knowledge recombination undertaken by firms. The unit of analysis is 
represent by the patent (Appendix B reports the firm level analyses that 
provide a better understanding on the intensive and extensive margins). 
Specifically, we distinguish between the growing and contractive phases of the 
business cycle, controlling for invention, inventors and organizational 
characteristics as well as years, technologies dummies and firm fixed effects 
Table 3.4-( model 1). Demand driven factors play a significant role in the 
timing and characteristics of innovations (Fabrizio & Tsolmon, 2014). During 
downturns, demand decline. The main consequence is that firms could 
perceive distant search as highly risky and uncertain relative to the expansion 
phases of the cycle. Hence, firms become more sensitive to risks associated 
with novel inventions which are likely to be postponed to the upturns of the 
cycle (Yang et al., 2004; Steenkamp & Fang, 2011). As we cannot directly test 
any effect due to changes in the behavior of consumers, in Table 3.5 we shed 
light on the relationship between unconventionality and downturns by focusing 
on the financial health of firms (model 2). In model 3 we show the estimations 
for patent in the portfolio of firms having a tendency to cut during the 
contractive phases of the cycle versus those that do not have this tendency. The 
retrenchment from novel projects does not impact the entirety of technological 
competences of firms. Firms develop specialized competences in core 
activities where the exposure to risks is lower due to a robust and cumulated 
knowledge base (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Along this line, we distinguish 
between core and non-core inventions to highlight potential differences 
between this set of firms' activities during the contractive and growing phases 
of the cycle (model 4). In a second set of regressions we use the same models 
to investigate how the technological impact of inventions is influenced by the 
reorientation of firms’ search strategies along the business cycle (Table 3.6)
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
Description Variables Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Higher values are associated to more atypical 
combinations 
Unconventionality 166,168 -3.543 0.619 -6.679 -1.316 
RO t-1 Real Output 166,168 10.422 1.545 5.255 13.61 
(R.O t  - R.O t-1/ R.t t-1) > 0 Expansion 166,168 0.012 0.015 0 0.112 
(R. O t - R. O t-1/ R.O t-1  ) < 0 Contraction 166,168 0.001 0.004  0 0.107 
Ln(number of bwc.cits+1) Citations 166,168 2.418 0.896 0 7.064 
No prior citations No Prior Citations 166,168 0.008 0.093 0 1 
Ln of the number of technological subclasses 
recombined 
Components. 166,168 1.441 0.561 0.693 5.099 
Number of inventors in the team Team 166,168 2.371 1.565 1 34 
Ln (tot. number of patents of most prolific inventor in 
a team) 
Experience 166,168 15.965 29.05 1 485 
1- Hirschman-Herfindah index Diversification 166,168 0.120 0.114 0.0138 1 
Ln(tot. number of patents) by the firms Patent Portfolio Size 166,168 4.882 1.717 0 7.470 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for High and Low Financially constrained firms. 
 
Low reliance on external financing   High reliance on external financing 
  Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Unconventionality 103,943 -3.57 0.610 -6.602 -1.551 
 
43,399 -3.48 0.621 -6.679 -1.795 
Real Output 103,943 10.107 1.314 5.255 13.610 
 
43,399 11.070 1.719 5.568 13.610 
Expansion 103,943 0.009 0.0133 0 0,112 
 
43,399 0.017 0.017 0 0.112 
Contraction 103,943 0.001 0.004 0 0.107 
 
43,399 0.001 0.004 0 0.067 
Citations 103,943 2.414 0.903 0 7.064 
 
43,399 2.397 0.856 0 6.311 
No Prior Citations 103,943 0.088 0.093 0 1 
 
43,399 0.008 0.0926 0 1 
 Components 103,943 1.441 0.571 0.693 4.962 
 
43,399 1.449 0.540 0.693 4.127 
Team 103,943 2.413 1.629 1 34 
 
43,399 2.262 1.388 1 26 
Experience 103,943 13.14 18.276 1 298 
 
43,399 23.61 46.58 1 485 
Concentration 103,943 0.112 0.115 0.013 1 
 
43,399 0.135 0.115 0.014 1 
Assignee 103,943 5.723 1.608 0 9.469   43,399 6.035 2.037 0 9.504 
Note: We used the median value of the Kaplan and Zingales Index to split the sample between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms with a slightly higher percentage in the group of financially constrained firms (57,39%). 
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3.4.1 Technological Search Over the Business Cycle 
Table 3.5 shows the results of our main analysis of the effect of business 
cycles on the type of inventions. In model 1 the coefficient of Real Output 
suggest that a higher level of Output is associated with more unconventional 
inventions in line with the pro-cyclical view (Fabrizio & Tsolomon, 2014). 
The coefficient of Expansion suggests that a 1% increase in total Output 
generates an increase in the level of unconventionality equal to 0.082%. The 
coefficient of Contraction indicate that a 1% decrease in Output produces a 
decline in the level of Unconventionality of 0.077%. A Chow test confirms 
that these coefficients are statistically different from each other. These results 
indicate that during contractive phases of the cycle, towards the trough, firms 
retrench from more novel inventions, recombining components in a more 
conventional way through the use of established combinations. Downturns 
therefore are not only associated with a reduction in R&D expenditures, as 
extensively discussed in literature, but also to a decrease in the degree of 
unconventionality characterizing the search and recombination of knowledge 
which result in less innovative outputs.
24
 It is relevant to note that 
Unconventionality varies proportionally less in recessions. Hence, firms 
response to a variation in the level of Output is not symmetric, a variation in 
the output of the same magnitude generate different responses in downturns 
and in upturns. The decline in unconventionality is proportionally lower during 
contractions phases compare to the increase in unconventionality in 
expansions. 
The controls are in line with our expectations. Inventions based on a larger 
number of components recombine elements in the technological space which 
are more distant providing possibilities for more novel solutions. Finally, 
inventions originating from larger teams are based on less novel technological 
combinations. This result, surprisingly at first, can be explained by the fact that 
larger teams have the advantage of recombining components from a broad set 
of competences, but also require a common "language" before integrating very 
distant domains.  
                                                          
24 In a separate regression, available in Appendix B (Table B.1), we investigated the evolution of 
the number of patents.  
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In line with the pro-cyclical relationship between business cycle and 
innovation, managers are more cautious with regards to risky investments, 
such as original innovative projects, during the contractive periods of the 
cycle. Firms may focus on problems which leverage on established knowledge 
domains and require the exploitation of existing solutions; they are therefore 
reluctant to pursue innovative projects based on the exploration of new 
technological domains through distant search (Cyert & March, 1963; Troilo et 
al., 2014). Two main factors play a role in the pro-cyclical relationship 
between novel inventions and the business cycle. On the supply side, firms 
experience a reduction of resources to allocate to innovation during downturns. 
On the other side, firms facing lower availability of resources are more 
concerned about efficiency than efficacy, favoring more conservative projects 
(Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994).  
 
3.4.2 Technological Search over the Business Cycle: the role of 
financial constraints and firms' competences 
Model (2) in Table 3.5 reports the results for the two subsamples. The 
coefficient for Contraction is significant only for firms with high dependence 
on external finance. A 1% decrease in Output produce a decline of 0.08% for 
firms that are financially constrained. The reaction of low financially 
constrained firms to variations in the level of Output (expansion and 
contraction) remain similar in magnitude. A Chow test confirm that the 
response of low and financially constrained firms is statistically different. 
This finding supports the view that the decrease in demand and profitability 
occurring during downturns mostly affects the innovation strategies of 
financially constrained firms, which are hindered from undertaking novel 
inventive projects, characterized by higher risks and uncertainty. Financially 
resilient firms instead do not change significantly their strategies during 
downturns and are able to sustain similar levels of unconventionality in their 
inventions. These results suggest that the availability of slack resources is 
critical for the pursuit of novel projects based on the exploration of new 
technological domains. Firms with higher slack resources are more likely to 
engage in innovative activities characterized by distant search as organizations 
are less concerned about immediate returns (Danneels, 2008; Levinthal & 
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March, 1981). Nohria and Gulati (1996) argue that slack resources allows 
firms to pursuit innovative projects associated with higher levels of uncertainty 
but also a potentially high pay-off. Financially constrained firms might also 
have a harder time in retaining top scientists with a consequent decrease in the 
innovativeness of firms patenting strategies (Hombert & Matray, 2016). 
Model 3 differentiate between patents belonging to assignee that tend to cut 
in R&D during the contractive phases of the cycle versus those firms that do 
not show this tendency. The coefficient of Contraction is significant only for 
firms that cut in R&D (a 1% decrease in Output produces a reduction in 
unconventionality of 0.06%). 
Model (4) in Table 3.5 shows that, during the contractive phases of the 
cycle, firms cut back on novel inventions in the core of their technological 
competences (-0.08%), whereas the retrenchment in non-core activities is not 
significant. Also for this set of regression the Chow test confirm that the 
coefficient for Core and Non-core are statistically different from each other. 
During downturns firms select carefully their R&D projects to limit potential 
risks, thus reducing their exposure. It follows that during downturns, when the 
availability of resources decreases and firms become more sensitive to 
expected returns, firms will selectively cut back on more uncertain projects 
and reorient scarcer resources on projects characterized by more predictable 
outcomes. As most of the patents belong to the core competences of the firms, 
it is likely that firms will hold back innovative product in this set of activities.  
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Table 3.2 Correlation Table 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Unconvention 1.0000  
          2 Real Output 0.1827* 1.0000  
         3 Expansion 0.1313* 0.4862* 1.0000  
        4 Contraction -0.0853* -0.2372* -0.2632* 1.0000  
       5 Citations 0.0410* -0.0197* 0.0078* -0.0237* 1.0000  
      6 no Bwd cits 0.0042 0.0052* -0.0142* -0.0091* -0.2547* 1.0000  
     7 Components 0.2155* 0.0323* 0.0092* -0.0370* 0.1204* 0.0052* 1.0000  
    8 Team 0.0323* -0.0204* -0.0424* -0.0375* 0.1544* 0.0067* 0.0926* 1.0000  
   9 Experience 0.0802* 0.2151* 0.1082* -0.0590* 0.1046* 0.0120* 0.1110* 0.1526* 1.0000  
  10 Concentration 0.0263* -0.0778* 0.0406* -0.0583* 0.1842* 0.0073* 0.0356* 0.0692* 0.1276* 1.0000  
 11 Assigne 0.1024* 0.4312* 0.1747* -0.1054* -0.0658* -0.1139* 0.0314* 0.0326* 0.1856* -0.4452* 1.0000  
67 
 
Table 3.4: Estimations for technological search over the business cycle. OLS models for the degree of Unconventionality. 
 All Low KZ  High KZ Cut R&D Non Cut R&D Core Non Core 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Real Output 0.0899*** 0.0895*** 0.0829*** 0.0752*** 0.0795*** 0.0938*** 0.0490*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0076) (0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0098) 
Expansion -0.7923*** -0.9712*** -0.5963* -1.0775*** -0.8543*** -0.8678*** -0.2935 
 (0.1522) (0.2211) (0.3267) (0.2678) (0.1957) (0.1607) (0.4741) 
Contraction 1.2091*** 1.1576** 1.1004 1.3258*** -0.6826 1.1630*** 1.1204 
 (0.3869) (0.5154) (0.9574) (0.4443) (0.8881) (0.4098) (1.1709) 
Citations -0.0103*** -0.0093*** -0.0110*** 0.0031 -0.0196*** -0.0121*** -0.0005 
 (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0057) 
No Bwd Cits -0.0179 -0.0100 0.0215 -0.0072 -0.0314 -0.0236 0.0095 
 (0.0164) (0.0203) (0.0353) (0.0257) (0.0212) (0.0173) (0.0504) 
Components 0.2182*** 0.2170*** 0.2343*** 0.2072*** 0.2258*** 0.2121*** 0.2482*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0081) 
Team -0.0030*** -0.0032*** 0.0002 0.0036** -0.0084*** -0.0042*** 0.0056* 
 (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0031) 
Experience -0.0000 -0.0004*** 0.0001* -0.0001 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Concentration -0.1711*** -0.2080*** 0.1176 -0.0434 -0.2507*** -0.1647*** -0.2267 
 (0.0358) (0.0497) (0.0779) (0.0569) (0.0474) (0.0362) (0.2348) 
Assignee  0.0002 0.0057* 0.0051 0.0053 -0.0049 -0.0005 0.0033 
 (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0067) 
Constant -4.9184*** -4.8989*** -5.2361*** -4.0849*** -4.7838*** -4.9274*** -5.7305*** 
 (0.0896) (0.0959) (0.5705) (0.5642) (0.1037) (0.0901) (0.6127) 
N 166168 103943 43399 77432 88736 146559 19609 
R2 0.1730 0.1575 0.2251 0.1700 0.1586 0.1790 0.1659 
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The models report the results of the Ordinary Least Square on the median value of the degree of novelty in patents. Models include 20 year, 36 technology and 
sector dummies. Models also include controls (dummies) for missing information about backward citations. All models include firm fixed effects.  
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3.4.3 Technological Search over the Business Cycle: Technological 
Impact  
The analysis so far has highlighted a reduction in the level of technological 
novelty during downturns, especially for financially constrained firms and in 
core research activities. The implications for firm performance however 
remain unclear and may depend on the ability of firms to choose effectively 
the projects to pursue during downturns. Due to reduced availability of 
resources, firms may be more efficient in the selection of innovative projects, 
reducing their involvement in riskier projects and focusing on inventions with 
more certain outcome (Almeida et al., 2013). However, novelty, and the 
uncertainty underlying it, is usually associated to inventions with both higher 
failure rates and higher impact. Therefore one should expect firms, especially 
those with limited access to financial resources, to be more selective in the 
pursuit of novel projects and therefore generate novel inventions with higher 
impact during downturn, due to the discontinuation of more uncertain projects. 
In this section we analyze the relationship between the business cycle and 
the technological impact of the inventions as measured by forward citations
25
 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). If firms are more efficient in the selection of projects, we 
should expect novel inventions generated during negative variations of output 
to receive more forward citations, as unproductive projects are discontinued or 
postponed. Moreover, this premium should be higher for novel inventions 
from financially constrained firms.  
The models in Table 3.6 show that the coefficient for the degree of 
unconventionality is not significant in model (1). This result is possibly due to 
the lower level of unconventionality, and consequent impact, of inventions 
during downturns. Model 1 shows that expansion phases, namely positive 
variation of the output, are associated with higher number of forward citations. 
In model (2) we split the sample according to the dependence on external 
financial capital. The results indicate that the decision to discontinue novel 
projects is not associated with the availability of financial resources in 
contractive phases while an increase in the number of forward citations is 
                                                          
25 In this section we rely on the same regression models to investigate the effect of search strategies 
on the (natural logarithm plus one of the) number of the forward citations received by patents. 
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observed for low and high financially constrained firms inventing in 
innovation during pro-cyclical phases.  
The coefficient of the degree of unconventionality in inventions is negative 
in non-core activities while it is positively associated with forward citations in 
non-core technologies (model 4). This finding is consistent with the view that 
unconventionality in non-core areas is potentially associated with more 
explorative inventive approaches, providing the basis for the development of 
future inventions. Indeed, these inventions receive a higher number of forward 
citations, indicative of a higher technological importance and economic 
significance. Model 4 also shows that positive variation of the output are 
associated with higher forward citations in the core and non-core activities 
whereas negative variations in output are associated with lower forward 
citations in non-core activities only. 
Overall the results suggest that inventions characterized by higher level of 
unconventionality developed in non-core areas have a higher impact. Firms are 
however risk averse showing sensitivity in the contractive phases by cutting on 
unconventional inventions characterized by higher risk and an unpredictable 
outcome. 
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Table 3.5: Technological Impact. OLS models for the number of forward citations. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 6 Model 7 
Unconventionality -0.0028 0.0039 -0.0220** -0.0097** 0.0374*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0086) (0.0045) (0.0124) 
Real Output -0.0621*** -0.0583*** -0.1048*** -0.0580*** -0.0991*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0074) (0.0135) (0.0059) (0.0169) 
Expansion 1.8317*** 1.8886*** 1.2563** 1.8927*** 1.6090** 
 (0.2626) (0.3796) (0.5783) (0.2774) (0.8167) 
Contraction -0.6313 -1.2235 0.6388 -0.2339 -3.6037* 
 (0.6672) (0.8851) (1.6945) (0.7075) (2.0169) 
Citations 0.1327*** 0.1417*** 0.1277*** 0.1288*** 0.1577*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0065) (0.0034) (0.0098) 
No_bwd cits 0.0991*** 0.1486*** 0.0516 0.0877*** 0.2301*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0348) (0.0624) (0.0298) (0.0868) 
Components 0.2045*** 0.1980*** 0.2185*** 0.2000*** 0.2383*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0100) (0.0051) (0.0143) 
Team 0.0509*** 0.0523*** 0.0481*** 0.0515*** 0.0415*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.0053) 
Experience -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Concentration 0.2095*** 0.2140** 0.3746*** 0.1998*** 0.3651 
 (0.0618) (0.0853) (0.1379) (0.0625) (0.4045) 
Size -0.0549*** -0.0425*** -0.0528*** -0.0583*** -0.0179 
 (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0084) (0.0042) (0.0116) 
Constant 1.4528*** 1.4529*** 3.0383*** 1.4070*** 1.5953 
 (0.1558) (0.1667) (1.0108) (0.1572) (1.0576) 
N 166168 103943 43399 146559 19609 
R2 0.2526 0.2758 0.2180 0.2633 0.1888 
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 The models report the results of the OLS on the median value of the degree of novelty 
in patents. Models include 20 year, 36 technology and sector dummies. Models also include controls for missing information about Bwd cits. 
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3.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks  
Innovation dynamics tend to be pro-cyclical, with a sizeable contraction of 
R&D investments during downturns. This pattern has serious implications for 
long term R&D efforts and growth. This study contributes to the debate on 
pro-cyclical versus counter-cyclical innovation by showing a re-composition 
of patent portfolios during downturns toward less novel inventions, especially 
as far as financially constrained firms are concerned. Reduced profitability 
form ongoing projects, lower availability of external funding and higher level 
of uncertainty affect firms' decisions with regards to R&D investments and 
innovation search strategies at large. Our results are consistent with empirical 
evidence showing that in the contractive phases of the cycle, firms tend to be 
more risk averse. They have higher preferences towards inventions that build 
on more established knowledge bases that are expected to provide close in 
time returns.  
From a theoretical standpoint, our results provide interesting insight in the 
debate on the relationship between innovation and business cycle. We found 
that the negative phases of the business cycle are associated with lower degree 
of unconventionality. This implies that during economic downturns, the 
recombination process is characterized by local search as knowledge 
components are recombined among familiar and less riskier technological 
domains. This especially occurs in financially constrained firms and core 
technologies. This finding is linked to the vast economic literature describing 
the effects of financial constraints on the ability of firms to undertake more 
novel inventive processes when environmental conditions are most 
challenging.  
From the managerial point of view, the results of this study advocate the 
design of proper strategies that sustain adequate level of innovation during 
contractive phases. Deep pocket firms should be aware of the risk of canceling 
or postponing projects with higher uncertainty during recession phases as 
competition from competing technologies may decrease. 
From a policy perspective, our results inform that the contractive phases of 
the cycle not only limit the amount of R&D investments in innovation but, 
more importantly, change investments decisions, with a higher preferences 
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towards more conservative and less impactful innovation projects. This finding 
may inspire future research on the design of policies that are not limited to the 
economic support to R&D through tax incentives and credit packages but are 
also able to drive firms' incentives towards more explorative innovation that 
have higher social returns. Research in this direction should also focus on a 
better understanding the extent to which firms reshape their patent portfolio in 
a more efficient way by cutting less valuable project and carry on most 
promising and eventually novel ones. This would be in turn a very interesting 
aspect to consider in the design of innovation policies.  
This study is not without limitations. As recognized in the literature, 
patents data have the major drawback of capturing only successful inventions. 
Besides, they don't have a uniform value and not all sectors are equally patents 
intensive (Cohen et al., 2000). Yet, patents data reveal major and important 
innovations patterns. Moreover, patent classification system is rather stable 
over time and regularly updated making it a reliable source for the 
computation of the level of unconventionality in the recombination of 
knowledge. In this analysis we consider only the primary patent class which 
make difficult to clearly differentiate between core and non -core activities of 
the firms. In our analysis we try to identify the heterogeneity of firms reactions 
to variation in the level of output by considering the role of financial 
constraints. However, other sources of heterogeneity can play a role in shaping 
the relationship between type of innovation and business cycle. Future research 
will further extend the richness of the dataset by including and differentiating 
between single and multi-business firms using Compustat segment-level data. 
The rational is that multi-business firms are likely to be less exposed to 
negative shocks. The scope of future research is to provide further insights on 
how recombination process are reshaped along the business cycle. Hence, it is 
interesting to consider potential premium associated with better performances 
(i.e. sales) in the aftermath of downturn for firms that are able to sustain 
adequate levels of technological innovation.  
In this analysis we tackle the role of market concentration on the level of 
patent unconventionality. Future research may emphasize further this aspect 
driven by the rational that during expansion competition may increase 
innovation because firms have incentives to increase their technological lead 
over rivals (Aghion et al., 1998). However, a decrease in competition during 
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the contractive phases may translate in a decline of patent race pushing more 
resilient firms to invest in unconventional innovations. 
The impact of economic recessions on innovation is not homogeneous 
among industries. In complex industries as in the information technologies, 
economic crises may serve as an opportunity to reallocate resources to new 
projects and to build a forthcoming market demand for more radical products. 
Thus future research may explore the relation between search process and 
business cycle in different industries.  
Although its limitations, this study contributes to a stream of research 
aiming at advancing the understanding of the search process along the business 
cycle, a topic that have important implications for economic recovery and 
growth. 
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Chapter 4 
Sowing Failures, Reaping 
Success? Evidence from 
Pharmaceutical R&D 
Projects 
4.1 Introduction 
In November 2016 Eli Lilly announced that its potential blockbuster drug 
against Alzheimer's disease, Solanuzemab (Sola), expected to generate about 
$1.6bn in sales by 2020, failed once again the Phase III clinical trial. After two 
previous failed attempts in 2012, Eli Lilly decided to retest the drug targeting 
2100 patients with mild Alzheimer. Although the drug performed slightly 
better than individuals taking a placebo, the improvement was too small to be 
considered as statistically significant
26
 (Chen et al., 2016). The announcement 
of the failure caused a sudden drop by 10.5% in Eli Lilly’s stock price and a 
fall by 5% in the stock price of Biogen, which is developing a rival drug, 
Aducanumab
27
. Eli Lilly has been working on a drug for Alzheimer's disease 
for 15 years, spending about $3bn in the past three decades on experimentation 
and drug development.  
Sola is only one of the many examples of drugs that have repeatedly failed 
in late clinical trials reflecting the intrinsic experimental nature inherent to 
drug development processes characterized by soaring costs and uncertain 
                                                          
26 https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=1000871 
27 https://www.ft.com/content/ec01d882-b618-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62 
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outcomes
28
. The estimated average pre-tax industry cost per new drug approval 
(inclusive of failures and capital costs) amount to over USD 2.5 billion per 
marketed drug (Di Masi et al., 2016). Therefore, the pharmaceutical industry 
represents one of the key examples of an innovation context marked by 
uncertainty, high failure rates, repeated trials, and long development 
trajectories. Drug development is an innovation process where organizations 
built on cumulative knowledge and experience (Scotchmer, 2004). These 
conditions induce pharmaceutical firms to specialize in certain domains to 
exploit specialized knowledge cumulated over time and the existing 
competences developed from previous trials conducted in-house and by others 
firms (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1978, Herriot et al., 1985).  
As widely described in the literature, organizations can use their previous 
experience to identify potential inefficiencies and effective practices, and 
adjust them in follow up R&D projects (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). The 
organizational learning literature has stressed the important role of learning 
from positive and negative experience as one of the mechanisms that can 
improve firms’ subsequent innovation process, and at the same time generate 
knowledge spillovers to other firms operating in related technological areas  
(Teerlak & Gong, 2008; Francis & Zheng, 2010; Levinthal & March, 1993). It 
has been advocated that firms can learn from failures in a process of trial and 
error (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003; Chesbrough, 2010) and be guided by the 
motto "Fail often in order to succeed sooner"
29
. Prior studies have emphasized 
the experimental nature of learning by analyzing the role of catastrophic 
failures such as in the case of the design and organization of the value chain of 
the Airbus A380 (Dörfler & Baumann, 2014) and the orbital launch of 
Columbia in 2003 (Madsen & Desai, 2010).  
Studies in this stream of research have focused on the role of experience 
from failure on performances enhancements (Ingram & Baum, 1997; 
Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Baum & Dahlin, 2007) disregarding, with only 
few exceptions, mechanisms of learning from successful experience (Hoetker 
& Agarwal, 2007; Magazzini et al., 2012). Since organizations have a 
                                                          
28 For a more comprehensive example see the report from the FDA "22 case studies where phase 2 
and phase 3 trials had divergent results", retrieved from 
"file:///C:/Users/Daniela/Downloads/1%204%2016%20final%20final%20(1).pdf 
29 This statement is from Tom Kelley, general manager of IDEO. 
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tendency to de-emphasize negative outcomes and to highlight positive results 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; Denrell, 2003), there are arguments to suggest that 
learning from success may be more salient than learning from failures. 
Existing studies have however not systematically compared the extent to 
which firms learn from prior failures and successes.  
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating to what extent 
pharmaceutical firms learn from prior failures and successes in their 
subsequent drug development efforts through either in-house experiential 
learning or through vicarious learning (learning from the experience of other 
firms). Relevant experience in related prior drug development efforts is 
identified by considering prior drug development projects of which the 
underlying patent is cited by the patent that is exploited in the current focal 
drug development project. This study examines whether (i) learning from 
successes is more decisive than learning from failures; ii) experiential learning 
is more important than vicarious learning. Unlike previous studies adopting 
aggregated measures of experience at the organizational level (Kim et al., 
2007; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Darr et al., 1995), we leverage a comprehensive 
and detailed micro-level dataset on drug development projects to examine the 
relationship between the probability that a drug development is successful and 
prior relevant experience in drug development efforts. 
Results show that projects that build on firms’ previous successful efforts 
have a higher likelihood to generate marketable drugs, while building on prior 
failures reduces this likelihood. A similar pattern, though much weaker in 
magnitude, is observed for drug development projects building on prior related 
projects of other firms. The findings of this study show that contrary to 
common wisdom, previous failures increase the incidence of failures. This 
pattern may be related to the higher potential market value of risky projects. 
Projects targeted to certain disease like Alzheimer face less competition due to 
the lack of existing drugs in the markets for the cure of this disease. At the 
same time, they represent fruitful opportunities of investments given the higher 
associated rewards. As a consequence, firms may be willing to accept higher 
failure rates linked to the experimentations in this high risk markets. In turn the 
experimentation in this type of markets also requires a deeper search efforts in 
order to understand the cause-effects linkages related to the cure of the disease. 
The results also point out a certain degree of organizational inertia as firms 
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continue familiar research trajectories. In addition to informing the literature 
on organizational learning and innovation, our study facilitates a more nuanced 
view on the learning mechanisms playing a role in the pharmaceutical sector. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section 
presents the relevant literature on organizational learning theory and develops 
our two main research questions. In Section 3 we describe the data and report 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results. The final section 
discusses the results and the potential implications. 
4.2 Theory and Research Questions 
4.2.1 Organizational Learning 
Organizations learn through a dynamic process where information and 
knowledge are acquired, generated, interpreted, stored and retrieved (Huber, 
1991; Senge, 1990). A key insight of organizational learning theory is that 
organizations adapt their knowledge base in response to lessons drawn from 
past experience and cumulated knowledge (Cyert & March, 1963; Huber, 
1991; Levitt & March, 1988). Depending on the extent of adaptation, the 
learning process may generate minor adjustments and refinements of existing 
routines through exploitation of previous knowledge or rather significant 
changes of existing practices through exploration of alternatives approaches 
(March, 1991). Changes in organizational knowledge is typically observable 
by improvement in future performances (Argote, 1999; Baum & Ingram., 
1998). Hence, organizations' ability to learn and adapt has been recognized as 
an important source of competitive advantage (Senge, 1990; Redding & 
Catalenello, 1994) in particular when knowledge generated through learning is 
difficult to imitate quickly (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). 
The learning process is usually triggered by feedback received from the 
environment and performance below aspirations that calls for adaptation of 
strategies, and search for improved solutions (Cyert & March, 1992; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Levitt & March, 1988; Simon, 1978; Stalk et al., 1992). 
Through performance feedback, organizations set benchmarks or reference 
points to reinforce actions and decisions that generated a positive outcome 
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while questioning those that lead to negative results (Levitt & March, 1988; 
Cyert & March, 1992).  
Theorists from the behavioral theory of the firm define aspirations as the 
lowest level of performance acceptable by organizational decision makers 
(Greve, 2003). The decision process is thus driven by aspirations which are 
used to appraise organizational performance into successful or negative 
outcomes (Cyert & March, 1963). Organizational learning literature has 
typically considered learning from prior aggregated organizational experiences 
(Argote & Epple, 1990; Darr et al., 1995) whereas other studies looking at 
more disaggregated dimensions have mostly analyzed responses to failed 
experiences (Desai, 2015; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). However, as 
suggested by the behavioral theory of the firm, organizations may respond 
differently to failed and successful experiences calling for a comparison 
between learning from success and failures.  
4.2.2 Learning from Failures and Success 
Although the important role of experience has been acknowledged in 
organizational theory (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1993), the 
bulk of studies have typically focused on the role of failed experience on 
subsequent performances by looking at knowledge generated by accidents 
(Madsen & Desai, 2010; Desai, 2015; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Desai 
2016; Dörfler & Bauman, 2014), errors (Ramanujam & Goodman, 2003), 
product recalls (Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Rhee & Haunschild, 2001), 
strategy failures (Chuang & Baum, 2003). This stream of literature has 
acknowledged the importance of investigating failures to understand the root 
causes, identify potential inefficiencies and design proper procedures in 
subsequent trials. Researchers in this stream of research advocate that negative 
catastrophic experiences stimulate "problemistic searches" for new solutions 
leading to a significant change of the status quo, away from the comfort zone 
of what the firm has already tried (Maslach, 2016; Cyert & March, 1963; Lant, 
1992; March & Shapira, 1992).  
Cyert and March (1963) suggest that organizations have stronger incentives 
to change their actions in reaction to failures through behavioral innovation. 
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Organizational learning in response to failure is characterized by a sense of 
urgency, especially for large failures, that is likely to trigger the search and 
adoption of new knowledge (Cameron, 1984; March, 1981). By questioning 
the practices and strategies that lead to negative outcomes, failures are 
expected to stimulate a search towards routes that wouldn't have been taken 
otherwise. Baum and Dahlin (2007) suggest that organizations performing far 
from their aspiration levels engage in more distant search following failure 
experience relative to those that meet the desired aspirations. Greve 2003 
demonstrates empirically that performance below aspiration not only makes 
decision makers search for solutions, it also makes them more likely to try 
inherently risky solutions.  
Following this logic, organizations should tolerate some degree of failure 
in order to gain valuable new knowledge and discover new learning 
opportunities for their innovation strategies (Leonard-Barton, 1995; 
Edmondson, 2011). A number of studies have provided initial indirect 
evidence of the learning effects from failures. Magazzini et al., (2012) 
examined the value of patents resulting from pharmaceutical R&D projects 
and found that patents from both successful and failed R&D projects generate 
a higher number of forward patent citations than those from projects not 
entering clinical trials. Khanna et al. (2016) is an exception in examining how 
‘small’ failures, proxied by voluntary patent expiration, affect the amount and 
quality of firms R&D output. They find that small failures are associated with 
a decrease in patent applications but with an increase in their quality measured 
by forward citations. 
The above arguments contrast with the theoretical argumentation that 
learning from failures is not an automatic process, as organizations are usually 
reluctant to openly share and divulge their own mistakes (Husted & 
Michailova 2002; Cannon & Edmonson, 2001). Thus, organizational learning 
is considered as myopic since firms often tend to overlook failures and 
overemphasize knowledge generated by previous successes (Levinthal & 
March, 1993). This is largely due to cognitive limitations and to a different 
approach to learning from failures and success. Miller and Ross, (1975) 
asserted, for instance, that individuals are much more likely to ascribe success 
to personal capability and failure to luck, than they are to attribute success to 
luck and failures to a deficit in ability. Similarly, Edmonson (2011, 2005) 
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suggested that individuals deal with mistakes by looking for explanations that 
support their existing beliefs, detaching themselves from the real causes of 
failures.  
Among studies stressing the importance of learning from failures, a number 
have argued that organizations may fail to learn from failed experience by 
generating incorrect lessons (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Staw et al., 1981). 
For instance, Eli Lilly was ready to discard is chemotherapy drug Alimta after 
failure in clinical trials. Only after a deeper investigation it was found out that 
the failure was due to a deficiency in folic acid in patients used in the trials. By 
simply associating folic acid with Alimta the problem was solved (Edmonson, 
2005). In this regard, Edmonson (2005) emphasizes the importance of identify, 
analyze and experiment failures. Other studies have instead identified 
organizational and psychological barriers that hinder learning from failures 
(Cannon & Edmonson, 2001; 2005). On the flip side of learning from failures, 
Levinthal and March (1993) highlight that although firms can benefit from 
failures through explorative search, they have to be careful not to end up in a 
continuous cycle where failures result in more failures. Firms that respond to 
failure by constantly searching for new technology, develop limited knowledge 
on a domain which can lead to an increase in the risk of future failures. This 
cycle of failures can also be generated by the fact that compared to previous 
success, failures are the evidence of what is not properly working out of many 
possibilities without necessarily narrowing down avenues for future 
development on right trajectories.  
Relatively few studies have examined whether firms benefit from 
knowledge generated by previous successes (Madsen & Desai., 2010; 
Magazzini et al., 2012; Hoetker & Agarwal., 2007). Successful outcomes 
represent the proof that previous decisions and practices worked well (D'Este 
et al., 2014) and that search for alternative solutions or development of further 
knowledge is unnecessary to reach the desired aspiration level (Lant, 1992; 
March & Shapira, 1992). Building on previous success trigger decision makers 
to search locally in the proximity of their existing knowledge leading to a 
refinement of previous assumptions and actions (Maslach, 2016). This strategy 
allow firms to economize on scarce resources and search cost while at the 
same time reducing uncertainty on the decision making process as the cause-
effects linkages are well known and became established in organizational 
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practices (Cyert & March, 1963; Shaver et al., 1997; Gimeno et al. 2005). 
However, learning from repeated success can also have a flip side as it 
increases self confidence that the expected aspiration levels will be reached. 
Based on cognitive limitations, organizations tend to attribute success to the 
quality of their decisions, actions and managerial capabilities, ignoring other 
circumstances and external factors that may have influenced the outcome 
(Miller & Ross, 1975). This may lead to the underestimation of risks and 
limited opportunities to adapt to technological changes and to respond to 
unexpected results (Levinthal & March, 1993). Hence, drawing solutions only 
from past success may trap firms into organizational rigidity and inertia. This 
may actually increase the likelihood of future failures, since the opportunities 
to adapt and look for alternative approaches are limited by the 
institutionalization of existing routines (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Madsen 
& Desai, 2010).  
Although organizational theory has drawn attention to the opportunities 
and caveats of learning from failures and success, the actual ability of 
organizations to capitalize on knowledge from positive and negative outcomes 
remains empirically underexplored (Magazzini et al., 2012; Baumard & 
Starbuck, 2005; Staw et al., 1981). Moreover, extant literature has rarely 
focused on a direct comparison of organizational learning from success and 
failure, with a few exceptions. 
 Haunshild and Sullivan (2002) focused on accident rates of U.S. airlines 
proxy organizational experience in the field by the time the firms was 
operating in the sector. They find that established firms were less likely to 
experience accidents than younger firms but without a clear distinction on the 
effects of previous success and failures. Haunschild and Rhee (2004) analyzed 
automobile recalls on the likelihood of future recalls. They found that 
experience on prior automobile production decreases the rate of future recalls 
suggesting learning.  
Madsen and Desai (2010) instead provided a direct comparison of learning 
from failures and success by analyzing the orbit launch accident in 2003. They 
found that launch vehicle companies learn more effectively from failure 
experience than from success in line with the argument that failures intensify 
search activities in urgency circumstances (Wildavsky, 1998).  
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This study augments understanding on the role of learning from success 
and failure in previous drug development projects in the pharmaceutical 
industry, for which both failures and success are intrinsic components. In this 
context successes are rare but have an important impact on firms 
performances, while failures occur frequently leading to serious losses of 
capital due to the large investments required for experimentation. This pushes 
firms to learn from their previous mistakes and from the knowledge that is 
generated from previous successful experimentation.  
 
A first focal question for research hence is whether pharmaceutical firms 
have a higher propensity to learn from success than from failure in their drug 
development efforts (RQ1).  
4.2.3 Vicarious Learning 
Organizational learning theory advocates that organizations learn and develop 
knowledge not only through their direct experience - experiential learning - but 
also through the observation of the experience of other organizations - 
vicarious learning - by imitating or avoiding specific practices or strategies 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998; Levitt & March, 
1988; Ancona & Bresman, 2007; Hatinschild & Miner, 1997; Huber, 1991; 
Levitt & March, 1988; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Miner et al., 2008; Meyer & 
Scott, 1983). Inferential learning occur by selectively copy others firms in a 
mimetic way (Katila & Chen, 2008) or for example by observing R&D 
activities of competitors,  interpreting and copying other's firm search (Katila, 
2002). Observing other firms' search can also work as a signal of opportunities 
(Katila & Chen, 2008).  
While direct experience with a certain task generates deep and tacit 
knowledge that may improve future performances in subsequent trials (Argote 
et al., 1990; Argote, 1996; Pisano & Bolmer, 2001), this is expected to be less 
so  when firms learn vicariously by imitating successful experience and best 
practices of other firms (Conell & Cohn, 1995; Haunschild & Miner, 1997) or 
by analyzing failures of other firms (Baum et al., 2000; Beckman & 
Haunschild, 2002; Kim, 2000; Miner et al., 1999). In the case of vicarious 
learning firms do not obtain the same level of detailed information and 
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firsthand experience as with direct experiential learning. Since firms lack 
direct access to other firms’ knowledge repositories, other firms’ actions 
influence firm strategy by changing expectations about current and future 
outcomes (Strang & Macy, 2001). The literature on vicarious learning through 
inference has debated the limits of this mechanism, as it can lead  firms ns to 
adapt their practices or to take decisions on the basis of expectations rather 
than more objective facts (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999). On the other hand, 
vicarious learning may still be beneficial as firms can integrate new valuable 
knowledge in their practices in high uncertainty environments when 
experiential knowledge alone is not sufficient to interpret the current state of 
the world (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). The integration of new knowledge 
can be facilitated when the other firms work in a common domain, sharing 
comparable knowledge bases, organizational forms and routines (Hannan & 
Carroll, 1992; Miner et al., 1999). 
Research focusing on vicarious learning from other firms' failures have 
empirically shown that failures decrease as the number of prior failures 
experienced by similar firms increases (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Chuang & 
Baum, 2003; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Kim & 
Miner, 2007). Failures have a signaling role, indicating promising and less 
promising trajectories of experimentation under uncertainty (Hoetker & 
Agarwal, 2007). In this regard, Krieger (2016) examines how 
biopharmaceutical firms react to news about competitors' failures in clinical 
trial and showed that firms react to failures from related projects in the same 
market (disease indications) and technology (inhibitor or antagonist 
approaches) by doubling their propensity to terminate their projects. Failure in 
different markets but in the same technology also increase significantly the exit 
rate, whereas failures in the same market but in different technologies does not 
affect projects survival rates. 
Although failures by other firms can provide salient information about 
efficacy of the compounds, firsthand experience in the pharmaceutical industry 
may still play a prominent role as firms can leverage tacit knowledge from 
their explorative research on the compound and their experimental experience.  
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A second focal question for research is then to examine whether 
pharmaceutical firms learn more from their own drug development experience 
than from other firms' experience (RQ2). 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Research Setting: Innovation in the Pharmaceuthical Industry  
The drug development  process is structured as a chain of well-defined phases 
in which the firm leading the project need to achieve precise milestones 
reporting the results of the study to the FDA and to the Center for Drug 
Evaluation (CDER) in the US (see Figure 1). The development of a new drug 
relies heavily on basic research usually conducted during the discovery phase. 
This phase includes the screening of potential compounds that are biological 
active for the medical treatment of a disease. The next step is the preclinical 
phase aimed at collecting information on dosing and toxicity level by testing 
the compounds on living animals. In case the test show lack of toxicity, the 
firm file an Application for the Investigation of New Drug (IND) to the FDA 
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Figure 1: Drug development Process with Example. Data are extracted from several sources: DiMasi et al., 2003; Campbell 2005; 
AlfForum, Abrantes et al., 2004; Mestre et al., 2012. 
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and proceed further to the Clinical trials for human tests. Clinical trials are 
organized into three main phases with different requirements and costs. In 
Phase I the drug is administered to a restricted number of healthy volunteers to 
identify potential toxicity issues in humans. If the drug doesn’t show any major 
side effect it is administered to a larger number of volunteers with the specific 
disease object of the study, Phase II. This phase determines drug effectiveness 
and stability as well as the appropriate dosage. During Phase III the drug is 
administered to a larger sample of patients that are monitored over time to 
determine the drug effectiveness on a larger scale and potential side effects 
that didn't arise in previous phases. A New Drug Application (NDA) is filed if 
all phases are successfully completed to provide scientific reports on the drug 
effectiveness and safety in contrasting the diseases compared to pre-existing 
drugs. In case of approval, the drug is made available for prescription to 
patients and goes into pre-registration and registration phases until it is finally 
marketed. However, even after the drug is launched, the company is still 
responsible to report any potential side effect raised after the approval in order 
to withdrawn from the market possible toxic drugs
30
.  
The pharmaceutical industry is characterized by high technological 
uncertainty, extensive costs and risks. Typically, only 22% of compounds that 
are tested in clinical trials conclude with a successful market launch (DiMasi et 
al., 2003). In absolute number, for every 250 compounds that enter pre-clinical 
testing, 5 advance to clinical testing and only 1 is eventually approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Campbell, 2005). Uncertainty in the 
drug development is also related to the length of the project that takes on 
average 12 years from the research lab to the market (EFPIA, 2014) with 
possible failures occurring also in later stages of development.  
Researchers have showed that between 2007 and 2010 on a sample of 83 
projects in Phase III, almost 90% of the failures across all therapeutic areas 
were attributed to safety reasons (21%), or to a lack of efficacy (66%) in 
demonstrating a statistically significant improvement versus placebo 
(Arrowsmith, 2011). Similar trends are found in a more recent contribution by 
Harrison (2016) who document that in the period 2013-2013, there were 218 
                                                          
30 Some well-knon cases of market withdrawal are the Fen-Pen recalled in 1997 after 24 years in 
the market; Cerivastatin by Bayer, recalled in 2001 after causing 10000 deaths; Rofecoxib by 
Merk in 2004 or Valdecoxib by Pfizer in 2005. 
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failures in Phase I/II. Of these, 52% of drugs fail due to a lack of efficacy 
while 24% of failures are due to lack of safety. The majority of failures occur 
for the medical treatment of complex pathology especially cancer and neuro-
degeneration (DiMasi, 2003; Julia, 2013). During the drug development 
process, pharmaceutical firms sustain extensive investments that have rapidly 
surged over time from 231 million of US $ in 1987 to over US $ 800 million in 
2000 (DiMasi et al., 2003; Adams & van Brantner, 2006). The highest share of 
R&D is concentrated in Phase III with about 32.1% of investments (EFPIA, 
2014) making failures at this stage very costly for organizations.  
 
4.3.2 Sample and Data 
To explore the role of success and failures in drug development, we 
leverage on the Pharmaceutical Industry Database (PHID) maintained at IMT 
Institute for Advanced Studies in Lucca (Italy). This database provides fine-
grained data on more than 30,000 pharmaceutical R&D projects including their 
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification, the indication on the 
treated disease, the development history of the project, the company leading 
the project as well as other companies that were involved during the trial as 
licensor or licensee. This database relies on information collected from 
governmental agencies, industry conferences, press relies, contacts with firms. 
For a subset of 9,496 projects, the PHID database also reports the associated 
patent publication number used by the firm to protect the compound under 
development
31
. We enrich the patent information by extracting the patent 
family relative to each patent publication number from PATSTAT (version 
2013) matching 9,165 projects that are associated with at least one patent 
family (96.51% of projects reporting a patent). We further cleaned the 
subsample remaining with 8,243 projects whose development process occurred 
in countries having comparable standards and procedures (Europe, Japan, 
USA, North America, Canada) or whose final drug has been marketed 
worldwide. We use patent data to link, via citations, the focal project to 
previous research efforts as well as controlling for knowledge spillovers that 
                                                          
31 The information over patent is available only for a subsample since natural compound are 
excluded from patent protection. The information on patents is available in the database where a 
patent search has been conducted for each compound and one or more patents were identified. 
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can generate an advantage for the successful outcome of the focal project. The 
theoretical and empirical literature in innovation suggests that patent citations 
represent a source of knowledge spillover (Trajtenberg, 1990). This literature 
also posits that highly cited patents are the most innovative as other firms are 
willing to imitate their ideas (Carpenter & Narin, 1983; Narin, Rose and 
Olivastro, 1989; Trajtenberg, 1990). In the pharmaceutical industry, patents are 
a good proxy of innovation, not only because compounds are patented early-on 
in the development process, but also because the propensity to patent is 
amongst the highest across industries (Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Campbell, 
2005; Jaffe, 1989; Cohen et al., 2000) and represent an important source of 
technological advantage in this industry (Levin et al., 1987). 
The rich amount of information included in the dataset, allows us to control 
for a series of patent-projects characteristics as well as organizational factors 
that may affect the final stage of follow-up compounds. After the cleaning 
procedure our sample includes 8,243 focal projects linked to 8,112 distinct 
patent families
32
. However, we restrict our analysis only to focal projects 
whose development process initiated between 1980 and 2005 to allow enough 
time in clinical trials,
33
 remaining with 7,350 projects linked to 7,042 patent 
families and lead by 1,374 distinct firms (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.2 provides some summary statistics about project performances in 
clinical trials. A large majority of focal projects in our sample has failed 
(35.58%) whereas only a smaller fraction has reached the final stage in the 
development(21.47%). A high fraction are still in progress (ongoing) or have 
never been officially discontinued being listed as ongoing despite no 
development update for long periods of time (42.95%).This trend is consistent 
with prior literature, acknowledging the high attrition rates and uncertainty 
characterizing the drug development process (DiMasi, 2003; Kola & Landis, 
2004). The average length of projects ranges on average from 8 years for failed 
                                                          
32 The relationship between focal project and patent is one-to-many. In our analysis we considered 
all the patents associated to the projects.  
33 In order to enable learning mechanisms to take place we restricted the analysis to the focal 
projects that started after the cited. 
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projects up to 14 years for successful projects, a trend that find consistency 
with previous studies (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004).
 34
  
There are 3,851of focal projects (52.39%) that built on previous research 
efforts citing 3,720 existing projects. The large majority of firms in our sample 
have between one and fifty projects for a total of 4,239 distinct projects. There 
are 20 large pharmaceutical companies with more than 50 projects that alone 
contribute to a total of 3,111 projects (Table 4.1). 
                                                          
34 For projects with market drugs we extract also the first date of sales. The average length of  
projects with marketed drugs then is 11 years, consistent with  the trend described in the literature. 
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Table 4.1: Most representative firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Num 
Proj. Succ. Fail Ong    
Num 
Proj. Succ.   Fail                                         
  
Ong. 
Takeda 56 9 29 18 Bayer 144 46 46 52 
Johnson & Johnson 58 15 17 26 Novartis 149 39 81 29 
Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma 58 13 20 25 AstraZeneca 162 46 78 38 
Boehringer Ingelheim 66 23 36 7 Astellas 167 61 63 43 
Eisai 83 24 40 19 AbbVie 203 69 55 79 
Daiichi Sankyo 89 38 25 26 Bristol-Myers  216 44 86 86 
Actavis 91 51 15 25 Merck & Co 243 47 83 113 
Roche 94 6 61 27 Sanofi 243 26 176 41 
Amgen 106 20 34 52 GlaxoSmithKline 320 81 117 122 
Lilly 114 8 42 64 Pfizer 449 45 160 244 
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4.3.3 Dependent Variable 
In our analysis we measure learning as the cumulated experience generated by 
previous R&D efforts, direct and vicarious, that operate to produce better 
outcomes in following attempts. 
Projects status. Successful projects are those that are lunched in the market or 
are in the process of registration or pre-registration. Failed projects are those 
that have been discontinued or suspended during development trials. Our third 
group is represented by all the projects that are still in the preclinical or clinical 
trials (ongoing projects). Every project, along the development process, may 
go through different status at different time, for different indications and in 
different markets. Therefore, to correctly identify the status we analyzed the 
development history of every project and we classified as Success those 
projects that have at least one success, as Failure those projects that have 
experienced only failed events while projects that have experience both a 
success and a failure in their development history are classified as success 
since at least for one indication or in certain geographical market have been 
approved by the FDA
35
. The remaining projects that along their development 
path did not experience any success or failure are classified as Ongoing (this 
group is not considered in the main analysis but will be presented in the 
Appendix Table A.6).  Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show the distribution over time of 
the projects by starting and outcome date. Table 4.2 reports the final phase 
reached by focal and cited project before termination. Table 4.4 reports the 
status of focal projects that build on previous efforts versus those that do not. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35  The projects that have both a Failure and a Success event in their development history are in 
total 509. In non reported regression we tried different classification for our dependent variable 
with results robust to alternative classifications.  As an example Dronabinol in its development 
history has a successful events, namely being marketed for treating anorexia nervosa, nausea and 
vomiting related problems. During its development history, clinical trials have been started also to 
cure migraine and dementia but with unsuccessful outcome. However, since at least for one 
indication the experimentation was successful, Dronabinol is classified as Success. 
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Figure 2: : Number of Successful/Failed and Ongoing projects over time.  
 
Table 4.2: Final Phase reached by the focal and the cited project before 
termination. 
 FINAL PHASE OF 
FOCAL BEFORE 
TERMINATION 
FINAL PHASE OF 
CITED BEFORE 
TERMINATION 
 Freq % Freq % 
Discovery 6 0.23 3 0.23 
Preclinical 829 31.70 387 29.25 
Clinical 8 0.31 5 0.38 
Phase I 486 18.59 238 17.99 
Phase II 936 35.79 478 36.13 
Phase III 330 12.62 205 15.50 
Terminated 20 0.76 7 0.53 
Tot 2615 100 1,323  
We extracted the most advanced phase reached by the project before 
termination in countries having comparable standards (Europe, Japan, USA, 
North America, Canada).  This enable us to know at which phase in the trial 
process the failure has occurred.  
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Figure 3: Distribution over time of focal and cited projects 
 
Table 4.3: Status of Focal and Cited project. 
 STATUS OF FOCAL STATUS OF CITED 
 Freq % Cum Freq  % Cum 
Failure 2,615  35.58 35.58 1,323 35.56 35.56 
Ongoing 3,157 42.95 78.53 1,319 35.46 71.02 
 Success 1,578 21.47 100.00 1,078 28.98 100.00 
Tot 7,350 100 100 3,720 100 100 
For 2,325 focal  projects and for 1,123 cited projects in the Ongoing group we 
don't have any update on the development process since more than 10 years. 
We use a cut off value of 10 years of no updates to distinguish between 
projects that are likely to have failed but didn't reported the termination event 
and projects that are still in the development process. We choose 10 years 
which is a longer time compared to what described in the literature in order to 
ensure that the group of suspicious ongoing actually include only projects that 
although not formally failed have performed badly. Focal: 2325 Suspicious 
Ongoing and 832 Real Ongoing. Cited: 1123 Suspicious Ongoing and 196 Real 
Ongoing. 
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Table 4.4: Status of focal projects that build on previous projects versus those that 
don't built on previous projects 
 
4.3.4 Independent Variables 
Reliance on previous projects: we analyze the reliance of the focal project on 
previous research efforts via patent citations. We distinguish Building on own 
projects, when focal project cites patents linked to projects developed by the 
same Lead Company, from Building on others' projects, when instead the 
focal build on research efforts by other firms. Self-citations refer to the ability 
of the firm to build on previous experiences and knowledge with possible 
benefits on following research projects
36
 (Hall et al., 2001). Literature has also 
considered citations of other organizations as a good proxy of knowledge 
flows (Jaffe et al., 2000). We further distinguished between citation to 
previous Successful, Failed and Ongoing efforts both by the Same Lead as 
well as other firms' projects (Building on own Failure / Success / Ongoing 
versus Building on others' Failure / Success / Ongoing)
37
. We distinguish Self-
                                                          
36 Nerkar (2003) uses a similar approach and consider patent citations as a proxy for knowledge 
recombination - patents citing previous patents using knowledge embodied in the cited ones. 
37 In order to avoid multicollinearity we use exclusive dummies only among the two main set of 
independent variables: Building on own previous own projects and Building on previous projects 
by other firms. As an example, the variable "Building on own Failure" flags focal projects that 
only built further on their own previous failures. At the same time the focal can also build on 
previous failure by other firms or previous success by others.  
 Focal projects that built on 
previous R&D efforts 
Focal projects that DONT 
built on previous R&D 
efforts 
 Freq. % Freq.          % 
Failure 1,340 34.80 1,275       36.44 
Ongoing 1,637 42.51 1,520       43.44 
Success    874 22.70    704        20.12 
 3,851  100 3,499         100 
The 52.39% of focal projects built on previous R&D efforts via patent citations 
with a success ratio equal to 22%.  Patent citation link may identify 
incremental development projects, whereas non-linked patents may be based 
on true innovations and new drug development opportunities. However, the 
success rate in the two group is quite similar ruling out this possibility. 
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citations from citations to other organizations since they convey different 
patterns of knowledge diffusion and learning mechanisms. On one side self-
citations measure the extent to which the organization is able to benefit from 
its previous research efforts in a cumulative way (Hall et al., 2001). On the 
other side, citations to other firms' efforts capture the extent to which the focal 
firm built on external knowledge through vicarious learning. Table 4.5 reports 
the citation patterns whereas Table 4.6 shows the success ratio of focal projects 
building on previous R&D efforts. 
 
Table 4.5: Citations patterns. 
 
 
Table 4.6: Success Ratio 
 
 
 
 Building on: 
  Success Ongoing Early Fail Late Fail 
 
Focal: 
Success 679 272 182 254 
Ongoing 701 968 614 666 
Early Fail 11 509 306 277 
Late Fail 636 291 238 308 
There are 3851 focal projects that built on previous research efforts, Repetition 
in the citation patterns in this table are possible due to multiple citations per 
focal project. On average focal cites 2 previous projects while the average 
number of cited patent families is 15.  
 
 Freq. Succ Succ. Ratio 
(%) 
Focal building on Success 
Focal building on Failures 
Focal building on Succ. & Fail 
Focal building on Ongoing 
1039 440 42,34%  
1223 112   9,15%  
986 190 19,26%  
603 60 9,95%  
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4.3.5 Control Variables 
We introduce a series of control variables related to the project, the associated 
patents as well as firms' characteristics.  
4.3.5.1 Project Controls 
The drug development projects may refer to several Medical Indications and 
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification (ATC). The Indication refers 
to the use of the drug for treating a certain disease. For instance, diabetes is an 
indication for insulin or stated in another way insulin is indicated for the 
treatment of diabetes. The ATC points to the active ingredients of drugs 
according to the organ or system on which they act and their pharmacological 
and chemical properties. In the ATC classification System drugs are classified 
into 5 levels: the first indicates the anatomical main group (metabolism "A"; 
cardiovascular system "C", and so forth), the second level indicates the 
therapeutic main group, up to the last level indicating the chemical substance. 
A drug that targets diabetes may for example report indications also for obesity 
and other metabolic disease and it is usually associated to ATC classes A10X, 
Drug used in Diabetes, A10L, Alpha-glycosidase Inhibitor, A84, Anti-obesity 
preparation. This study uses ATC- 3 level to identify the relevant drug market 
in line with standard procedure commonly used by the European Commission 
and pharmaceutical companies. A drug in ATC-3 class can only be substitute 
with another drug in the same ATC-3 class but not by a drug in a ATC-2 level 
even if pointing at the same Therapeutic Indication. For instance drugs in 
ATC-3: A10B and A10A are both associated to the treatment of diabetes but 
use different target action (insulin versus non-insulin), therefore they are not 
substitute. The inclusion of multiple indication and ATC per project might 
increase the possibility of success as scientists may leverage on a common 
knowledge and testing models on the same molecule applied to Indication 
sharing similar biological characteristics. Therefore we control for the Number 
of Indication and ATC classes associated to the project (Table 4.7).  
The risk embedded in the development of a drug in the ATC classes can 
vary over time. We measure a dynamic ATC Success Rate associated with 
each ATC included in each project by computing the share between Successful 
98 
 
project over the total project with known outcome (Success and Failure) before 
the starting date of the focal projects.
38
  
We also control for the R&D Opportunity in ATC by taking into account 
the total number of projects by other firms in the same ATC having a time 
overlap with the focal project (R&D competition in ATC). We also control for 
the possibility that unobserved characteristics of therapeutic areas may 
generate different project outcomes by considering the most representative 
ATC Classes in our sample associated to more than 30 projects (87 ATC 
dummies). Projects that are more recent in time may be less likely to have a 
final outcome status, either being marketed or terminated. To control for year 
effects, we include Starting Year dummies.  
Table 4.7: Number of Indication and ATC Classes of focal projects 
 
4.3.5.2 Patent Controls 
Our sample includes development projects of compounds that are protected by 
patent law. Chandy et al., (2006) et al., suggested that the ability of 
pharmaceutical firms to translate patents into final drugs is higher for firms 
that develop an intermediate number of drug-related patents. Thus, we include 
in our control variables the Number of Patent families the focal project is 
associated to, while also identifying, through dummies, projects that share the 
same patent family (Same Patent Family). In this study patent families are 
also useful to capture additional knowledge from previous patents via citations.  
We include the total Number of Backward Citations (Bwd cits) to other 
patent families and also a control for the citation to Non Patent Literature 
(Citing NPL Scientific) in the form of scientific references as existing studies 
                                                          
38 In case of multiple ATC per project  we computed the mean of (ATC Success Index).  
 Number of Indications Number of ATCs 
 Freq. % Freq.          % 
1 3,931 53.48 5,357       72.88 
2 1,609 21.89 1,439       19.58 
≥3 1,810 24,60    554         7.55 
 7,350  100 7,350         100 
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have shown an important link between science and technology (Narin et al., 
1997; Griliches, 1986; Koenig, 1983; Van Looy et al., 2003). Patent 
information also allows us to observe whether the focal project build on 
previous research efforts, the characteristics of the projects it builds on as well 
as other related patents. We consider the average quality of cited patent family 
proxy by the Forward citation. As failure may be linked to the intrinsic quality 
of both the focal and the cited patent. More novel or original patents are 
usually associated with a higher risk. To control for these factors we include 
the Originality measure by Trajtenberg et al., (1997) based on the spread of 
backward citations to technological classes. Novelty is also associated with the 
number of elements that are combined within patents, thus we control for the 
number of technological components that are recombined within the focal and 
cited patent
39
. We also flag common characteristics between focal and 
previous projects by identifying projects developing drugs in at least one 
common therapeutic area reported (Same ATC focal cited).  
Patents embody valuable knowledge upon which firms rely for the 
development of drugs. Therefore, we control for knowledge spillovers by 
identify the projects in which the company leading the R&D project is also the 
owner of the patent protecting the compound (Same Company Lead-Patent) 
4.3.5.3 Firm Controls 
Large firms have been found to be path dependent, usually confined within 
their established routines and practices showing resistance towards new 
explorative solutions (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). Yet, they also build on a 
larger knowledge base that allow them to leverage on direct failed ad 
successful events, benefit from scope economies on related projects, and better 
assessment of potential risks. The concentration of R&D portfolios of firms in 
specific therapeutic areas may increase the likelihood of a project to reach the 
market.  
Danzon et al., (2005) show that firms with focus experience rather than 
broad knowledge are able to leverage economies of scope with higher 
probability of completing Phase III in clinical trials. Hence, we control for the 
Concentration of firm portfolio over ATC classes pointing to the span of firm 
                                                          
39 These measures are computed at the family level. 
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research strategies using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. Note that each 
projects may include multiple ATC classes thus we capture the breadth of 
projects portfolio using a fractional count and then collapsing everything at 
firm level
40
. This measure will take the value one for firms having a very 
concentrated project portfolio, whereas it will approach zero for more 
diversified firms.  
Nerkar and Roberts (2004), find that experience in proximal technologies 
has a positive effect on commercial success of new pharmaceutical products. 
Hence, we control for the firm success ratio by computing the number of failed 
projects over time prior the starting date of the focal (Firm Failures Ratio). 
Since this variable is not cumulative, it controls for a different propensity of 
the focal firm to succeed or failed over time, possibly due to experience
41
. 
Projects that are more recent in time may be less likely to have a final outcome 
status, either being marketed or terminated. Finally, to capture variation in 
trends across firms and ATC classes over time, we also use Firms, ATC and 
Starting Year dummies. Table 4.8 provides an overview of the variables with 
a short description and summary statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 For the derivation of the Index see: Gruber, M., Harhoff, D., & Hoisl, K. (2013). Knowledge 
recombination across technological boundaries: scientists vs. engineers. Management 
Science, 59(4), 837-851. 
41 We also used an alternative and more direct measure of experience by computing the cumulative 
years of firm activity in the focal ATC in previous projects (Years of Experience in ATC).To  
control for firm-year unobserved effects we use the ratio of failed project prior the starting year of 
the focal. The main results are robust in both specification. 
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Table 4.8: Overview of Variables, their description and summary statistics for the 
group of Failure and Success excluding ongoing (4193 obs) 
Variable Description Measure Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Project Status Status of the focal projects 
(Success/Failure) 
Dummy 4193 0.376 0.484 
Building on: 
Focal projects building on 
previous own failed, 
successful or ongoing 
projects.                                       
(Focal Lead=Lead of 
previous proj.) 
Exclusive 
Dummies 
   
Self Failure 4193 0.052 0.222 
Self Success 4193 0.031 0.175 
Self Succ.& Fail. 4193 0.057 0.233 
Self Ongoing 4193 0.014 0.117 
Building on: 
Focal projects building on 
previous failed, successful or 
ongoing projects by other 
firms.                                   
(Focal Lead≠Lead of 
previous proj.) 
    
Others' Failure 
Exclusive 
Dummies+ 
4193 0.118 0.322 
Others' Success 4193 0.157 0.364 
Others' Succ &  
Fail. 
4193 0.137 0.344 
Others' Ongoing 4193 0.047 0.213 
Focal Projects 
controls:      
Num. Indication 
Number of Indications 
Number of 
Indications 
4193 2.35 2.49 
Num. ATC Class 
Number of ATC classes 
Number of 
ATC classes 
4193 1.428 0.765 
Num. Families 
Number of patent families 
Number of 
families 
4193 1.137 0.407 
Sharing the same 
patent 
The focal project is 
associated to a patent family 
shared by other focal 
projects. Extent to which 
same technological efforts 
are re-used. 
Dummy 4193 0.201 0.401 
Focal Patent 
Controls:      
Patent Originality Originality Index 
 
3793 0.829 0.137 
Number of 
Components 
 
  
3888 41.02 76.84 
Same Company - 
patent 
The lead company and the 
owner of the patent are the 
same entity (Jaccard 
similarity) 
Dummy 4193 0.922 0.289 
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Citations controls:      
Cite NPL - 
Scientific. Lit. 
Extent to which the focal 
project refers to Scientific 
NPL. 
Dummy 4193 0.802 0.398 
Bwd cit. 
Extent to which the focal 
project builds on previous 
technological efforts 
Number of 
Backward 
patent 
references 
4193 2.31 0.973 
Cited Patent 
controls:      
Fwd cit. Average quality of cited 
patent family 
Mean of Fwd 
citations 5year 
4193 8.74 8.035 
Patent Originality Originality Index 
 
3808 0.806 0.103 
Number of 
Components   
3835 28.55 36.403 
Same Company - 
patent 
The lead company and the 
owner of the patent in focal 
projects are the same entity 
(Jaccard similarity) 
Dummy 4193 0.0922 0.289 
Same ATC focal-
previous proj. Focal  building on previous 
projects having at least 1 
ATC class in common (via 
patent citations) 
Dummy 4193 0.349 0.476 
ATC Controls: 
     
ATC success rate 
Number of Successful 
projects in ATC prior to the 
starting of the focal project 
Number of 
Success in ATC 
4193 0.469 0.237 
R&D competition in 
ATC 
Number of projects by other 
firms in the ATC with time 
overlap 
Number of 
projects 
4193 5.62 1.664 
Firm Controls: 
     
Failure Ratio over 
time 
Number of failed projects 
over time prior the focal  
4193 1.05 1.22 
Breadth of 
firmactivities 
Breadth of  the focal Lead's 
research activities  
1-Herfindahl 
Index 
4193 0.118 0.179 
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Table 4.9 11: Correlation table 
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4.4 Results 
In our empirical strategy we focus on the effects that learning from previous 
R&D efforts has on the outcome of current drug development projects. The 
unit of analysis is therefore represented by the single project. In our empirical 
analysis we use logit model and take the likelihood of achieving project 
success (approval and market introduction of the drug) as the dependent 
variable. We exclude ongoing projects to focus on projects with a clearly 
defined outcome (in the appendix we examine ongoing status as an additional 
outcome, using a multinomial logit specification Table C.5). The estimates on 
prior success and failure indicate the likelihood of success of focal projects 
that build on previous projects versus those focal projects that do not build on 
prior projects of the focal or other firms. In Tables 4.10 and 4.12 we consider 
all citations linked to previous projects. In Tables 4.11 and 4.13 we instead 
control for the timing of the citation. In order to do that, we redefine the 
independent variables to take into account only citation linkages where the 
focal project ends after the cited projects (projects that ends before the cited 
are flagged by the dummy Projects before cited outcome). Models 1 show the 
results when only the control variables are considered. Models 2 presents the 
estimations of the full model.  
Our first research question proposes to examine whether pharmaceutical 
firms have a higher propensity to learn from success rather than from failures. 
Table 4.10 shows that previous successful attempts (both by the focal firm and 
by other firms) have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of 
achieving a successful outcome in focal drug development projects. We find 
the opposite result when the focal project builds on previous failures or 
ongoing projects. In other words, the estimates indicate that failure experience 
has a tendency to trigger future failures whereas previous success induces 
further success. The increase in the odds of achieving a successful outcome 
given previous success is substantially high (189%) for own success and about 
42% for others firms' success. Prior failure instead decrease the odds of 
success, by 50% for the coefficient (own Failure) and 37% for other firms' 
failure. The strong results for prior success provide a confirmative answer to 
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research question 1, while the negative effect of failure contrast with prior 
research findings on learning from large failures.  
Table 4.10: Estimations for experiential and vicarious learning  
on project status 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Self Failure  -0.7033*** 
  (0.2500) 
Others' Failure  -0.4666** 
  (0.1973) 
Self Success  1.0643*** 
  (0.2576) 
 Others' Success  0.3574** 
  (0.1668) 
 Self Succ. & Failure  0.1532 
  (0.2579) 
Others' Succ. & Failure  -0.3599* 
  (0.2139) 
Self Ongoing  -0.8032** 
  (0.3411) 
Others' Ongoing  -0.4418* 
  (0.2391) 
 
Num Indication 
 
0.2634*** 
 
0.2603*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0261) 
Num ATC classes 0.9800** 1.0038** 
 (0.4801) (0.4857) 
Num Patent Family 0.5677*** 0.5980*** 
 (0.1457) (0.1445) 
Shared patent Family -0.5597*** -0.5637*** 
 (0.1613) (0.1624) 
Focal Patent originality -1.8145*** -1.6375*** 
 (0.4446) (0.4431) 
Focal Patent Num.Comp. -0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Focal Lead=Focal Pat -0.6037*** -0.5965*** 
 (0.1450) (0.1468) 
Citing NPL Scientific 0.1024 0.1056 
 (0.1159) (0.1171) 
Bwd Cits 0.4072*** 0.4206*** 
 (0.0612) (0.0688) 
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Fwd cited 0.0011 0.0008 
 (0.0060) (0.0058) 
 
Cited Patent Originality 
 
0.2305 
 
0.2138 
 (0.4827) (0.4782) 
Num.Comp.  cited Patent 0.0004 0.0012 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Focal Lead=Cited Patent 0.0614 0.1352 
 (0.1855) (0.2329) 
Same ATC focal-cited 0.4009*** 0.4288*** 
 (0.1021) (0.1211) 
Succ in ATC 1.2301*** 1.0494*** 
 (0.2585) (0.2609) 
R&D competition in ATC -0.0742 -0.0359 
 (0.0639) (0.0654) 
Failure Ratio -1.0150*** -1.0015*** 
 (0.2287) (0.2310) 
Breadth of firm activities 0.7859** 0.7762** 
 (0.3389) (0.3404) 
Constant -1.5869** -1.9228** 
 (0.7684) (0.7621) 
Observations 3568 3568 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3270 0.3414 
log Lik. -1593.3710 -1559.2313 
Chi squared 1983.3707 2045.8247 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
Models report logit for Success and Failures with inclusion of 25 year, 87 ATC classes 
dummies. 
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Table 4.11: Estimations for experiential and vicarious learning on project 
status.  Time Restriction 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Cites Self Failure  -0.6089** 
  (0.2575) 
Cites Others' Failure  -0.2919 
  (0.2063) 
Cites Self Success  1.5979*** 
  (0.3639) 
Cites. Others' Success  0.5949*** 
  (0.1913) 
Cites Self Success and Failure  0.3124 
  (0.2679) 
Cites Others' Succ&Failure  -0.2619 
  (0.2265) 
Cites Self Ongoing  -0.7875** 
  (0.3436) 
Cites Others' Ongoing  -0.3655 
  (0.2451) 
 
Project before cited outcome 
 
-0.8634*** 
 
-0.8283*** 
 (0.1561) (0.1879) 
Num Indication 0.2622*** 0.2601*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0260) 
Num ATC classes 0.9506** 0.9527* 
 (0.4788) (0.4869) 
Num Patent Family 0.5528*** 0.5727*** 
 (0.1479) (0.1442) 
Shared patent Family -0.5487*** -0.5801*** 
 (0.1634) (0.1718) 
Focal Patent originality -1.8058*** -1.6527*** 
 (0.4521) (0.4606) 
Focal Patent Number of 
Comp. 
-0.0006 -0.0004 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
 
Focal Lead=Focal Pat 
 
-0.6233*** 
 
-0.6116*** 
 (0.1437) (0.1452) 
Citing NPL Scientific 0.0822 0.0816 
 (0.1174) (0.1162) 
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Bwd cits 0.3820*** 0.3662*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0676) 
fwd cited 0.0007 0.0001 
 (0.0061) (0.0058) 
Cited Patent Originality 0.2543 0.2637 
 (0.4794) (0.4798) 
Num. Comp. of cited Patent 0.0002 0.0010 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Focal Lead=Cited Patent 0.0772 0.0863 
 (0.1812) (0.2259) 
Same ATC focal-cited 0.5302*** 0.5202*** 
 (0.1118) (0.1311) 
Succ in ATC 1.2495*** 1.1178*** 
 (0.2698) (0.2740) 
R&D competition in ATC -0.0903 -0.0562 
 (0.0649) (0.0661) 
Failure Ratio -1.0000*** -0.9749*** 
 (0.2280) (0.2288) 
Breadth of firm activities 0.7978** 0.7532** 
 (0.3395) (0.3375) 
Constant -1.4437* -1.7596** 
 (0.7812) (0.7886) 
Observations 3568 3568 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3325 0.3478 
log Lik. -1580.3527 -1544.0172 
Chi squared 1945.5579 1977.0382 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
Models report logit for Success and Failures with inclusion of 25 year, 87 ATC 
classes dummies. 
The independent variables only include citations where the focal project ended after 
the cited. Focal projects that end before are included in the dummy Projects before 
cited outcome. 
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In the second research question, we proposed to examine whether there is a 
stronger influence from previous own success or failure than from other firms’ 
experience. A Wald test confirms that other firms’ prior success has a smaller 
effect on success than firms’ own prior success. Similarly, the difference in 
coefficients of own and other firms’ failure is significant as well. Citing 
ongoing projects has similar effects as citing failures. The difference in the 
coefficients between prior own and other firms’ success provides a 
confirmative answer to research question 2. Imposing a stricter time ordering 
between focal and prior projects (Table 4.11) leads to a similar pattern as in the 
models showed in Table 4.10, but with the effects generally larger in 
magnitude for citing previous own and others' success.  
Control variables reveal results that are overall consistent with our 
expectations. Focal projects with more medical indications and therapeutic 
areas have a higher probability to succeed as well as projects with more than 
one patent family. These variables shows the same trends and magnitude also 
in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. The reuse of the same patent family among several 
projects increases the incidence of failure, which is likely to be due to the 
lower costs of reusing the same patent for several projects allowing more risks 
to be taken through local search (the effects of reusing the same patent is better 
examined in the Appendix, Tables C.3 and C.4). The other controls at the 
patent level suggest that a higher originality of the focal patent on which the 
project is based, decrease the likelihood of success of the drug. This result 
suggests that projects that build further on patents that are original (combining 
knowledge from different sources) may have a higher intrinsic risk and distant 
search which may explain a higher failure rate. As found in previous studies 
(Narin et al., 1997) backward citations to patents increase the likelihood of 
success. A generally higher success ratio for projects in the same ATC 
significantly drives the success rate as well. Interesting is the positive effect of 
projects having the same ATC of the cited project suggesting that building 
further on common ATC classes facilitates learning and leads to a higher 
probability of success due to specific experience in the therapeutic category. 
Firms that develop specialized expertise in certain fields can limit the 
probability of failures since they can build further on cumulated knowledge. 
This finding is in line with studies pointing to the refinement of performance 
through repeated experience (Argote, 1996) and to the benefits of developing 
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focused experience enabling firms to rely on economies of scope (Danzon et 
al., 2005). In line with expectation, a higher success rate in the ATC increase 
the likelihood of success. At firm level, higher failure rates prior the starting 
date of the focal projects decrease the likelihood of success. Other control 
variables have no significant effects. 
Given the importance of within-ATC class learning shown in Tables 4.10 
and 4.11, we provide in Table 4.12 further insights on the effect of previous 
success and failure depending on whether prior projects cover the same ATC 
class or not. Interestingly, the negative effect of previous failures is limited to 
prior own and other failures in different ATCs by other firms', while it is not 
significant when prior projects cover the same ATC. The results also indicate 
that the probability of project success is enhanced in case prior experience 
relates to firms’ own and others firms' projects within the same ATC class. 
 
Table 4.12: Estimations for experiential and vicarious learning on ATC 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Self Same ATC Failed  -0.1645 
  (0.2790) 
NO Self Same ATC Failed  0.1585 
  (0.1556) 
Self Different ATC Failed  -0.3654 
  (0.2690) 
No Self Different ATC Failed  -0.5343*** 
  (0.1715) 
Self Same ATC success  0.7179*** 
  (0.2436) 
No Self Same ATC Success  0.7608*** 
  (0.1198) 
Self Different ATC Success  0.2101 
  (0.2349) 
No Self Different ATC Success  -0.0256 
  (0.1532) 
Self Same ATC Ongoing  -0.3479 
  (0.3213) 
No Self Same ATC Ongoing  -0.0213 
  (0.1720) 
Self Different ATC Ongoing  -0.1114 
  (0.2764) 
No Self Different ATC Ongoing  -0.2729 
  (0.1730) 
Num Indication 0.2640*** 0.2667*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0269) 
Num ATC classes 0.9704** 1.0192** 
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 (0.4763) (0.5152) 
Num Patent Family 0.5647*** 0.6072*** 
 (0.1479) (0.1502) 
Shared patent Family -0.5350*** -0.5070*** 
 (0.1579) (0.1663) 
Focal Patent originality -1.8362*** -1.6799*** 
 (0.4500) (0.4449) 
Focal Patent Number of Comp. -0.0007 -0.0005 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Focal Lead=Focal Pat -0.6162*** -0.6080*** 
 (0.1437) (0.1506) 
Citing NPL Scientific 0.1226 0.0984 
 (0.1163) (0.1192) 
Bwd cits 0.4640*** 0.4670*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0725) 
fwd cited 0.0046 0.0036 
 (0.0059) (0.0059) 
Cited Patent Originality 0.3000 0.1797 
 (0.4848) (0.4881) 
Num. Comp. of cited Patent 0.0005 0.0013 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Focal Lead=Cited Patent 0.1734 0.2290 
 (0.1794) (0.2134) 
Succ in ATC 1.2952*** 1.0039*** 
 (0.2512) (0.2625) 
R&D competition in ATC -0.0825 -0.0391 
 (0.0645) (0.0668) 
Failure Ratio -1.0141*** -0.9813*** 
 (0.2306) (0.2344) 
Breadth of firm activities 0.8277** 0.8091** 
 (0.3384) (0.3418) 
Constant -1.7576** -2.0055*** 
 (0.7569) (0.7665) 
Observations 3568 3568 
Pseudo R2 0.3239 0.3457 
log Lik. -1600.6820 -1548.9970 
Chi squared 1928.4928 2140.3781 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
Results of logit for Success and Failures and include  25 year and 87 ATC classes 
dummies. 
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Table 4.13: Estimations for experiential and vicarious learning on ATC. Time 
restriction 
 Model 1 Model 22 
Self Same ATC Failed  -0.0403 
  (0.2557) 
NO Self Same ATC Failed  0.2800 
  (0.1870) 
Self Different ATC Failed  -0.4706* 
  (0.2627) 
No Self Different ATC Failed  -0.7904*** 
  (0.1775) 
Self Same ATC success  1.4817*** 
  (0.2984) 
No Self Same ATC Success  0.9820*** 
  (0.1539) 
Self Different ATC Success  0.2361 
  (0.2906) 
No Self Different ATC Success  0.1287 
  (0.1495) 
Self Same ATC Ongoing  -0.4513 
  (0.2995) 
No Self Same ATC Ongoing  -0.1596 
  (0.1886) 
Self Different ATC Ongoing  -0.6671*** 
  (0.2575) 
No Self Different ATC Ongoing  -0.2868 
  (0.1810) 
Cited before outcome -0.6705*** -0.4064*** 
 (0.1414) (0.1553) 
Num Indication 0.2633*** 0.2653*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0266) 
Num ATC classes 0.9385** 0.9199* 
 (0.4730) (0.5098) 
Num Patent Family 0.5520*** 0.5771*** 
 (0.1500) (0.1534) 
Shared patent Family -0.5200*** -0.4966*** 
 (0.1593) (0.1681) 
Focal Patent originality -1.8332*** -1.6822*** 
 (0.4590) (0.4578) 
Focal Patent Number of Comp. -0.0007 -0.0004 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) 
113 
 
Focal Lead=Focal Pat -0.6355*** -0.6323*** 
 (0.1428) (0.1509) 
Citing NPL Scientific 0.1102 0.0757 
 (0.1175) (0.1206) 
Bwd cits 0.4590*** 0.4456*** 
 (0.0610) (0.0725) 
fwd cited 0.0053 0.0042 
 (0.0061) (0.0060) 
Cited Patent Originality 0.3290 0.1846 
 (0.4829) (0.4797) 
Num. Comp. of cited Patent 0.0004 0.0014 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Focal Lead=Cited Patent 0.2186 0.2602 
 (0.1737) (0.2089) 
Succ in ATC 1.3260*** 1.0747*** 
 (0.2578) (0.2670) 
R&D competition in ATC -0.0961 -0.0499 
 (0.0653) (0.0667) 
Failure Ratio -1.0009*** -0.9546*** 
 (0.2303) (0.2354) 
Breadth of firm activities 0.8483** 0.8139** 
 (0.3385) (0.3454) 
Constant -1.6889** -1.9843** 
 (0.7638) (0.7831) 
Observations 3568 3568 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3274 0.3562 
log Lik. -1592.2983 -1524.1035 
Chi squared 1914.9722 2045.0624 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by firm); * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 25 year 
and 87 ATC dummies 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
The knowledge that both failures and success convey is of paramount 
importance in the drug development process due to knowledge advancements 
and spillovers that can benefit the focal as well as competing firms (Hoetker & 
Agarwal, 2007). Although prior studies have stressed the role of balancing 
learning from failures and success (Levinthal & March, 1993) empirical 
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research has focused, with few exceptions (Madsen & Desai., 2010; Magazzini 
et al., 2012) on benefits generated from failures (Desai, 2015; Haunschild and 
Sullivan, 2002; Eggers, 2014). This study extends our understanding of 
learning from failures and successes by examining the effect that learning from 
previous failed or successful drug developments efforts has on the success rate 
of related subsequent projects. It compares the roles of firms’ experiential 
learning with that of vicarious learning from other firms’ prior related drug 
development efforts. The pharmaceutical industry provides an interesting 
setting as failures and successes are generally disclosed, while the high 
propensity to patent and the fact that drug development projects relate to 
specific patents allow to identify linkages between projects through patent 
citations.  
We find that both prior success in related drug development efforts of the 
focal firm and prior success of other firms positively affect the probability of 
success of subsequent drug development efforts. Contrary to common wisdom 
on learning from failures, our findings suggest that prior failures lead to a 
greater likelihood that firms fail again in their drug development efforts with a 
similar pattern observed for other firms’ prior failures. For both learning from 
success and failures, direct experiential learning effects are larger than 
vicarious learning effects. 
We offer a number of potential explanations for these findings. First, the 
results point to a degree of inertia in firms’ drug development strategies when 
failing in R&D. In the pharmaceutical industry, firms specialize in therapeutic 
areas, and previous investments and cumulated knowledge may lead to 
escalating commitments and reluctance to withdraw from a development 
trajectory, in particular in the context of high expected, although very 
uncertain, returns (Maslach, 2016; Nerkar & Roberts, 2004). One illustration is 
Eli Lilly, which embarked on further trials for its Sola drug although having 
experienced two previous failures in Phase III trials. Given the high investment 
sustained, one possible explanation of why failures drive further failures is that 
pharmaceutical firms may tend to replicate previous trajectories since the costs 
of starting projects, or diversify them in related indications within the same 
ATC-3 or through the reuse of the same patents, are lower. Thus firms may 
have incentives to start new projects even though they are likely to fail. This 
explanation is further supported by the findings that the patterns of prior 
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failures and following failures are only visible for drug development projects 
sharing the same ATC and the finding that projects sharing the same patent 
family are more likely to fail, pointing to higher failures when firms are 
expected to face lower costs. Results show that firms tend to learn from 
success in the same ATC which point on one side to a resolved uncertainty of 
experimentation by the existence of previous success and on the other to 
possible imitations among pharmaceutical firms. On the other hand, firms 
encounter a higher probability of failure when they build on failures in 
different ATC since there may still be uncertainty about proper compounds to 
cure certain diseases.   
A second explanation is that pharmaceutical firms may continue with failed 
lines of research because the expected gains in case of success are very high, 
compensating the higher risk of failure. A marketable drug for the treatment of 
a disease for which a drug is still not available, as in the case of Alzheimer, 
can provide very high profits. Therefore, the higher risk associated with 
failures may be mitigated by the greater expected returns if the firm can market 
a drug that has no competitors in the market. In contrast, building on previous 
success, although increasing the probability of a positive outcome, is likely to 
implies more incremental rewards since there are already competing drugs in 
the market. This is in line with previous studies suggesting that being the first 
to introduce an innovative product on the market is positively associated with 
sales (Grabowski & Vernon, 1990; Roberts, 1999). In the pharmaceutical 
industry, managers select experimentation of compounds that are most 
promising, taking into account commercial considerations and the probability 
of success (Arora, 2009).  
We examined the power of this explanation by analyzing yearly sales for 
successful projects (10% of the total sample), distinguishing between projects 
building on previous failure versus and projects building on previous 
successes. Computations on drug sales launched since 2003 in the US based on 
IMS data, reveal that average yearly sales value in the US is 7.6% higher for 
drugs citing failures only (686 versus 638 million US dollars). While this is in 
line with expectations, the magnitude of this difference is too small to consider 
this a major explanation for the observed patterns.  
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A last explanation for firms' behavior in building on previous failures is 
that there is no treatment of certain diseases on the market, such that as a 
consequence pharmaceutical firms experimenting on the cure of these disease 
have no other choice than building further on previous failures. In these 
circumstances, failures may give insights about the possible causes of what 
went wrong in previous experimentation but do not narrow down many other 
alternatives that the firms need to search through before finding the right route. 
Hence, failure may lead to subsequent failure.  
The explanations presented are drawn mainly on technical reasons that lead 
firms to suspend or discontinue their projects. However, firms strategic 
decisions related to competition may also play a role and need further 
investigation.  
Although these explanations may be part of the answer for the patterns 
observed, our results also suggest further research on alternative explanations 
on the incentives for building on previous failures. We note that the absence of 
a significant negative effect of learning from failures for projects that share the 
same ATC suggests that positive learning effects may occur for the most 
related projects, but may be outweighed by cost considerations. 
Our study contributes to the organizational learning theory by 
demonstrating that pharmaceutical firms have the possibility to improve 
significantly their performance if they build on prior successes, while our 
results also emphasize the difficulties in learning from failures. Our study 
provides a different perspectives on the finding by Magazzini et al., (2012) 
showing that failed projects receive more patent citations and highlight that the 
fact that patented compounds are followed up in future related drug 
development does not mean that the knowledge they convey increases the 
probability of success. 
Our study informs the policy debate on the advantages and disadvantages 
of enforcing disclosure on the reasons for unsuccessful trials. Recognizing the 
value of information from clinical trials, the FDA has released in 2007 an 
Amendment Act to include the results of trials of successful drug in public 
registers. Along these lines, in September 2016 the FDA has extended this Act 
(FDAAA801) by requiring the submission of results information for trials of 
unapproved products. Our findings indicate that these new regulations may be 
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helpful. If firms have a better understanding of the reasons behind other firms’ 
prior failures, they may fail less in their subsequent drug development.  
This study also presents limitations. The design of this study enables us to 
capture only partially the mechanisms through which learning operates. 
Through the use of citations between focal patents underlying drug 
development projects, the analysis benefits from the understanding of which 
kind of prior research the focal firm builds on, but the analysis may not capture 
broader learning processes. Also, our analysis does not take into account the 
organizational context in which learning takes place (Argote and Todorova 
2007) nor how effectively knowledge disseminates across units involved in the 
experimentation process.  
Notwithstanding the findings of this study, additional research is necessary 
to improve our understanding of the complex relationship between previous 
success and failures and the performance of subsequent R&D projects. 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks and 
Direction for Future 
Research 
5.1 Summary of main findings 
This dissertation draws on, and contributes to, the innovation literature that 
conceives innovation as a search and recombination process based on 
cumulative experience and constrained by cognitive limitations, uncertainty 
and challenges of value appropriation. Although there has been a fruitful 
discussion on firms' search processes in the existing literature, the question of 
how the external environment influences firms' search process remains still 
underexplored (Katila & Chen, 2009, Leten et al., 2016). This dissertation 
contributes to a better understanding of the crucial role of environmental 
characteristics in shaping the direction and success of firms' search process 
through the studies presented in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  
Chapter 2 explores the process of search and knowledge recombination 
over the entire technological landscape. This chapter presents a new measure 
of the extent to which knowledge is combined in an unconventional way. 
Compared to existing measures, built on patent citations, the indicator 
presented in this chapter focuses on the actual combinations of knowledge 
components (proxied by USPTO patent classes) within inventions. The 
analysis uncovers that a large fraction of patents is based on conventional 
knowledge recombination, pointing towards local search. Inventions that build 
on more novel combinations are rare but also more cited. In particular, 
inventions that search in established frameworks but introduce a disruptive 
combination in their most creative effort. The correlation with existing novelty 
measures like ‘originality’ by Trajtenberg et al., (1997) and ‘new first 
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combinations’ by Verhoeven et al., (2016) is only weakly related, suggesting 
that they capture different dimensions of knowledge recombination.  
Chapter 3 analyzes how unfavorable economic conditions shape the search 
process that firms pursue. This chapter provides interesting insights relevant 
for debate on the pro-cyclicality or the counter-cyclicality of innovation. 
Results suggest that contractive phases of the business cycle are associated 
with more conventional recombination, signaling local search strategies. Firms 
respond asymmetrically to expansions and contractive phases of the sector 
business cycle showing overall a pro-cyclical trend both at the intensive (a 
decrease in unconventionality) and at the extensive margins (an overall 
decrease in the rate of patenting). This process is not uniform across the whole 
technological portfolio of firms but it is concentrated in firms’ core 
technologies. Moreover, not all firms retrench from explorative activities, but 
only financially constrained firms. 
Chapter 4 examines when and to what extent pharmaceutical firms learn 
from others' firms failures and success in their subsequent drug development 
efforts. Utilizing comprehensive and detailed information on pharmaceutical 
firms’ global drug development projects we find that projects that build on 
firms’ previous successful projects have a higher likelihood to generate 
marketable drugs, while building on prior failures reduces this likelihood. A 
similar pattern, though weaker in magnitude, is observed for drug development 
projects building on prior projects of other firms in their environment through 
vicarious learning. 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the studies presented in the 
dissertation. The studies confirm the tendency of firms to search mostly in 
local or familiar domains. Chapter 2 shows a general tendency towards local 
search through the recombination of knowledge according to established 
schemas. Chapter 3 shows that firms are sensitive to the contraction phases of 
the business cycle and respond by reducing more explorative search and the 
intensity of inventive activities in general. In addition, in Chapter 4 it was 
observed that local search, measured as drug development in existing or 
related ATC classes, can increase the likelihood of drug development success. 
The dissertation also contributes to the debate on the pay-off from local 
versus distant search (Gavetti, 2012; Winter, 2012). Prior studies have focused 
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on the implications of local or distant search processes on firms' competitive 
advantage and survival. Two main streams of literature have emerged. The 
first stream of literature highlights the myopic and cognitive biases driving 
firm activities. The second stresses the importance of introducing variety into 
organizational routines in order to mitigate the local-search trap. The studies in 
this dissertation are consistent with the notion of higher innovation rewards 
associated with distant search. Chapter 2 highlights that novel inventions that 
are based on established paradigms but at the same time introduce a disruptive 
combination are on average more cited. This finding confirms that local search 
with distant ‘jumps’ provides advantages in terms of technological impact. 
Chapter 4 shows that local search through the reuse of related ATC classes, 
while increasing the rate of drug development success, is also associated with 
relatively smaller marketing rewards. Markets requiring distant search may 
provide higher economic rewards, as no prior drugs are available, pushing 
firms to accept higher failure rates.  
5.2 Limitations and avenues for future research 
This dissertation is subjected to a number of limitations that open up 
possibilities for future research. First, the studies of this dissertation use patent 
data as main source of information about innovation. As recognized in the 
literature, patents data have the major drawback of capturing only successful 
inventions. Besides, they do not have a uniform value and not all sectors are 
equally patents intensive (Cohen et al., 2000). Yet, patents data reveal major 
and important innovations patterns.  
The citation approach used in Chapter 4 may be an imperfectly trace 
learning. The design of the study reported in Chapter 4 captures only partially 
the mechanisms through which the environment, via vicarious learning, shapes 
the search process. Nonetheless, citations helped in identifying the kind of 
prior research the focal firm builds in terms of prior projects, patents and 
scientific literature. 
A first avenue for research is in stream of literature on the origins and 
measurement of radical innovations (Fleming, 2001; Rosenberg, 1982; Ahuja 
& Lampert, 2001; Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010). This stream of literature 
discusses whether radical innovations originate from totally new knowledge or 
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from new combinations of existing knowledge. The most prominent view is 
that  "innovation combines components in a new way, or that it consists in 
carrying out new combinations" (Schumpeter, 1939, p.88). Empirical studies 
based on patent data have investigated the combination of technological and 
knowledge components within inventions, utilizing a number of different 
measures with the challenge to use patent information to delineate the 
boundaries of the recombination process. This stream of literature represents 
an interesting avenue for future work for refining and improving existing 
measures as well as provide a better understanding of their explanatory power. 
The measure proposed in Chapter 2 points in this direction. Recent efforts 
exploit text mining techniques that allow to capture technical and scientific 
components reported in patents (Magerman et al., 2010). Qualitative work 
would also provide a better understanding of the recombination process.  
A second avenue for future research deals with the investigation of the 
search process at the inventor level. While the overall strategy of firms is 
highly important in determining how inventive search is performed, individual 
inventors are at the core of inventions. Inventors with a diversified knowledge 
base may see promising routes of research that other don't notice. In addition, 
understanding the importance of diversity in an inventor team may contribute 
to the debate about the "fantastic four" or the "superman" role of the inventor 
in the search and recombination process (Taylor & Greve, 2006). Future 
research could inspire improved human resource practices conducive to 
different search strategies.  
Another area of research relates to the study of regulations in the 
pharmaceutical industry and their effects on the success of drug development. 
In September 2016 the FDA has extended a prior Act (FDAAA801) requiring 
the submission of results of trials of unapproved products. If this disclosure 
leads firms to have a better understanding of the reasons behind other firms’ 
prior failures, they may fail less in their subsequent drug development. 
Legislation that stimulates the development of orphan drugs may also 
influence the success rate in the pharmaceutical industry. Pammolli et al., 
(2011) highlight that since 1990 the R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical 
industry has decreased. Future research focusing on the learning effects of 
previous R&D efforts could assist in understanding this relative productivity 
decline in order to inspire remediating policy instruments. 
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A last avenue for future research is triggered by the unexpected finding in 
Chapter 2 that large firms are better at producing unconventional combinations 
compared to small firms. Further research would contribute to the debate on 
whether radical innovations are generated by large or small firms. Earlier 
studies have suggested that young firms develop breakthrough innovations 
(Henderson, 1993; Prusa & Schmitz, 1991). However, large firms are better at 
diversifying risks and have greater scale and scope advantages. The results in 
Chapter 2 go against this conventional view and call for further research 
investigating the role of size and incumbency in the inventive search process. 
Apart from organizational structure, further research may investigate whether 
and how large firms leverage a diversified technological base to combine deep 
competencies in core fields with knowledge from non-core fields. The debate 
might benefit from moving beyond a mere distinction based on size and 
incumbency and include a range of environmental factors that might drive 
search outside extant paradigms. 
The study discussed in Chapter 3 provides an interesting ground for future 
research. Firms postpone or hold back more unconventional innovation during 
downturns. However, they may also become more efficient in selecting the 
most promising projects discontinuing those that have a lower value or that are 
eventually more incremental. This would be an important aspect to consider 
for the design and implementation of innovation policies. The study in Chapter 
3 uses as proxy of impact the forwards citations. However, it would be 
interesting to provide deeper insights about other measures of firms 
performances (Tobin's Q ratio for example) in order to understand the 
premium of firms that either don't cut back in R&D or un novelty. As common 
practice in the literature, this study uses industry business cycle. Future works 
may complement the analysis with macro level shocks. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
A.1  Analytical derivation of the Unconventionality 
measure 
Teece et al. (1994) developed measures of relatedness and coherence for the 
diversification activities of firms. In the present study these measures are 
adapted to describe the diversification patterns in the knowledge space 
(Breschi et al., 2003; Nesta & Saviotti, 2005; Piscitello, 2005). Following 
Teece et al. (1994), let 1ikC  if invention k has membership in patent class i, 
and 0 otherwise. The number of inventions with membership in class i is 

k
iki Cn . It follows that the joint occurrence of each possible combination 
of subclasses within the same patent over the whole universe of USPTO 
patents granted in the previous five years is: 
jk
k
ikijt CCJ                                              (A.1) 
where Jijt provides the number of inventions having simultaneously 
membership in class i and class j. Raw counts of the number of inventions 
having membership in each couple of patent classes, however, cannot be taken 
directly as a measure of relatedness. Classes must be present at a rate greater 
than what one would expect if combinations were made at random. 
We first computed the conditional probability that a patent belongs to class 
i given that it also belongs to class j, P(i|j)=Jij/nj where nj represents the 
number of patents citing class j only. The main issue is that P(i|j) and P(j|i) are 
not equal as ni is different from nj. The fact that ni≠nj implies that Jij  increases 
with the relatedness of i and j, but also with ni and nj, the number of inventions 
having membership in each class of the couple determining potential 
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overestimations of the actual co-occurrence of the couple of classes in the same 
patent. 
We then benchmarked the observed number of co-occurrences against their 
expected number, had the combinatorial process followed a random process. 
We adjusted Jij  for the number of inventions that would appear in the couple ij 
under the null hypothesis that inventors combine patent classes at random. To 
operationalize the null hypothesis, the distribution of Jij must be derived by 
assuming that inventions are assigned to classes at random, call this random 
variable xij. Teece et al. (1994) identify the distribution of the random variable, 
but they do not derive it in their paper. For the sake of exposition, we derive 
the distribution in order to clarify the construction of the measure. This brief 
exposition is based on Bryce and Winter (2006). 
Draw a sample of size ni from the population of K multi-class inventions. 
Now draw another sample of size nj and observe xij, or the number of 
inventions that were also in the ni sample. The number of ways of selecting x 
inventions to fill x positions in sample nj is equivalent to the number of ways 
of selecting x from a total of ni inventors, or 





x
ni
.  
The number of ways of selecting inventions not receiving assignment to 
class i for the remaining (nj – x) positions in the nj sample is equivalent to the 
number of ways of selecting (nj – x) from a possible (K - ni) inventions, or 










xn
nK
j
i
. 
Then the number of possible permutations of the nj sample is the number of 
ways of combining a set of x inventions assigned to class i (ni) multiplied by 
(nj – x) inventions not assigned to class i, or: 
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





x
ni










xn
nK
j
i
42
.            (A.2) 
The number of different samples of size nj that can be drawn from K is 








jn
K
. The number of possible permutations of the nj sample divided by the 
number of ways of choosing a sample of size nj is the probability that x 
inventions from population K are assigned to both class i and class j. Thus, the 
number xij of inventions having membership in both class i and class j is a 
hypergeometric random variable with probability given by: 
 

























j
j
ii
ij
n
K
xn
nK
x
n
xXP                                                                  (A.3) 
whit mean
43
: 
   
K
nn
XE
ji
ijij                                                               (A.4)
       
                                                          
42 Since sample nj was fixed as the number of inventions in class j, inventions assigned to class i in 
this quantity are de facto also assigned to class j. 
43 Since sample nj was fixed as the number of inventions in class j, inventions assigned to class i in 
this quantity are de facto also assigned to class j. 
43For intuition of the mean, assume that nj inventions in K have been assigned to class j. Now 
randomly assign inventions in K to class i. The probability that any one invention receives a class i 
assignment is K
ni
. Since there are nj inventions in K, each with probability K
ni
 of being assigned 
to class i, the expected number of inventions assigned to both class i and class j is 






K
n
n ij
. 
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 and variance: 

















1
12
K
nK
K
n ji
ijij                                                                (A.5) 
The difference between Jij and the expected value of the random variable, 
provides the basis for the final measure of conventionality in combinations: 
ij
ijij
ij
J





                (A.6) 
where the difference between the observed and the expected occurrence of 
the couple of classes (Jij-μij) is divided by the standard deviation of the 
observed incidence. When this difference is positive and large, it indicates that 
the combination of pairs of patent classes in multi-class inventions is 
systematic, typical or conventional. Thus, large values of the difference are 
associated to couple of classes-subclasses that are systematically recombined 
together and over-represented in the sample, hence based on local search 
strategies. On the other hand, small or even negative values of this difference 
indicates that unexpectedly few inventions have successfully combined the 
focal couple, suggesting that the combination thereof is not systematic, 
unconventional or unconventional pointing to search strategies that connect 
more distant pieces of knowledge.  
From (A.5), we can derive the degree of conventionality of the patent z, az, 
as the simple average of the measure τij for all combinations of technologies 
(i,j) whose the patent has membership.    
 


 

1
1 1
1 m
i
m
ij
ijz
n
alityonventionaInventionC 
,       (A.7) 
where n is the number of the patent’s subclass combinations and m is the 
combination index. For instance, if a patent has four subclasses, then m is 
equal to six, since this is the number of subclass combinations (4(4-1)/2). 
Hence, m=1, …, 6. We transform this measure by adding its minimum value 
128 
 
and taking the natural log plus 1. We finally multiply this measure by (-1) so 
that higher value are associated to novel combination of knowledge. 
 
 
A.2 Conventionality across years and technologicies 
Appendix A.2 details the Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 reported in Chapter 2. The 
tables reported in this Appendix show the distribution of conventionality 
across applications years for several technological categories. Consistently 
with  Table 2.2 in Chapter2, also these tables show a decrease in the level of 
conventionality over time.  
Table A.7 reports the summary statistics of conventionality distinguishing 
for the frequency of combinations occurring at the level of all technologies 
recombined within a single patent. This table shows that conventionality is 
lower for combinations that are rarely recombined. The standard deviation 
associated to technologies frequently recombined decrease with the use. This 
summary statistics may suggest  that combinations that rarely occur entail a 
higher level of risk that decreases with usage.  
Table A. 8  shows the average tau for the most representatives technologies 
at dyadic level. In particular, it shows the average conventionality resulted 
from the recombination of these technologies, i.e. Drug technology 
recombined with communication has a conventionality of 14.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
Table A.1: Conventionality over time in Drugs 
appyear mean sd N 
 
appyear mean sd N 
1980 38.753 30.486 3,986 
 
1991 29.026 23.425 7,941 
1981 36.530 28.270 4,231 
 
1992 28.884 22.047 9,138 
1982 37.713 27.534 4,458 
 
1993 32.727 28.661 10,872 
1983 36.862 26.412 4,408 
 
1994 35.249 31.244 14,850 
1984 37.164 28.587 5,263 
 
1995 39.507 35.379 22,989 
1985 36.030 29.189 5,677 
 
1996 24.365 20.976 13,921 
1986 32.774 23.127 5,906 
 
1997 29.615 26.635 17,417 
1987 32.605 25.267 6,583 
 
1998 26.697 22.937 16,844 
1988 32.304 26.536 6,924 
 
1999 28.439 24.967 19,220 
1989 32.185 26.761 7,595 
 
2000 32.275 29.086 20,569 
1990 30.958 25.702 7,913 
 
Tot 32.109 27.785 21,6705 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Conventionality over time in Computer Hardware & Software 
appyear mean sd N 
 
appyear mean sd N 
1980 60.131 40.057 2,618 
 
1991 40.416 29.572 5,945 
1981 57.551 39.645 2,884 
 
1992 37.436 29.482 6,035 
1982 58.140 43.561 3,059 
 
1993 35.567 26.540 6,772 
1983 51.605 39.039 2,888 
 
1994 33.918 27.256 9,217 
1984 52.560 39.474 3,232 
 
1995 33.241 28.583 12,288 
1985 51.014 38.060 3,282 
 
1996 30.128 30.607 13,265 
1986 48.342 35.540 3,594 
 
1997 27.867 24.977 15,902 
1987 48.471 33.889 4,318 
 
1998 24.615 22.120 16,478 
1988 46.880 33.607 4,973 
 
1999 24.256 22.964 18,969 
1989 45.810 32.123 5,213 
 
2000 25.568 27.456 21,896 
1990 42.732 31.091 5,816 
 
Total 34.318 30.950 168,644 
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Table A.3: Conventionality over time in Information Storage 
appyear mean sd N  appyear mean sd N 
1980 50.878 37.195 1,910  1991 32.309 25.716 4,368 
1981 49.308 35.254 2,038  1992 30.170 19.811 4,422 
1982 46.710 35.181 2,244  1993 29.949 24.235 4,921 
1983 43.543 34.797 1,978  1994 29.591 21.331 6,554 
1984 43.369 38.403 1,920  1995 29.646 22.626 7,530 
1985 39.738 32.967 2,272  1996 30.217 28.030 8,700 
1986 39.840 29.660 2,628  1997 29.704 25.545 11,433 
1987 39.873 28.519 2,967  1998 26.188 29.630 10,792 
1988 38.783 32.944 3,511  1999 25.628 27.936 11,444 
1989 37.312 30.315 3,536  2000 27.177 34.519 12,564 
1990 34.229 28.606 3,737  Total 31.759 29.479 111,469 
 
 
 
Table A.4: Conventionality over time Semiconductors 
appyear mean sd N  appyear mean sd N 
1980 45.314 26.277 1,269  1991 32.166 22.167 4,516 
1981 47.253 28.401 1,104  1992 31.028 19.051 4,422 
1982 45.261 26.849 1,182  1993 28.639 17.742 4,469 
1983 43.166 22.153 1,385  1994 29.595 19.306 5,684 
1984 44.217 28.556 1,638  1995 28.929 21.128 6,956 
1985 42.037 23.944 1,665  1996 28.322 21.560 7,176 
1986 41.281 23.610 1,812  1997 30.356 26.108 9,123 
1987 42.830 29.11 2,300  1998 27.902 23.290 9,516 
1988 40.805 25.218 3,212  1999 24.883 20.803 10,468 
1989 35.891 20.227 3,488  2000 24.104 23.523 11,366 
1990 32.721 19.249 3,963  Total 30.861 23.413 96,714 
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Table A.5: Conventionality over time in Material Processing & Handling 
Table A.6. Conventionality over time inMaterial Processing & Handling 
appyear mean sd N appyear mean sd N 
1980 51.117 37.185 5,983 1991 46.005 37.927 7,533 
1981 51.617 38.252 5,515 1992 45.935 39.840 7,247 
1982 51.392 38.417 5,452 1993 46.337 39.869 6,909 
1983 50.969 38.016 5,330 1994 48.794 40.848 7,148 
1984 52.898 39.417 5,559 1995 49.858 43.519 7,294 
1985 51.990 38.900 6,201 1996 52.338 43.796 7,360 
1986 49.709 37.231 6,220 1997 55.185 47.758 8,294 
1987 50.164 39.351 6,326 1998 54.303 49.084 7,759 
1988 47.881 37.377 6,926 1999 54.740 48.461 8,373 
1989 47.395 37.147 7,220 2000 55.632 53.123 8,607 
1990 45.250 34.312 7,238 Total 50.522 41.838 144,494 
 
 
 Table A.6: Conventionality over time in Communications 
 
 
 
 
 
appyear mean sd N  appyear mean sd N 
1980 54.019 40.681 3,677  1991 38.350 28.650 7,310 
1981 51.662 38.905 3,714  1992 36.604 27.544 7,696 
1982 51.394 38.157 3,753  1993 35.398 26.485 8,229 
1983 50.589 37.698 3,648  1994 33.889 27.291 10,563 
1984 48.161 35.214 3,836  1995 32.073 26.737 12,876 
1985 47.243 35.680 4,349  1996 30.026 25.499 14,737 
1986 47.344 37.834 4,588  1997 28.506 25.491 17,944 
1987 45.080 32.525 5,014  1998 26.562 24.877 19,054 
1988 44.198 34.240 5,638  1999 27.443 27.260 21,282 
1989 42.279 32.010 6,521  2000 28.570 31.718 23,108 
1990 40.139 29.127 6,854  Total 34.621 30.684 194,391 
132 
 
 
Table A.7: Summary statistics of Conventionality distinguishing for the frequency 
of combinations occurring at the couple level 
Frequency N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
≤ 5 29,190,002 44.08 62.355 -5.968 993.33 
> 5 17,765,275 47.027 51.971 -5.398 993.33 
This table shows that  the average Conventionality is lower for combinations that are rarely 
recombined together.  
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Table A.8: Distribution of Conventionality for the combination between the most representative technologies 
 
Tecnology definition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
1 
Agriculture, Food, 
Textiles   
71.729 35.792 39.788 66.888 73.050 32.064 32.403 69.597 36.485 53.205 40.174 47.309 
2 Organic Compounds 35.792 40.585 28.477 21.569 17.502 24.988 28.971 36.551 28.785 38.212 37.951 47.373 
3 Resins 39.788 28.477 37.335 16.681 23.699 17.857 27.226 28.436 30.202 27.272 19.411 27.727 
4 Communications 66.888 21.569 16.681 45.930 20.839 20.591 14.553 36.345 26.501 32.284 22.089 34.621 
5 
Computer Hardware 
& Software 
73.050 17.502 23.699 20.839 34.854 17.181 16.628 30.112 27.921 42.513 18.227 34.318 
6 Computer Peripherals 32.064 24.988 17.857 20.591 17.181 38.132 15.955 19.744 22.695 17.269 17.706 30.584 
7 Drugs 32.403 28.971 27.226 14.553 16.628 15.955 35.894 36.560 15.634 18.347 18.494 32.109 
8 Electrical Devices 69.597 36.551 28.436 36.345 30.112 19.744 36.560 61.261 36.716 37.674 27.971 44.266 
9 Nuclear & X-rays 36.485 28.785 30.202 26.501 27.921 22.695 15.634 36.716 68.781 40.754 25.165 37.891 
10  Power Systems 53.205 38.212 27.272 32.284 42.513 17.269 18.347 37.674 40.754 59.110 25.435 41.244 
11 
Semiconductor 
Devices 
40.174 37.951 19.411 22.089 18.227 17.706 18.494 27.971 25.165 25.435 34.774 30.861 
  
47.309 47.373 27.727 34.621 34.318 30.584 32.109 44.266 37.891 41.244 30.861  
Note: in contrast with Table 2.1 and 2.2, this table shows the average Conventionality for the combination occurring among the most 
representative technologies taking a coupling perspective which is the base for the construction of the measure. 
 Lowest Conventionality among the combination of technologies are n bold. The last column and row report the average at the invention level. 
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Appendix B 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix B: Additional analysis at firm level 
Appendix B reports extra analysis at the level of the firm. Tables B.1 and B.2  
show the trend in unconventionality at different lags of Real Output. 
Table B.3 reports the estimators at the firm level of overall patent production.  
In Table B.4 and B.5 we focus on the patent production by differentiating 
between low and high financially constrained firms. 
Table B.6 reports the estimations for the weighted unconventionality. This set 
of analysis has the objective to differentiate between intensive and extensive 
margins. Also in this set of analysis we differentiate between low and high 
financially constraints (Table B.8) and identify also firms that retrench from 
local search in innovation through a cut in R&D Table (B.7). 
 Table B indicates a cut in patent production during the contractive phases of 
the cycle (-0.262%).  Table B.7 shows that firm that cut in R&D may have a 
different sensitivity to the contractive period of the cycle. Table B.6 details the 
finding based on patent level analysis suggesting that the decrease in 
unconventionality is not due to a general decline at the extensive margins but 
also at the intensive.  
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Table B.1: Estimations for technological search over the business cycle. OLS models for the degree of Unconventionality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Real Output 0.0855***   0.0896*** 0.0865*** 0.0899*** 
 (0.0031)   (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Expansion  0.0165  -0.8865***  -0.7923*** 
  (0.1461)  (0.1492)  (0.1522) 
Contraction   0.8487**  1.6078*** 1.2091*** 
   (0.3791)  (0.3793) (0.3869) 
Citations -0.0103*** -0.0101*** -0.0101*** -0.0103*** -0.0103*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
no Bwd Cits -0.0171 0.0201 0.0199 -0.0173 -0.0180 -0.0179 
 (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
Components 0.2182*** 0.2182*** 0.2182*** 0.2182*** 0.2182*** 0.2182*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Team -0.0031*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0030*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Experience 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Concentration -0.1675*** -0.2139*** -0.2144*** -0.1715*** -0.1675*** -0.1711*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0358) 
Assignee Size 0.0007 0.0184*** 0.0182*** 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Constant -4.8803*** -4.0632*** -4.0622*** -4.9167*** -4.8876*** -4.9184*** 
 (0.0894) (0.0844) (0.0844) (0.0896) (0.0894) (0.0896) 
N 166168 166168 166168 166168 166168 166168 
R2 0.1728 0.1690 0.1690 0.1730 0.1729 0.1730 
Standard errors in parenthes* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The models report the results of the Ordinary Least Square on the median value of the degree of novelty in patents. Models include 20 year, 36 technology 
and sector dummies. Models also include controls (dummies) for missing information about backward citations. All models include firm fixed effects. 
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Table B.2: Estimations for technological search over the business cycle.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Real Output 0.0925***   0.0956*** 0.0935*** 
 (0.0033)   (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Expansion t-2  -0.3280**  -0.9230***  
  (0.1414)  (0.1426)  
Contraction t-2   1.6834***  2.2731*** 
   (0.3938)  (0.3933) 
Citations -0.0103*** -0.0100*** -0.0101*** -0.0101*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
no Bwd Cits -0.0178 0.0208 0.0199 -0.0170 -0.0185 
 (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
Components 0.2182*** 0.2182*** 0.2183*** 0.2181*** 0.2182*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Team -0.0030*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0030*** -0.0030*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Experience -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Concentration -0.1724*** -0.2158*** -0.2133*** -0.1759*** -0.1710*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0358) 
Assignee  0.0002 0.0187*** 0.0182*** 0.0005 -0.0002 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Constant -4.9450*** -4.0624*** -4.0614*** -4.9722*** -4.9522*** 
 (0.0898) (0.0844) (0.0844) (0.0899) (0.0898) 
N 166168 166168 166168 166168 166168 
R2 0.1730 0.1690 0.1691 0.1732 0.1732 
Standard errors in parenthes* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B.3 : Estimations for Patent Production over the business cycle.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 ln_pat ln_pat ln_pat 
Real Output 0.2979*** 0.3015*** 0.2984*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0196) (0.0200) 
    
Expansion 0.2108  0.6397 
 (0.7732)  (0.8024) 
    
Contraction  2.8418* 3.1839** 
  (1.5399) (1.5986) 
    
Concentration -0.6384*** -0.6360*** -0.6371*** 
 (0.0649) (0.0649) (0.0649) 
    
R&D Intensity 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
    
No R&D Intensity 0.1370* 0.1327* 0.1314 
 (0.0804) (0.0804) (0.0804) 
    
Size 0.6914*** 0.6931*** 0.6932*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0323) 
    
KZ 0.0244 0.0252 0.0250 
 (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0205) 
    
Cons -3.5944*** -3.6327*** -3.6062*** 
 (0.2727) (0.2706) (0.2727) 
N 6080 6080 6080 
R2 0.8616 0.8617 0.8617 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The models report the results of the OLS on the natural logarithm of the patent count by 
firm and Year. Models include 20 year and sector dummies including also controls 
(dummies) for missing information on the number of employees, sales and R&D. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. This analysis is built on the same dataset used in the main set 
of regressions but the observations have been now collapsed by firm and Year. Drawing 
on Fabrizio and Tsolmon (2014) we use the Ln Real Output at time t and t-1. Results show 
a pro-cyclical trend. 
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Table B.4: Estimations for patent production based on R&D cut. 
 Cut in R&D Non Cut in R&D  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 ln_pat ln_pat 
Real Output 0.4015*** 0.2700*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0247) 
   
Expansion -0.6989 1.5572 
 (1.3076) (1.0321) 
   
Contraction 3.8692* 2.1455 
 (1.9827) (2.8301) 
   
Concentration -0.7114*** -0.6107*** 
 (0.1089) (0.0812) 
   
R&D Intensity -0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) 
   
No R&D Intensity 0.3023*** -0.0284 
 (0.1164) (0.1124) 
   
Size 0.7065*** 0.7042*** 
 (0.0480) (0.0449) 
   
KZ 0.0454 0.0012 
 (0.0305) (0.0280) 
   
Constant -3.0960*** -3.3312*** 
 (0.4563) (0.3178) 
N 2567 3513 
R2 0.8666 0.8566 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The models report the results of the OLS on the natural logarithm of the patent 
count by firm and Year. Models include 20 year and sector dummies including 
also controls (dummies) for missing information on the number of employees, 
sales and R&D. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  Drawing on Fabrizio and 
Tsolmon (2014) we use the Ln Real Output at time t and t-1. Results show a pro-
cyclical trend. 
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Table B.5: estimations for patent production bases on Kaplan Zingales.  
 Low KZ High KZ 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 ln_pat ln_pat 
R Output 0.2374*** 0.4245*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0340) 
   
Expansion -0.0795 0.3833 
 (0.9944) (1.5021) 
   
Contraction 2.7977 4.7082* 
 (2.0786) (2.7169) 
   
Concentration -0.5903*** -0.7097*** 
 (0.0859) (0.1145) 
   
R&D Intensity 0.0001 0.0007** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
   
No R&D Intensity 0.3686*** -0.2714** 
 (0.1292) (0.1323) 
   
Size 0.7848*** 0.4861*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0606) 
   
Constant -3.3013*** -3.1532*** 
 (0.3355) (0.4284) 
N 3973 2107 
R2 0.8781 0.8739 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The models report the results of the OLS on the natural logarithm of the 
patent count by firm and Year. Models include 20 year and sector dummies 
including also controls (dummies) for missing information on the number of 
employees, sales and R&D. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  Drawing 
on Fabrizio and Tsolmon (2014) we use the Ln Real Output at time t and t-1. 
Results show a pro-cyclical trend. 
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Table B.6: Estimation for the weighted conventionality.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Real Output 0.3351*** 0.3351*** 0.3354*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0247) (0.0252) 
    
Expansion -0.4312  -0.0615 
 (0.9728)  (1.0098) 
    
Contraction  2.7773 2.7444 
  (1.9379) (2.0119) 
    
Concentration -0.9587*** -0.9577*** -0.9575*** 
 (0.0817) (0.0817) (0.0817) 
    
R&D Intensity 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
    
No R&D Intensity 0.1538 0.1488 0.1489 
 (0.1011) (0.1012) (0.1012) 
    
Size 0.7575*** 0.7590*** 0.7590*** 
 (0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0406) 
    
KZ 0.0335 0.0340 0.0340 
 (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0259) 
    
Constant -5.7054*** -5.7130*** -5.7156*** 
 (0.3432) (0.3406) (0.3432) 
N 6080 6080 6080 
R2 0.8417 0.8418 0.8418 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Table B.7:  Estimations for the weighed conventionality based on tut in R&D. 
 Cut in R&D  Non Cut in R&D  
 Model 1 Model 2) 
Real Output 0.4596*** 0.2980*** 
 (0.0477) (0.0311) 
   
Expansion -1.5236 0.9264 
 (1.6509) (1.2957) 
   
Contraction 4.1415* 0.3262 
 (2.5032) (3.5531) 
   
Concentration -1.0719*** -0.9118*** 
 (0.1375) (0.1019) 
   
R&D Intensity -0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) 
   
No R&D Intensity 0.3694** -0.0533 
 (0.1469) (0.1412) 
   
Size 0.7689*** 0.7739*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0564) 
   
KZ 0.0556 0.0081 
 (0.0385) (0.0352) 
   
Constant -5.5354*** -5.3852*** 
 (0.5761) (0.3990) 
N 2567 3513 
R2 0.8421 0.8409 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table B.8;  Estimations for the weighed conventionality based on . 
 Low KZ High 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Real Output 0.2763*** 0.4579*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0441) 
   
Expansion -0.8714 -0.3420 
 (1.2426) (1.9454) 
   
Contraction  2.1975 4.3100 
 (2.5975) (3.5188) 
   
Concentration -0.9171*** -1.0209*** 
 (0.1073) (0.1483) 
   
R&D Intensity -0.0000 0.0010** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
   
No R&D Intensity 0.4571*** -0.3295* 
 (0.1615) (0.1713) 
   
Size 0.8618*** 0.5124*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0784) 
   
Constant -5.4371*** -5.4096*** 
 (0.4193) (0.5548) 
N 3973 2107 
R2 0.8603 0.8527 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix C 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
This section presents additional regression tables that validate the findings 
discussed in Chapter 4 and rule out alternative explanations.  
Table C.1 uses the same model specification of Table 4.10 but includes 
firm dummies in order to exclude potential trends at the level of the firm. This 
specification was not preferred as our base model because the inclusion of firm 
fixed effects leads to the necessary omission of firms with only one project in 
the sample. The number of observations drops by about 1000. The results on 
the learning variables are consistent with findings reported in Chapter 4. All in 
all, citing previous failure (Self and Non Self) increases the incidence of 
failure with the coefficient of Self being larger. A contrasting pattern is shown 
for building further on previous Success. The coefficient of citing others’ 
success and failure and ongoing projects, significant at p<0.1 in Table 4.10 is 
not significant when we include firm dummies.  
Table C.2 uses the same specification of Table 4.11 with the inclusion of 
timing restriction on the citation patterns. Overall results are consistent with 
what shown in Table 4.11 although with smaller coefficients and lack of 
significance for the variables of citing previous ongoing projects. 
Table C.3 provides insights into the effects of the reuse of the same patent 
on the likelihood of success. In this model specification learning derive from 
previous R&D projects and from prior started same-patent projects (set of 
dummies for Prior Self/Non Self with same Family). We also include a control 
for the number of projects sharing the same patent that are initiated 
simultaneously Num. Sim. Projs. Overall the results are consistent with 
learning generated from building on previous projects only. In particular Self 
Failure and Self Ongoing in prior same family reduce the chances of success of 
the focal projects. Prior Success in the same Family instead increase the 
likelihood of success especially for prior Success by other firms. The 
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coefficients for prior failures by other firms is statistically significant and is 
positively associated with success of the focal projects.  
Table C.4 uses the same specification of Table C.3 but the independent 
variables are built on the restricted version that, for the set of independent 
variables of focal building on previous projects, doesn't consider the links to 
previous projects terminated after the focal. These cases are captured by the 
dummy "focal terminated before cited". Also the restricted models give to an 
important extent similar results for prior projects using the same family. These 
results emphasize that building on multiple patents having similar 
characteristics reduces the likelihood of success. This patterns may also 
suggest that firms may use previous similar patents to reduce costs.  
Table C.5 reports results of a multinomial logit model that includes the 
category of ongoing project in the dependent variable. In particular, our 
dependent variable includes the following categories: Success and Failures as 
defined in Section 4.3 and Ongoing projects. For Ongoing project we note that 
31.63% of these projects didn't reported any update regarding the development 
process for more than 10 years. Hence, we also treat the different ongoing 
projects separately by making a distinction between real ongoing projects 
(11.32%), reporting a recent update on status, and Suspicious ongoing whose 
last update on the development phase is before 1995. Results show that for the 
Success category, showed in the last column, the incidence of success is driven 
by building on previous success (self/Non Self) while failures decrease this 
incidence. The coefficients have similar magnitude to those showed in our 
baseline logit models. 
Table C.6 reports the frequencies in the three models that are used in the 
supplementary regression analysis reported in Table C.7. This set of 
regressions employs several different timing of citations patterns to ensure 
robustness of inferences to different time window and to check possible 
variations and different learning mechanisms. 
In particular, as shown in Figure C.1, in Model 1 we consider the citations 
to projects that have reached their outcome before the starting date of the focal 
project. In Model 2 the focal project starts before the outcome date of the cited 
project but ends after, whereas in Model 3 the focal project starts and reaches 
its final status before the outcome date of the cited. Since a focal project can 
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cite multiple related projects the inclusion of the focal in one of the timing 
restriction is not exclusive. As it is possible to note the likelihood of success 
from building on previous related success increase in Model 1 when the focal 
project relies on at least one related projects that has been marketed, knowing 
in this way the final outcome before starting the experimentation. Also citing 
previous failure (Self/Non Self) has a smaller negative coefficient in Model 1 
compared  to Model 3. 
In non reported analysis, we also account for potential learning from 
collaboration with other firms by controlling for potential other firms 
(licensors and licensees) involved in the project. Results for the main variable 
of interest remain, while the involvement of other firms increased the 
likelihood of success in line with prior studies stressing the role of alliances in 
increasing the probability of project success (Danzon et al., 2005; Hoang et al., 
2010). 
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Table C.1:: Estimations for experiential and vicarious learning on project status 
fixed effect 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Cites Self Failure  -0.8338** 
  (0.3304) 
Cites Others' Failure  -0.5545** 
  (0.2215) 
Cites Self Success  0.6542* 
  (0.3473) 
Cites. Others' Success  0.4876** 
  (0.2095) 
Cites Self Succ.&Failure  0.0055 
  (0.2991) 
Cites Others' Sucs.&Failure  -0.3107 
  (0.2604) 
Cites Self Ongoing  -0.7137 
  (0.4975) 
Cites Others' Ongoing  -0.3820 
  (0.2999) 
Num Indication 0.2994*** 0.2986*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0359) 
Num ATC classes 0.6092 0.7442 
 (0.5935) (0.6166) 
Num Patent Family 0.7780*** 0.8353*** 
 (0.1459) (0.1496) 
Shared patent Family -0.2617 -0.2344 
 (0.1598) (0.1643) 
Focal Patent originality -1.4995** -1.2391** 
 (0.6138) (0.6222) 
Focal Patent Number of Comp. -0.0014* -0.0013* 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Focal Lead= Focal Pat -0.4782*** -0.4568*** 
 (0.1512) (0.1530) 
Citing NPL Scientific 0.2416 0.2344 
 (0.1674) (0.1703) 
Bwd cits 0.4835*** 0.4847*** 
 (0.0846) (0.0925) 
fwd cited 0.0023 0.0012 
 (0.0091) (0.0093) 
Cited Patent Originality -0.3821 -0.4892 
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 (0.6824) (0.6874) 
 
Num. Comp. of cited Patent 
 
-0.0010 
 
0.0000 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) 
Focal Lead-Cited Patent 0.1876 0.4042 
 (0.2120) (0.2524) 
Same ATC focal-cited 0.2982** 0.3246* 
 (0.1366) (0.1729) 
Succ in ATC 1.5248*** 1.3410*** 
 (0.3551) (0.3663) 
R&D competition in ATC -0.0071 0.0245 
 (0.0741) (0.0752) 
Failure Ratio 3.2947*** 3.3365*** 
 (0.5355) (0.5411) 
Breadth of firm activities 5.7370 6.2945 
 (18.1048) (18.0917) 
Constant -4.0579 -4.9941 
 (15.4220) (15.4074) 
Observations 2721 2721 
Pseudo R
2
 0.4163 0.4286 
log Lik. -1058.8472 -1036.5508 
Chi squared 1510.4974 1555.0901 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Logit model for Success and Failures. Models include 25 year, 87 
ATC classes and  Firm dummies. 
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Table C.2:  Estimations for experiential and vicarious learning on project status 
fixed effect. Time restriction. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Cites Self Failure  -0.6571* 
  (0.3462) 
Cites Others' Failure  -0.2636 
  (0.2357) 
Cites Self Success  1.3381*** 
  (0.4533) 
Cites. Others' Success  0.7567*** 
  (0.2373) 
Cites Self Success and 
Failure 
 0.2692 
  (0.3136) 
Cites Others' Success and 
Failure 
 -0.1553 
  (0.2747) 
Cites Self Ongoing  -0.5849 
  (0.4998) 
Cites Others' Ongoing  -0.2340 
  (0.3099) 
Project before cited outcome -1.1175*** -1.0284*** 
 (0.2212) (0.2600) 
Num Indication 0.2966*** 0.2961*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0356) 
Num ATC classes 0.4833 0.5903 
 (0.5887) (0.6073) 
Num Patent Family 0.7676*** 0.7930*** 
 (0.1465) (0.1491) 
Shared patent Family -0.2702* -0.2958* 
 (0.1615) (0.1663) 
Focal Patent originality -1.4609** -1.2494** 
 (0.6140) (0.6212) 
Focal Patent Number of 
Comp. 
-0.0013* -0.0013 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Focal Lead=Focal Pat -0.4795*** -0.4428*** 
 (0.1529) (0.1548) 
Citing NPL Scientific 0.2078 0.1859 
 (0.1688) (0.1707) 
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Bwd cits 
 
0.4519*** 
 
0.4214*** 
 (0.0852) (0.0937) 
fwd cited 0.0017 0.0004 
 (0.0091) (0.0093) 
Cited Patent Originality -0.4562 -0.4367 
 (0.6870) (0.6937) 
Num. Comp. of cited Patent -0.0012 -0.0003 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Focal Lead=Cited Patent 0.2102 0.2800 
 (0.2152) (0.2511) 
Same ATC focal-cited 0.4639*** 0.4211** 
 (0.1418) (0.1784) 
Succ in ATC 1.5526*** 1.4107*** 
 (0.3578) (0.3671) 
R&D competition in ATC -0.0405 -0.0124 
 (0.0749) (0.0761) 
Failure Ratio 3.3817*** 3.4071*** 
 (0.5377) (0.5427) 
Breadth of firm activities 2.4790 1.8724 
 (18.5782) (18.3691) 
Constant -0.8002 -0.6359 
 (15.8819) (15.6773) 
Observations 2721 2721 
Pseudo R
2
 0.4239 0.4360 
log Lik. -1045.1413 -1023.1270 
Chi squared 1537.9092 1581.9378 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Logit model for Success and Failures. Models include 25 year, 87 ATC classes and  
Firm dummies 
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Table C.3:: : Estimations for experiential and vicarious learning on project status. 
PATENT REUSE 
 Model 1 Model  
   
Cites Self Failure  -0.6007** 
  (0.2620) 
Cites Others' Failure  -0.4933** 
  (0.2006) 
Cites Self Success  1.0581*** 
  (0.2504) 
Cites. Others' Success  0.3006* 
  (0.1716) 
Cites Self Succ.&Failure  0.2686 
  (0.2494) 
Cites Others' Succ. & Failure  -0.3530 
  (0.2185) 
Cites Self Ongoing  -0.6985** 
  (0.3478) 
Cites Others' Ongoing  -0.4236* 
  (0.2378) 
Prior Self Fail Same Fam  -0.4258 
  (0.3558) 
Prior No Self Fail Same Fam  0.7721** 
  (0.3630) 
Prior Self Succ Same Fam  1.2523** 
  (0.6258) 
Prior No Self Succ Same 
Fam 
 1.8612*** 
  (0.5124) 
Prior Self Ong.Same Fam  -0.8870** 
  (0.4171) 
Prior No Self Ong. Same 
Fam 
 0.9178** 
  (0.3960) 
Num Sim Proj -0.8801*** -1.1482*** 
 (0.2609) (0.2517) 
Num Indication 0.2624*** 0.2551*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0258) 
Num ATC classes 0.9589** 1.0174** 
 (0.4711) (0.4864) 
Num Patent Family 0.6257*** 0.6395*** 
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 (0.1446) (0.1423) 
Shared patent Family -0.3987** -0.5978*** 
 (0.1611) (0.2104) 
Focal Patent originality -1.7542*** -1.3435*** 
 (0.4453) (0.4327) 
Focal Patent Number of 
Comp. 
-0.0006 -0.0005 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Focal Lead=Focal Pat -0.6130*** -0.5380*** 
 (0.1450) (0.1446) 
Citing NPL Scientific 0.0996 0.1023 
 (0.1157) (0.1191) 
Bwd cits 0.4230*** 0.3973*** 
 (0.0609) (0.0685) 
fwd cited 0.0021 0.0017 
 (0.0059) (0.0059) 
Cited Patent Originality 0.2571 0.1690 
 (0.4833) (0.4784) 
Num. Comp. of cited Patent 0.0004 0.0012 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) 
Focal Lead= Cited Patent 0.0620 0.0767 
 (0.1840) (0.2129) 
Same ATC focal-cited 0.3731*** 0.4062*** 
 (0.1016) (0.1228) 
Succ in ATC 1.2555*** 1.1719*** 
 (0.2598) (0.2862) 
R&D competition in ATC -0.0761 -0.0407 
 (0.0645) (0.0655) 
Failure Ratio -1.0135*** -1.0434*** 
 (0.2301) (0.2311) 
Breadth of firm activities 0.7932** 0.7906** 
 (0.3368) (0.3353) 
Constant -1.8176** -2.2249*** 
 (0.7736) (0.7634) 
Observations 3568 3568 
Pseudo R
2
 0.3304 0.3549 
log Lik. -1585.1867 -1527.2433 
Chi squared 2036.1545 2174.7218 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Logit model for Success 
and Failures. Models include 25 year, 87 ATC classes and  Firm dummies 
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Table C.4: : Estimations for experiential and vicarious learning on project status. 
PATENT REUSE. Time restriction 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Cites Self Failure  -0.4935* 
  (0.2721) 
Cites Others' Failure  -0.3355 
  (0.2062) 
Cites Self Success  1.6130*** 
  (0.3880) 
Cites. Others' Success  0.5077*** 
  (0.1952) 
Cites Self Success and Failure  0.4685* 
  (0.2593) 
Cites Others' Success and 
Failure 
 -0.2649 
  (0.2294) 
Cites Self Ongoing  -0.6764* 
  (0.3522) 
Cites Others' Ongoing  -0.3547 
  (0.2434) 
Prior Self Fail Same Fam  -0.5034 
  (0.3532) 
Prior No Self Fail Same Fam  0.6893* 
  (0.3649) 
Prior Self Succ Same Fam  1.1394* 
  (0.6640) 
Prior No Self Succ Same Fam  1.7342*** 
  (0.5353) 
Prior Self Ong.Same Fam  -0.9475** 
  (0.4234) 
Prior No Self Ong. Same Fam  0.8429** 
  (0.3904) 
Num Sim Proj -0.8916*** -1.1459*** 
 (0.2595) (0.2503) 
Num Indication 0.2611*** 0.2563*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0257) 
Num ATC classes 0.9392** 0.9611* 
 (0.4745) (0.4948) 
Num Patent Family 0.6114*** 0.6196*** 
 (0.1467) (0.1406) 
Shared patent Family -0.3838** -0.5510** 
 (0.1635) (0.2176) 
Focal Patent originality -1.7445*** -1.3669*** 
 (0.4527) (0.4533) 
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Focal Patent Number of Comp. -0.0006 -0.0004 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Focal Lead=Focal Pat -0.6335*** -0.5565*** 
 (0.1434) (0.1435) 
Citing NPL Scientific 0.0786 0.0797 
 (0.1173) (0.1175) 
Bwd cits 0.3987*** 0.3493*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0671) 
fwd cited 0.0018 0.0010 
 (0.0061) (0.0058) 
Cited Patent Originality 0.2854 0.2219 
 (0.4796) (0.4789) 
Num. Comp. of cited Patent 0.0002 0.0009 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Same Company Lead-Patent 0.0776 0.0177 
 (0.1799) (0.2098) 
Same ATC focal-cited 0.5030*** 0.4925*** 
 (0.1116) (0.1324) 
Succ in ATC 1.2748*** 1.2315*** 
 (0.2713) (0.2919) 
R&D competition in ATC -0.0921 -0.0585 
 (0.0656) (0.0665) 
Failure Ratio -0.9972*** -1.0176*** 
 (0.2292) (0.2294) 
Breadth of firm activities 0.8026** 0.7760** 
 (0.3367) (0.3333) 
Project before cited outcome -0.8727*** -0.7763*** 
 (0.1574) (0.1928) 
Constant -1.6786** -2.0898*** 
 (0.7874) (0.7881) 
Observations 3568 3568 
Pseudo R2 0.3360 0.3603 
log Lik. -1571.9455 -1514.5365 
Chi squared 2013.0377 2071.2262 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Logit model for Success 
and Failures. Models include 25 year, 87 ATC classes and  Firm dummies 
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Table C.5:  : Multinomial Logit 
    
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
 Self Failure  -0.4416**  -0.6190**  -0.7297*** 
  (0.2235)  (0.2834)  (0.2509) 
 Others' Failure  0.1888*  0.2776*  -0.4969*** 
  (0.1067)  (0.1625)  (0.1830) 
 Self Success  0.1236  0.2913  1.0141*** 
  (0.3194)  (0.3477)  (0.2438) 
Others' Success  0.1165  0.0029  0.3329** 
  (0.1335)  (0.1956)  (0.1596) 
Self Succ.&Fail  0.0417  -0.3501  0.0259 
  (0.2522)  (0.3614)  (0.2687) 
Others' 
Succ.&Fail 
 -0.0888  0.0776  -0.3141 
  (0.1847)  (0.2164)  (0.1958) 
 Self Ongoing  0.9029***  0.4039  -0.8348** 
  (0.2686)  (0.3619)  (0.3744) 
Others' Ongoing  0.0472  0.1603  -0.4045* 
  (0.1513)  (0.2055)  (0.2198) 
Num Indication -0.1619*** -0.1632*** 0.1013*** 0.1031*** 0.2573*** 0.2537*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0273) (0.0266) (0.0269) (0.0262) (0.0263) 
Num ATC 
classes 
0.4753 0.5059 1.1707** 1.1827* 0.8493** 0.8947** 
 (0.5890) (0.5848) (0.5958) (0.6162) (0.4127) (0.4166) 
Num Patent 
Family 
-0.3210* -0.3156* 0.8092*** 0.8200*** 0.5521*** 0.5875*** 
 (0.1681) (0.1673) (0.1515) (0.1508) (0.1393) (0.1372) 
Shared patent 
Family 
0.3963*** 0.4040*** -0.2127 -0.1801 -0.6151*** -0.5837*** 
 (0.0935) (0.0929) (0.1566) (0.1616) (0.1532) (0.1455) 
Focal Patent 
originality 
-0.1827 -0.2181 -0.2855 -0.3757 -1.5536*** -1.3892*** 
 (0.3554) (0.3668) (0.6347) (0.6321) (0.3694) (0.3667) 
Focal Number of 
Comp. 
-0.0011** -0.0011** -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Focal Lead= 
Focal Pat 
0.0690 0.0644 -0.0462 -0.0606 -0.5859*** -0.5859*** 
 (0.1107) (0.1081) (0.1327) (0.1326) (0.1332) (0.1337) 
Citing NPL 
Scientific 
0.1801* 0.1818* 0.5257** 0.5303** 0.0701 0.0595 
 (0.0949) (0.0942) (0.2062) (0.2087) (0.1135) (0.1148) 
Bwd cits -0.1402*** -0.1270** -0.1035 -0.1005 0.3866*** 0.4018*** 
 (0.0507) (0.0539) (0.0704) (0.0753) (0.0568) (0.0640) 
fwd cited 0.0055 0.0050 -0.0058 -0.0065 0.0040 0.0039 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0059) (0.0057) 
Cited Patent 
Originality 
-0.4224 -0.3710 0.6516 0.7077 -0.1853 -0.1904 
 (0.3186) (0.3113) (0.7109) (0.7087) (0.4287) (0.4220) 
Num. Comp. of -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0009 
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cited 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
Focal 
Lead=Cited 
Patent 
-0.0527 -0.0599 -0.1916 -0.0270 0.0020 0.0821 
 (0.1679) (0.1883) (0.2064) (0.2279) (0.1744) (0.2175) 
Same ATC focal-
cited 
0.0439 0.0042 0.0640 0.0399 0.3620*** 0.3707*** 
 (0.0818) (0.1006) (0.1214) (0.1373) (0.0961) (0.1156) 
Succ in ATC -1.0005*** -1.0340*** 0.9042** 0.9420** 1.1622*** 0.9508*** 
 (0.2778) (0.2777) (0.4570) (0.4614) (0.2698) (0.2686) 
R&D 
competition in 
ATC 
-0.2723*** -0.2761*** 0.3697*** 0.3743*** -0.0724 -0.0458 
 (0.0686) (0.0671) (0.0987) (0.0978) (0.0640) (0.0631) 
Failure Ratio -0.8413*** -0.8087*** -1.0340*** -0.9905*** -1.1033*** -1.0536*** 
 (0.1906) (0.1845) (0.2075) (0.2070) (0.2058) (0.2054) 
Breadth of firm 
activities 
-0.1522 -0.1660 -0.8482*** -0.8517*** 0.9126*** 0.8747** 
 (0.2545) (0.2534) (0.2869) (0.2888) (0.3492) (0.3448) 
Constant 10.202 0.9875 -5.3671*** -5.3898*** -1.4224* -1.6788** 
 (0.8942) (0.8904) -10.590 -10.639 (0.7284) (0.7178) 
Multinomial Logit. All models includes 7350 observations. The Pseudo R2 of Model 1 is 0.2450, of 
Model 2 is 0.2531. The base group is Failure. Standard errors clustered by Firm. No restriction 
applied on timing of citations. 
. 
Figure C.1: Models taking into account different timing 
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